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ABSTRACT

"The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle
with pieces that just don’t fit together" (Black, 1976). The purpose o f this study is to
examine the dividend phenomenon.
The first essay o f the dissertation investigates the origins, modifications and
adaptations of corporate dividend payments to shareholders. Contemporary theoretical
modeling to date has neglected to acknowledge the potential influence o f dividend
payment tradition in the formulation of dividend policy.
The second essay examines the evolution o f the theoretical attempts to explain
dividend policy and empirical tests of these theories.

The dividend paradigms are

divided into models formulated in states with full information, models developed in
states of informational asymmetries and models using behavioral rationales as the basis
for their development. The second essay concludes with an analysis to determine if
method o f analysis, frequency of sampling observation or sample period influence the
often contradictory results o f the analyses.
The dissertation’s third essay explores the executive compensation, dividend
policy and capital structure determination process. This essay extends existing research
on the policies in two ways. Firm level data is used here; many of the earlier works
use industry data. The study also seeks to determine if the policy choice interactions
implied by earlier work can be demonstrated using a system of equations.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

"The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle
with pieces that just don’t fit together" (Black, 1976). Although corporate dividend
policy has been analyzed by financial economists for over a century and intensely
studied for the last four decades, the theoretical models developed thus far are incapable
o f adequately explaining the continued existence of the phenomenon. The payment of
dividends is not in the economic best interests of the shareholder, even in the absence
of personal and corporate taxes. Despite this apparent economic absurdity, generous
dividends continue to be paid by corporations and the dividend decision remains a major
component of the corporate financial agenda. The purpose of this study is threefold;
(1) to examine the historical evolution of dividend policy and determine if the
evolutionary process can help explain the persistence of this practice, (2) to review
comprehensively the theoretical modeling of dividend policy by financial economists
and the empirical tests of the theories and (3) to examine the executive compensation,
dividend policy and capital structure determination process and analyze the nature and
significance of the associations between these three policy variables.
The first essay of the dissertation investigates the historical evolution of
corporate dividend payments to shareholders.

The literature lacks an extant

examination of the origins, modifications and adaptations of these distributions over
their three centuries of existence.

Contemporary theoretical modeling to date has
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neglected to acknowledge the potential influence o f dividend payment tradition in the
formulation of dividend policy.
Joint stock trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made
the first dividend payments.

These distributions to shareholders were complete

disbursements of profits and invested capital and terminated the venture’s existence.
The payments were soon limited to profits when shareholders and managers realized
that maintaining the company as a going concern was more economically efficient.
Dividend payments later became and continue today as token offerings o f profits and
earnings retained in earlier periods that are determined solely at the corporate
manager’s discretion.
The dissertation’s second essay systematically examines the evolution of the
theoretical attempts to explain dividend policy and empirical attempts to support these
theories. The modern era of theoretical dividend modeling began with the Miller and
Modigliani (1961) (M&M) irrelevance declaration. The majority of models developed
following the seminal work of M&M rely on market imperfections as their basis for
explaining dividend existence.
The dividend paradigms can be divided into models formulated in states with full
information, models developed in states o f informational asymmetries and models using
behavioral rationales as the basis for their development. In the full information setting,
theorists add the market imperfection o f taxes to the perfect market world o f M&M.
The signaling, agency costs and free cash flow hypotheses are all based on the
assumption that informational asymmetries arising from the separation o f corporate
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managers and owners precipitate the need for dividend payments to shareholders.
Behavioralists model dividends as a function of behavioral and psychological influences.
The second essay concludes with an examination of the empirical tests of
corporate dividend policy to determine if method of analysis, frequency of sampling
observation, sample period or journal of publication influence the often contradictory
results of the analyses. These components are commonly cited by researchers as the
cause of the often conflicting findings in tests of theoretical models. Categorical data
analysis methodology is employed to describe the structural relation between the
explanatory variables and the empirical results. The entire sample o f empirical studies
and the empirical tests of the information content o f dividend hypothesis are analyzed
to determine if choice of the method of analysis, data type and sample period influence
the results o f the studies.
The dissertation’s third essay explores executive compensation, dividend and
capital structure policy decisions.

The informational asymmetries and agency costs

resulting from the separation o f corporate management and owners can be reduced by
the simultaneous optimization o f compensation, dividend and capital structure policy
choices (Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 1992, Mehran, 1992 and Smith and Watts, 1992).
Compensation contracts can be designed to foster managerial activities that benefit the
corporation’s owners and managerial activities can be better monitored and excess cash
flows reduced by significant dividend and debt interest payments.
This essay extends existing research on the compensation, dividend and debt
policy determination process in two ways. This analysis uses firm level data; many of

the earlier works use industry level data. The study also seeks to determine if the
policy choice interrelation implied by previous work can be demonstrated using a
system o f equations.
Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution o f corporate dividend policy and the
evolution of dividend policy theories is reviewed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines the
determinants and interrelations of executive compensation, dividend policy and capital
structure policy choices. Chapter 5 has concluding remarks and suggested direction for
future research o f the dividend puzzle.

CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY

2.1 INTRODUCTION
Corporate dividend payments to shareholders began over three hundred years
ago and have continued as an acceptable if not required activity o f corporate managers
despite their apparent contradictory economic nature. The original payments to joint
stock company shareholders in Holland and Great Britain were liquidating distributions
of capital and profit that terminated the joint stock enterprise’s existence.

Later

payments were limited to the net profits of the undertakings that permitted more
efficient use of investment capital and gave the companies perpetual existence. More
recently, the payments have become symbolic liquidations solely determined by
managers; dividends are paid to shareholders from a combination of profits from the
current period and earnings retained in previous profitable periods. Although largely
symbolic, the continued importance o f a consistent and significant dividend payment to
maintain shareholder contentment remains a managerial priority. The purpose of this
chapter is to trace the historical evolution of corporate dividend policy.
Section 2.2 examines the early history of joint stock companies in Holland and
Great Britain and the origins of dividend payments and policies. Section 2.3 explores
the development of joint stock companies in Great Britain following the Bubble Act of
1720 and the dawn of corporate activity in the United States. Section 2.4 looks at the
rise of railroad corporations and the origins of preferred stock issues.
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Section 2.5

examines the rise of the industrial corporation in the United States following the Civil
War.

Section 2.6 analyses the meteoric rise o f equities in the third decade o f the

twentieth century and the subsequent crash while Section 2.7 investigates corporate
dividend policy over the past 50 years. The chapter closes with a brief summary.

2.2 EARLY JOINT STOCK COMPANIES: ORIGINS TO 1720
2.2.1 The Origin of the Modern Corporation
The embryonic origin o f the corporation—groups united for a common purpose—
can be traced to Greek and Roman times (Williston, 1888a). Precursors o f the modern
corporation were found in Italy where merchants o f the fourteenth century formed loose
federations for limited purposes (Scott, 1912). Cooperatives o f merchants and traders
appeared in Denmark at approximately the same time (Kindleberger, 1984).

These

coalitions became more specialized during the next two centuries (Scott, 1912).
In the first fifty years o f the sixteenth century, successful sailing captains began
selling "ventures on parts" in their voyages to investors. Parts were bought and sold
in the open market; by the end of the sixteenth century, these parts were replaced by
fixed denomination shares (Masselman, 1963). The most common denomination of the
shares was 1/32 o f the ship’s property but interests o f 1/8, 1/16, 1/48, and 1/56 were
not uncommon. Investors regularly purchased shares from more than one captain to
diversify their risk of loss from the misfortunes common to sailing ventures of the
period (Barbour, 1929).
Joint stock companies evolved from these merchant associations due to the high
capital requirements of foreign trade (Kindleberger, 1984). Investors (shareholders)

provided capital for these corporations while sailing captains (managers) used their
special skills to employ the assets profitably and pay dividends to the shareholders
(Warren, 1923).

The first joint stock company organized in Great Britain was the

Eastland Trading Company, originally chartered in the fifteenth century and granted
monopoly trading rights to the Baltic countries. This enterprise was followed in the
sixteenth century by the Muscovy Company and the Levant Company, chartered for
trading with Russia and with Turkey respectively (Scott, 1912). The charters granted
to joint stock companies were not perpetual—rather the licenses were granted for
definite and limited periods to allow the government to alter the provisions o f the
charter and collect additional fees and taxes (Kindleberger, 1984). Without exception,
these trading companies produced significant profits for their owners (Scott, 1912).

2.2.2 Joint Stock Companies in Holland
The Dutch East India Company was formed in Holland in 1602 and granted a
monopoly for trading with India (Van Loon, 1913).

This enterprise was the first

permanently organized joint stock company (Kindleberger, 1984).

Shares o f the

venture began trading in Amsterdam almost immediately after the original stock
subscription was completed.
More than half o f the original capital for the venture was raised from the
merchants of Amsterdam. In the early years of the company, the organization paid 75
percent dividends; the high dividend level was largely the result of reckless abuse of
the new trading territories.

During its first fifteen years, the company’s dividends

averaged 25 percent (Scott, 1912).

The market for exchange of shares was held out-of-doors in Holland until a
building was erected for this purpose in Amsterdam in 1613. Demand for the shares
was stimulated by the expectation o f high profits from the company’s endeavors and the
desire to participate in those profits by individuals excluded from the original share
subscription. The demand for the shares by individuals and non-member merchants
quickly increased the price o f the shares by 15 percent (Ehrenberg, 1963).
Circulation of news of the venture from correspondents across the globe and
rumors of its successes and failures increased speculation in the shares. Professional
traders also used eavesdroppers and spies to glean private information. Rumors were
often started depending solely on a trader’s current position (Schama, 1987). Orders
for the sale o f a large number of shares entered by professional traders led to an flood
of sale orders by frightened amateur investors to sell their shares and a drop in share
price. The professional would profit by repurchasing the shares at a lower price (Allen
and Gale, 1992).

Trading was primarily in futures and liberal settlement dates

increased share volume and volatility (Ehrenberg, 1963).

The line between casual

wagering and organized stock trading was often blurred. Speculators traded in hope
of earning profits from the short term price fluctuations rather than from the profits
arising from successful completion of the voyages (Schama, 1987).
The company monopolized the spice trade in Holland. In 1632, seven ships
returned from India laden with spices. The cargo was sold at five times the venture’s
cost.

In 1661, goods were sold at twice their cost to the company.

In 1672, the

company’s worst year during the 17th century, cargos worth in excess of 40,000,000

guilders were brought to the republic. The average gain to the company per pound of
spice was 1200 percent (Van Loon, 1913).
Merchant ships of the period were often accompanied on their expeditions by
armed men-of-war.

Although the practice originated during the middle ages, the

foremost use of the convention was with the organized trade o f the Dutch East India
Company. The lack o f competition among the ships o f the venture and the common
ownership of the vessels precluded the fear of the loss of monopoly rents common to
single ship endeavors of the period (Barbour, 1929).
The Dutch East India Company was not managed by a single individual; rather,
the company was divided into four chambers, each representing a fixed number of
shares that had been purchased by investors from a distinct geographical area.
Inhabitants of other provinces could hold stock individually but had no influence on
managerial policy. Each chamber sent ships in proportion to their ownership o f the
company; the ships and all potential profits from those ships remained the sole property
of that chamber. The company had a general board of directors with 46 members but
immediate power was centered in a 17 member Board o f Governors.
Minority stockholders holding less than five shares had no voice in the
company’s operations—these investors were allowed only to accept their dividends from
the directors and express their profound gratitude for such excellent management. No
shareholder meetings were held, no annual nor quarterly reports were issued, nor were
Board o f Governor meeting minutes kept. The high level o f dividends quieted any
potential investor anxieties. Financial juggling by managers kept dividend payments
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high throughout the seventeenth century.

A share purchased at the time o f original

subscription produced dividends exceeding 35 times the initial purchase price during the
com pany’s first eighty years o f business.

During the 180 years o f the com pany’s

existence, dividend payments averaged 21 percent annually.
The Dutch West India Company was founded in 1621 but, unlike the Dutch East
India Company, it was not granted a strict trading monopoly. Shareholders had a more
direct influence in the com pany’s operations. The 74-mem ber board o f directors was
chosen from all owners possessing at least two shares o f stock.

A committee o f 19

directors was given direct managerial control. The com pany’s trade areas included the
west coast of Africa, the east coast o f America, and all islands between and south of
the two coasts. The Dutch W est India Company was unsuccessful from its inception
due to competition and other exogenous factors (Van Loon, 1913).

2.2.3 Joint Stock Companies in Great Britain
The most important joint stock venture in Great Britain was the British East
India Company, formed in 1599 as a spinoff o f the Levant Company. The British East
India Company was granted a charter and monopoly trading rights by Act o f Parliament
in 1600 (Baskin, 1988).

The first agreement between a loosely organized group of

merchants was for one voyage; proceeds from the sale o f cargo and company assets
were divided among the shareholders at the end o f the voyage proportionate to their
ownership (Kindleberger, 1984).

The assets o f the venture were liquidated at the

conclusion o f each voyage to prevent fraudulent practices and to insure that proper
division o f proceeds to shareholders was accomplished (Baskin, 1988).
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The limited number of original shares were primarily sold among acquaintances.
Shareholders had unlimited liability and were subject to calls for additional funds if
needed.

Management and ownership were completely independent with managers

chosen according to their ability and knowledge o f the venture rather than their
proportion o f ownership in the company (Baskin, 1988). A governor, deputy governor,
and 24 committees made up the management structure (Scott, 1912). The ownership
of shares was transferrable through sale o f the shares but it was understood that any
change of ownership would be limited to individuals known by the other stockholders
(Baskin, 1988).

Between 1609 and 1613, distributions of profit and principal from

voyages totaled between 120 and 240 percent (Scott, 1912); a significant portion was
paid in articles acquired during the expeditions. These divisions o f principal and profits
closely resembled liquidating dividends (Preinreich, 1978).
The first joint stock shares of the British East India Company were issued in
1613 with the cost of the shares to be paid over a four-year period. For record keeping
convenience, each share had an equal and definite value (Williston, 1888b).

Four

voyages were scheduled with separate capital raised for each expedition through the
installment payments required by the purchase of stock. Divisions from the company
averaged 31 percent of share purchase price per year from its inception through 1617
(Scott, 1912) and totaled over 150 percent for the first five years after the initial joint
stock sale (Baskin, 1988).
By 1617, the company had 934 shareholders and 36 ships; seven additional
voyages were scheduled.

Not all voyages were profitable due to the high risk and
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uncertainty associated with sea voyages (Kindleberger, 1984); depressed economic
conditions in G reat Britain and an outbreak o f plague in London contributed to the ioss
of profitability (Scott, 1912). The shares sold more than 30 percent below the original
offering price from 1617-1634 due to the com pany’s poor perform ance (Ehrenberg,
1963).
The minimum investment allowed in the company had increased to £100 by
1657 (Scott, 1912). Voting rights required an investment o f at least £500 with smaller
investors being allowed to pool their holdings to reach voting status.

An investment

o f £1000 was required for com mittee membership (W illiston, 1888b). An independent
appraisal o f com pany assets was scheduled in 1664 with subsequent appraisals to occur
at three-year intervals.

Following each appraisal, shareholders were allowed to

exchange their proportion o f ownership for cash and their shares w ere sold to a new
investor. New stockholders w ere also required to pay an admission fee to the company
in addition to the share purchase price.
Liquidation o f assets at the end o f each voyage proved to be inefficient since a
portion of the proceeds were invariably paid in the form o f com modities acquired on
the voyage.

The success o f the company and the subsequent confidence o f the

shareholders in the corporation’s managers led to a belief among shareholders that
accountability could be accomplished exclusively through the paym ent o f generous
dividends (Baskin, 1988).

This fundamental right o f the shareholder to receive

dividends was recognized from the initial joint stock offerings (W illiston, 1888b).

A

20 percent dividend paid exclusively from profits was declared in 1661 and paid in
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1662. Once begun, the practice o f paying dividends solely from profits continued; a
dividend of 20 percent was paid again in 1663 and 1664. The 1664 appraisal conducted
after dividend payment showed a 30 percent undistributed capital gain. The 40 percent
dividend declared in 1665 included the undistributed capital gain o f 30 percent and an
additional 10 percent dividend from profits (Scott, 1912).
The trading price o f the shares varied independently of the level of dividends
during this period. Despite the large dividends paid between 1665 and 1667, the shares
routinely sold below par. Between 1668 and 1670, when no dividend was paid, the
stock price traded above par . The turnover of shares was small during the period
despite the well distributed ownership; the largest holding in the company at the time
was less than one percent of the total outstanding stock. This pattern was indicative of
a general shareholder confidence in the firm’s managers.
Dividends from 1671 through 1677 totaled 130 percent. In 1677, the stock price
reached £245; a dividend of 40 percent was paid in 1678. In addition, a distribution
of one-half percent was made in damaged calico. Between 1675 and 1681, dividends
averaged greater than 20 percent each year with total dividends for the period totalling
more than 150 percent (Scott, 1912); the stock at the same time traded between £300
and £500 (Ehrenberg, 1963). Although impressive, these returns were not exorbitant
when compared with other joint stock company dividends of the period (Scott, 1912).
The 1678 appraisal value o f the company exceeded £1,750,000 with more than
£1,000,000 in undistributed profits.

Beginning in 1681, the corporate directors

instituted an annual gift to the King from corporate profits.
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Table 2.1 shows the trading price, cash dividends and stock dividends o f the
British East India Company between 1662 and 1720. The highest dividend paid in any
single year was 50 percent that was paid in 1680, 1682, 1689 and 1691. The British
East India Company failed to pay dividends for eight consecutive years beginning in
1692. The price of the stock showed considerable volatility during the period, trading
from £60 to £900 per share (Scott, 1912).

TABLE 2.1
TRADING PRICE RANGE, CASH DIVIDENDS AND STOCK DIVIDENDS OF
THE BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY1
1662-1720

Year

Trading Price
Range

1662-1667
1668-1674
1675-1682
1683-1691
1692-1699
1700-1708
1709-1720

60-80
80-130
130-520
150-500
60-316
116-278
208-898

Cash Dividend
(Percent)

150
90
200
200
0
66
100

Stock Dividend
(Percent)

100

1 From Scott, William Robert, 1912, The Constitution and Finance o f English,
Scottish, and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

The British East India Company also employed men-of-war to protect their
vessels. Private marine insurers began to provide insurance against the loss o f ships
involved in the expeditions. Insurance providers were more successful and reputable
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in Holland and many British ships were insured by Dutch companies despite the higher
premiums charged by these firms. Premiums were highly volatile, varying from 3 to
4 percent in peacetime to over 15 percent in time of war (Barbour, 1929).
The success of the early trading companies increased the public’s interest and
acceptance of joint stock ventures during the seventeenth century (Baskin, 1988).
Although stock and share dealing was largely unorganized before 1680, by the middle
of the next decade a highly developed securities market had evolved (Morgan and
Thomas, 1969). London coffee shops served as the first venues of security trading.
Corporate activity climaxed between 1690 and 1720 (Baskin, 1988). Before 1691, only
three joint stock companies existed and all of these were trading companies—the East
India Company, the Royal African Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company
(Williston, 1888a). Increases in trade and the subsequent improvement in the general
economic conditions precipitated the formation and issuance o f stock by 100 new
companies between 1691 and 1695 (Kindleberger, 1984).

These issues included

mining, banking, clothing and utility companies (Ehrenberg, 1963). The lack o f cash
dividend payments by the East India Company during the period did not discourage
potential investors from purchasing the shares of the joint stock companies (Scott,
1912). Speculation in joint stock issues increased to frenzied levels and share prices,
new issues and volatility rose to unprecedented levels (Baskin, 1988). The East India
Company resumed cash dividends in 1700 and the stock price increased eight-fold over
the next two decades (Scott, 1912). The total capitalization of joint stock companies
reached £21,000,000 by 1717, a fourfold increase in 22 years (Kindleberger, 1978).
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New company formation continued at a frantic pace—in the twelve months beginning
in September 1719, 195 new companies were formed (Kindleberger, 1984).
Trading and speculating in new and established issues continued to accelerate.
This rampant growth was further fueled by allowing investors to purchase shares for
only 5-10 percent o f their market price; shareholders were subject to future calls for
the balance owed on the shares. The low down payment was justified by the belief that
a new company’s need for funds was a gradual process and that regular infusions of
capital from the shareholder payments would increase the safety o f the firm’s creditors
(Scott, 1912).
The South Sea Company was granted a charter in 1711 for the purpose of
consolidating the national debt of Great Britain and replacing the debt with corporate
stock. Secondary issues provided funds for the company to pay exorbitant dividends
to original issue shareholders.

Other fraudulent practices including income and

dividend manipulations were also common.

The South Sea Company’s stock price

increased ten-fold before its inevitable collapse (Kindleberger, 1978). The debacle of
the South Sea Company and the subsequent passage of the Bubble Act in 1720 greatly
limited the promotion and development of the joint stock companies in Great Britain
over the next four decades (Baskin, 1988). The Act made unincorporated joint stock
companies illegal and placed severe stipulations on new company formation (Clark,
1929a).

Corporations could not be established without an explicit charter from

Parliament and the sale o f shares was prohibited (Davis, 1917).
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2.2.4 Joint Stock Companies in the Colonies and Early Dividend Regulations
The earliest corporations in the American Colonies were public corporations—
cities and towns. Before the end of the seventeenth century, private corporations began
to appear. These corporations were modeled after English corporations using English
law and with corporate charters granted by the Crown.

Private corporations were

distinguished from public corporations by their private support and control. The most
common type of private corporations of the period were those organized for religious
worship. No joint stock business corporations existed in the American colonies before
1720 (Davis, 1917).
The establishment of permanently capitalized joint stock companies produced the
first dividend payment regulations. Corporate charters of the late seventeenth century
routinely limited dividend payments to profits only.

This practice became more

commonplace in the eighteenth century (Williston, 1888a).
In 1697, Parliament enacted a statute making the recipients of a dividend paid
from capital of the Bank of England liable to bank creditors (Kindleberger, 1984). By
1700, two statutory standards existed—the profit rule and the capital impairment rule.
The profit rule’s objective was preservation of a minimum asset level to insure
repayment of the company’s creditor claims. The capital impairment rule developed
to ensure a corporation’s continued existence.

Early law developed solely from

corporate charters and actual practice precedents rather than from court decisions (Kehl,
1941).
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2.2.5 Summary
Corporate dividends began as divisions of venture capital and profits based on
original investor contribution. The widespread success of joint stock endeavors led to
the distribution of dividends solely from voyage profits. Company capital remained
intact and the enterprise continued as a going concern. Corporate managers rapidly
realized the importance of generous dividends for investor satisfaction.

The use of

profits only to pay dividends and prohibition against capital impairment by excess
dividend payments were restrictions imposed on corporate dividend policy within fifty
years of the first profit only dividend payments.

2.3

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT AND THE FIRST
U . S. CORPORATIONS: 1720 TO 1800

2.3.1

Joint Stock Companies in Holland and Great Britain
The replacement of the able managers of the seventeenth century Dutch East

India Company with managers chosen solely on the basis of their family background
and social acquaintances severely affected the company’s profitability (Van Loon,
1913). During the eighteenth century, the Board of Governors was forced to secretly
borrow funds from financial institutions outside of Holland to maintain the level of
dividend payments (Kindleberger, 1984). After 1770, credit was maintained with great
difficulty; by 1780, the company was practically bankrupt. The company continued to
pay dividends providing a "splendid income" to shareholders up to its collapse in 1795
(Van Loon, 1913).
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In Great Britain, the passage of the Bubble Act o f 1720 by Parliament severely
limited the organization of new joint stock companies (Baskin, 1988).

The first

companies granted charters after the Bubble Act were canal companies.

These

companies doubled the length of canals in Great Britain between 1730 and 1790
(Kindleberger, 1984). More than 100 of these companies were organized before 1800;
81 began operation between 1791 and 1794 alone (Hunt, 1936). Although speculation
in these shares occurred, the level o f speculation was mild compared with the railway
mania that would transpire fifty years later (Kindleberger, 1984).

2.3.2 Joint Stock Companies in the United States
Business corporations in the colonies before the American Revolution were few
in number and of little importance; their structure and organization were not typical of
modern firms. The New London Society United for Trade and Commerce, established
in 1732, was the first U. S. business corporation. The second was the Union Wharf
Company of New Haven organized in 1760. No evidence exists o f the payment of
dividends by these corporations before 1800; all earnings were used for expansion and
maintenance of existing assets.
The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Loss by Fire,
the first corporation with modern corporate characteristics, was chartered in
Philadelphia in 1768 (Davis, 1917). This company was the only business corporation
with a charter predating the Declaration of Independence (Williston, 1888b). A number
of whaling, mining and manufacturing corporations were chartered during the 25 years
following the American Revolution and many unincorporated companies were founded.
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The first true banking corporation, the Bank o f North America, was chartered
in 1781 in Philadelphia with local citizens purchasing the majority o f the shares
(Williston, 1888b). The company was highly profitable from its beginning and paid a
4.5 percent dividend after six months of operation. Dividends o f 14.5 percent and 13.5
percent were paid in 1784 and 1785, respectively. Shareholder income from dividends
averaged 9.4 percent for the next century. The Bank of New York, another early joint
stock company, paid a 3 percent semiannual dividend from 1784-1791. By 1793, over
twenty banks were in operation. The shares of these stocks usually sold above par due
to their generous and consistent dividend payments. Bank stocks averaged 8.6 percent
dividends, usually paid semi-annually, between 1782 and 1800 (Davis, 1917). Table
2.2 shows the dividends paid by banking corporations on common stocks each year
between 1785 and 1800.
New issue sales and share trading became commonplace. The most common
method of security sale was by public auction.

An influx o f European funds for

investment in U. S. companies and speculation led to four semi-annual upswings in
stock prices between 1789-1791. Newspaper quotes of stock prices began to appear in
1786 and became a regular feature of newspapers as early as 1789 (Davis, 1917).
Between 1783 and 1800, 74 charters were granted to corporations to enhance
inland navigation.

The results of these firms were disproportionate to the efforts.

Although the canals offered increased convenience, the companies were unable to pay
cash dividends to their investors. Toll bridge and water supply companies of the period
also failed to pay significant dividends to their shareholders.

TABLE 2.2
U. S. BANK STOCK DIVIDENDS BY YEAR1
1785-1800
Bank

1785

1786

1787

1788

1789

1790

1791

1792

1793

1794

1795

1796

1797

1798

1799

1800

North America

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.5

7.0

7.0

13.5

12.5

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

11.0

10.0

New York

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.5

7.0

7.0

10.5

8.5

9.0

13.5

9.0

9.0

13.5

9.0

9.0

13.5

6.5

7.5

22.75

19.0

27.33

8.0

8.0

10.5

8.5

9.0

9.0

9.0

9.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

12.0

Massachusetts

2.5

5.0

8.5

Maryland

-

--

-

--

--

--

12.0

United States

--

-

--

-

-

--

-

8.0

7.5

8.0

8.0

8.0

9.0

8.0

8.0

10.0

Providence

-

--

-

-

--

--

--

7.5

7.0

7.0

8.0

8.0

8.0

8.0

10.5

10.0

South Carolina

-

--

--

--

--

-

-

9.0

9.0

15.0

15.0

7.52

tf3

#

U

tt

Hartford

-

-

-

--

--

--

--

-

3.5

3.0

0.0

0.0

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.0

Union (Boston)

-

--

--

--

--

--

-

-

8.0

8.0

8.5

10.0

10.0

9.0

9.0

9.0

--

0.0

8.0

8.25

6.0

6.0

8.0

10.00

9.5

9.5

8.0

8.0

10.0

10.0

New Haven
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

~
—

--

-

--

--

--

--

-

-

--

--

--

--

--

-

-

-

--

--

-

8.0

--

—

—

—

—

--

—

—

—

—

5.5

1 From Davis, Joseph S., 1917, Essays in the Earlier History o f American Corporations, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
2 For Six Months
3 Not Available
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The 33 insurance companies chartered from 1768-1800 were for the most part
financially prosperous.

Although dividends were paid by these companies to their

shareholders, the variance in the amount and the reliability o f the dividend payments
was much more pronounced than in the dividends received from banking corporations.
Between 1789 and 1800, eight manufacturing firms were chartered. The success
of these companies was at best equal to the success o f unincorporated manufacturing
firms of the period. Shareholders were not rewarded with dividends; all profits were
reinvested in the companies to finance growth and expansion (Davis, 1917). By the
close of the eighteen century, 335 American corporations existed, over 90 percent of
these were incorporated after 1789 (Kehl, 1941).
Practically no general statutes governing corporations existed before 1800.
Corporations and investors relied on English precedents to determine the legality of
corpoiate operations (Davis, 1917). No specific provisions in the charter protected the
interests of the company’s creditors—these creditors were safeguarded only by existing
common law principles (Warren, 1923).
Of paramount importance to American dividend law was the Bank of England
charter of 1694. Large sections of the charter were copied verbatim by Alexander
Hamilton when writing the Bank of the United States charter.

The only significant

change in the charter was the assignment of liability for incurred indebtedness due to
excess dividend payment.

In the original charter, shareholders were liable for the

debts; in the U. S. charter, the board o f directors were held accountable for the
indebtedness. The same policy of board of director liability was followed in subsequent
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bank charters in the United States (Kehl, 1941). Although corporate statutes varied
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the board of director liability held across the United
States (Briggs, 1933). Shareholder liability was unlimited (Clark, 1929a).
The 1781 charter of the Bank o f North America granted the board o f directors
the power to regularly pay the proper amount of dividends out o f corporate profits.
The 1784 charter of the Bank of New York contained a similar clause. The 1790 Bank
o f the United States charter was the first to specify payment o f semi-annual dividends
from profits (Davis, 1917).

2.3.3 Summary
The recognition of the importance of a consistent dividend stream led to less
than legitimate financial practices by the managers of joint stock companies when
corporate profits proved to be insufficient to continue dividend payments at established
levels. The passage of the Bubble Act in 1720, largely the result o f these fraudulent
activities, limited the further development of joint stock companies in Great Britain
during the last eighty years o f the eighteenth century.
In the United States, the number o f both incorporated and unincorporated joint
stock companies grew rapidly following the American Revolution. The first banking
corporations in the United States began to pay substantial dividends soon after their
inception. Other joint stock companies in the United States were less successful in their
efforts to pay shareholders generous dividends; some o f these corporations used current
earnings to fund expansions and other investment opportunities while other ventures
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were less than profitable. By the beginning o f the nineteenth century, dividends had
become symbolic liquidations rather than distributions of net profits.

2.4 THE RISE OF THE RAILROADS AND PREFERRED STOCK: 1800-1865
2.4.1 Corporate Activity in Great Britain
The dawn o f the nineteenth century in Great Britain found a renewed investor
interest in corporate securities (Kindleberger, 1984). This revival was largely the result
o f investor perception of railroad and canal corporations as civic improvement
companies rather than parsimonious profit seekers.

The perceived increase in

legitimacy decreased the public’s fear of fraudulent activity (Baskin, 1988). Annual
dividend payments of 7-12 percent by publicly traded banking firms also boosted
investor confidence (Hunt, 1936). A price list of publicly traded securities began to be
a regular feature in the newspapers of the era and the number o f issue quotes published
grew rapidly (Hunt, 1936).

Shares of 30 different corporations were available for

purchase by investors in 1815 (Conant, 1904).
A boom in English insurance company stocks occurred during the third decade
of the nineteenth century; the rapid growth and abundant success of these companies
intensified speculation in joint stock companies (Hunt, 1936). At the same time, the
market was inundated with new issues; 624 new companies issued stock between 1823
and 1825 (Kindleberger, 1984).

Parliament received 250 joint stock company

applications for incorporation in April 1824 alone (Hunt, 1936). The financial collapse
of 1827 led to the failure of 75 percent of the firms organized between 1823 and 1825;
most of the others had failed by 1843 (Baskin, 1988).

Joint stock banks generally
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emerged from the period unscathed with the majority o f the 40 banks organized
between 1826 and 1833 remaining profitable and paying dividends o f between 7 and 12
percent in 1833. Insurance companies were also generally successful; all but one o f the
companies organized during the boom were paying dividends to shareholders in 1843
(Hunt, 1936).
Great Britain’s first railroad stock began trading in 1825. For the next decade,
an average o f five new railroad companies issued shares each year.

In 1836, 29

railroad corporations sold stock for the first time and the initial sale o f shares o f 17
additional transportation companies occurred in 1837 (Kindleberger, 1984).
Before 1840, most railroad stocks were marketed and traded in local markets;
the majority of shareholders were not London financiers but local investors with
knowledge of the venture’s benefits and profit potential (Baskin, 1988).

Several of

these issues were paying dividends in excess of 10 percent by 1840 and almost all of
the companies paid dividends of at least 6 percent.

By 1844, these issues had

developed a reputation among investors for their security and profitability (Hunt, 1936).
Railroad issues experienced an almost manic boom over the next ten years; the trading
activity and price increases were unprecedented in British financial history. A flood
of new issues were offered to investors; these shares required small initial payments for
purchase. The market collapsed in 1847 when calls for additional capital led to the sale
of shares by investors unable to meet those calls. Of the large number of companies
organized between 1844 and 1868, only 42 percent were still operating at the end of
the period (Hunt, 1936).
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Corporate finance o f railroad companies in the middle o f the nineteenth century
was fraught with dishonesty. Dividends were commonly declared before profits were
determined and were often paid out of accumulated capital or from the proceeds of
subsequent issues (Kindleberger, 1984). The aggregate nominal dividend return on
railroad stocks in 1854 was 3.39 percent (Baskin, 1988).
The repeal of the Bubble Act in 1824 removed most o f the existing restrictions
on joint stock company organization but kept the requirement of Parliamentary approval
for incorporation.

This stipulation was not lifted until an act allowing general

incorporation was passed in 1856.

The act also included a provisions granting

shareholders limited liability (Kindleberger, 1984).

The share price o f corporation

stocks rose steadily in the decade following the enactment o f the limited liability statute,
especially the price o f shares o f those companies incorporated after the act’s passage.
Shares requiring full payment at purchase became the rule rather than the exception of
securities of this period (Jeffreys, 1954).

The limited liability clause provided the

impetus for the formation of over 2500 new companies between 1856 and 1862 (Hunt,
1936); the securities market continued to grow rapidly for the next twenty years
(Shannon, 1954). Unfortunately, the limited liability provision had no effect on the
investor’s personal risk when purchasing shares offered by joint stock companies; the
average life of initial issue corporations of the period was less than four years
(MacGregor, 1929).
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2.4.2 Corporate Activity in the United States
Between 1800 and 1823, 557 manufacturing corporations were incorporated in
the United States with over half of the new corporations based in New York or
Massachusetts. Cotton manufacturing corporation dividends during the period averaged
5.5%; the textile mill dividends averaged almost twice that rate. Textile makers paid
dividends o f between 10 and 20 percent during the War of 1812 (Clark, 1929a).
Manufacturing corporation profits in the United States increased significantly
following the War of 1812. The industrial revolution increased production, wealth and
precipitated a change in business methods o f American corporations (Faulkner, 1924).
The allure o f increased profits enticed outside investors to contribute capital to these
ventures (Davis, 1917); equity sales became the mills’ most important source of capital
in the first half of the nineteenth century (Davis, 1971). Up to this time, many o f the
textile mills had been closely held. Share par values ranged from 25 to 1000 dollars
per share (Clark, 1929a). Despite these advances, only a few U. S. financial firms
were capitalized in excess o f $500,000; the majority of manufacturing and other
industry corporations had less than $50,000 capital (Davis, 1917).
U.S. corporate issues began to be offered for sale in Great Britain during the
early nineteenth century. Shares o f existing corporations as well as new issues were
sold through investment bankers with offices in the United States and Great Britain
(Carosso, 1970).

Sales commissions averaged 1-2 percent originally but increased

competition in the middle of the century between investment bankers halved commission
rates (Hidy, 1941).
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The temporary shutdown o f many o f the mills for two years following the War
of 1812 was followed by payment of between 6 and 8 percent dividends for the next
ten years. The losses and lack of dividends during the Panic o f 1829 were offset by
dividends averaging 13.33 percent for the three years following the recession. Textile
dividends averaged 7.6 percent between 1825 and 1830 and 14.5 percent between 1831
and 1860.
The beginning of the Civil War brought another increase in profitability and a
further increase in Northeast textile mill dividends. Dividends increased from 8 percent
in 1860 to between 10 and 20 percent the following year. One textile mill paid a 66
percent dividend to its shareholders in 1861. Textile corporation paid dividends o f 25
to 50 percent in 1865, the most profitable year in the industry’s history (Clark, 1929b).
Early offerings of U. S. railroad company shares were primarily retailed to local
investors with knowledge of the profit potential. Most o f the capital raised for railroad
construction in areas with high population density and a large number o f potential
investors was through the sale o f equities. This practice was especially common in
New England.

In contrast, western U. S. railroads were primarily financed with

mortgage bonds due to fewer potential investors (Baskin, 1988).
Beginning around 1800, special charters began to provide remedy against capital
impairment caused by board o f director dividend declaration and payment. Although
the profit rule and the capital impairment rule became common in U. S. corporate
charters before 1825, dividend policy continued to be governed by special clauses in
each corporate charter. The first general dividend statute, enacted in New York in
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1825, made it unlawful to pay dividends except out of corporate profits.

The

corporation’s board o f directors was liable for damages if the law was violated. The
statute was widely copied by other states. A third general rule, the insolvency rule,
was first adopted in Massachusetts in 1830.

This rule prohibited the payment o f a

dividend when the firm was insolvent or the declaration or payment o f a dividend that
would make the firm insolvent. As with the profit rule, the corporation’s board of
directors were held accountable for this action. This rule was readily adopted by other
states (Kehl, 1941).

2.4.3 The Origins of Preferred Stock
Transportation companies in 1836 were the first U. S. corporations to employ
more than one class of stock (Evans, 1929). Railroad companies needed additional
infusions of capital but poor financial conditions precluded raising additional funds from
new investors to complete construction projects and current investors were not likely
to increase their investments in the companies due to a lack o f dividends or capital
gains on their earlier investments (Baskin, 1988). The idea for preferred stocks can be
traced to Europe where shares with dividend priority or preference already existed
(Evans, 1929). Transportation, clothing, brewing and manufacturing corporations in
Great Britain and Germany commonly used multiple classes of stock at this time
(Evans, 1931).
States were petitioned by transportation companies for aid for both existing
project completion and new projects. In 1836, Maryland legislators introduced a bill
providing public funds for projects in return for a guaranteed dividend from the stock
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issue. The bill passed with the semi-annual dividend payments starting three years after
stock issuance. This initial offering was soon followed by preferred stock issue by
other corporations in Maryland and in other states. Some of the issues were designed
to convert to common shares on a future date while others remained non-participating
preferred stocks.

One issue also allowed the state to have control over the

corporation’s board of director appointments (Evans, 1929).
The second stage in the development of preferred stock began in the next decade
with the sale of shares to private investors.
exchanged for new funds.

The promise of regular dividends was

Since original equity issue investors had received no

dividends from their investments, two classes o f shares evolved; a class o f stock with
guaranteed dividends and another with no guarantee o f dividends.

Preferred stock

became an accepted vehicle for emergency fund raising by transportation corporations;
several new railroad preferred issues began trading between 1843 and 1850. Around
1850, nine different preferred issues were available for purchase by investors. These
early guaranteed dividend issues were sold only in time o f financial need for expansion
or reconstruction of existing lines rather than in initial offerings.
The dividend rate and period of payment varied considerably among issues
during this period but dividend rates o f 10 to 12 percent o f original issue price were not
unusual. The high rates of returns were required to secure investor interest and give
original issue purchasers the opportunity to earn a fair return on their total investment
by increasing their stake in the firm. The board of directors or shareholders determined
the duration of the dividend payment and the level of the payment.

As a rule, the
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shares were preferred only until a dividend was paid on all shares; then the stock was
converted to common shares. The dividends were cumulative, non-participating and
carried the same voting rights as common shares (Evans, 1929).
Until 1850, preferred stock was used as a temporary mechanism for increasing
capital and employed almost exclusively by the railroad industry. Issuance o f preferred
stock before 1850 was invariably associated with financial distress. Bond interest was
often paid with the proceeds from preferred stock issues. As the number of preferred
issues grew, the security developed a distinct place in corporate structure with more
clearly defined rights and privileges. The uses of issue proceeds and characteristics of
the issues also began to diverge.

The participation feature became customary in

preferred stock issues (Evans, 1931); however, the issues were for the most part non
participating in the event o f asset distribution (Stevens, 1937).
In 1855, ten railroad preferred issues were trading; in twenty years the number
had increased to 44 issues. Companies began to issue more than one class o f preferred
stock.

At the same time, several o f the corporations began to limit the rights of

preferred shareholders (Evans, 1931). The last fifty years o f the nineteenth century saw
railroad stock in the United States develop into the predominant public market in
corporate securities (Baskin, 1988).
The Pennsylvania Railroad Corporation used preferred stock to fund the merger
activity that made it the world’s largest corporation in 1871.

The company

strengthened the investor’s perception of preferred stock—a security without the negative
connotation often associated with fixed income securities and less risky than equity
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issues. The attractive dividend rate and dependability of equity dividends o f preferred
stock also helped increase the public’s opinion of common stock as a legitimate
investment vehicle (Baskin, 1988).
During the late nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania Railroad Corporation
retained a portion of its earnings. This policy, although not uncommon in the United
States, prompted investors in Great Britain to send representatives to meet with
corporate management and express their opinion that all corporate earnings should be
distributed to shareholders (Baskin, 1988).
Although the power to issue preferred shares was given expressly by statute,
exceptions were not uncommon. The legal system of the time viewed preferred issues
as a form of mortgage on company assets (Evans, 1929). Around 1852, a change in
the legal process of preferred share issuance occurred due to the increase in the number
of issues. General acts rather than specific acts allowing preferred stock issue became
customary (Evans, 1931).

2.4.4 Summary
Paying consistent dividends remained of paramount importance to managers
during the first half o f the nineteenth century. Less than scrupulous corporate managers
continued to resort to fraudulent activities to maintain the payment stream. Limited
shareholder liability became a standard during the first half of the century and general
statutes governing dividend payments began to be enacted. Preferred stock matured
from its original use as a simple alternative capital raising instrument to a security with
its own unique set of characteristics.
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2.5 THE RISE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION: 1865-1920
2.5.1 Corporate Activity in Great Britain
The number of joint stock companies in Great Britain increased rapidly during
the last two decades o f the nineteenth century from 1302 corporations in 1880 to 6182
in 1898 (Conant, 1904). In 1914, 76.4 percent of corporate earnings in Great Britain
was paid to shareholders in the form o f dividends (Baskin, 1988); preferred stock
dividend requirements consumed 21 percent o f the earnings while the remaining 55
percent was used to pay common stock dividends. The higher personal tax rate in
Great Britain necessitated higher dividend payments by British corporations than their
American counterparts (Montgomery, 1927).

2.5.2 Corporate Activity in the United States
Before 1865, equity was the most important source o f capital for U. S.
manufacturing corporations. The need for investment capital was greatest when the
firm was least able to find funds—during initial organization.

This pattern was

especially true o f the textile industry. Legal restrictions against stock issues at less than
par and the average proprietor’s aversion to dilution of ownership and managerial
control restricted capital raising success.

Most manufacturing firms before 1880

remained closely held—75 percent o f the shares of the eleven largest textile mills o f the
period were held by less than 750 investors (Davis, 1917).
Following the Civil War, the majority of Northern manufacturing companies
paid regular dividends. The Lowell Company, the premier textile manufacturer in New
England, averaged paying 18 percent dividends during the decade following the war.
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Despite their closely held nature, these companies continued to pay significant
dividends. Dividend payments for all textile manufacturers averaged almost 8 percent
per year until the beginning o f the twentieth century despite the temporary suspension
of dividends by many companies following the panic o f 1874.

Manufacturing

production increased twice as fast as the population during this decade (Clark, 1929b).
The dawn of the twentieth century brought a further change in American
business.

The percentage o f manufactured goods being exported had tripled the 35

years following the Civil War to over 30 percent o f all manufactured products (Conant,
1904). Before the Civil War, individuals seeking investment opportunities bought real
estate. Equity share investment opportunities were limited primarily to railroad stocks.
The only industrial stocks available to investors were coal and textile firms (Navin and
Sears, 1955).

Before 1890, the Pullman Palace Car Company was the only

manufacturing firm traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).

Its close

association with the prosperous railroad industry caused investors to consider the
company more of a railroad firm than an industrial firm (Baskin, 1988).
Investor confidence in industrial firms increased dramatically at the end o f the
nineteenth century due to the payment of high dividends by nearly all issues almost
immediately after their inception (Faulkner, 1924). At the same time, railroad bond
interest rates declined from 7 to 3.5 percent (Conant, 1904). Dividends were frequently
paid out o f capital by these newly organized firms and the use o f capital for dividend
payment by firms in financial distress was common (Faulkner, 1924).

These
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extravagant dividend payments led to financial distress and bankruptcy by many o f the
firms (Baskin, 1988).
The majority of the other manufacturing firms of the period were small
partnerships or closely held corporations. Many companies remained family owned,
even the larger manufacturers like Singer and McCormick. However, ownership in the
New England textile corporations began to be more widely disseminated. The trading
of these shares was primarily consummated on the Boston Exchange. The shares were
regarded as investment grade securities and often were used as loan collateral.
Marshall Field and Company, Macy’s and other large department stores o f the
period were all partnerships. Sears, Roebuck and Company, Wool worth, Montgomery
Ward and The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company were all in their infancy during
this period; of these, only Montgomery Ward was incorporated.
Most of the extractive companies of this era were small partnerships.
Homestake Mining and Standard Oil were peculiarities as were a few large, publicly
traded copper and iron mining firms. Coal mining firms were viewed by investors
essentially as railroad stocks due to their close ties with the railroad industry (Navin and
Sears, 1955). Standard Oil paid dividends ranging from 5.25 percent to 30 percent
during the last twenty years o f the nineteenth century (Faulkner, 1924).
The processing industries, especially sugar and oil refining companies, were the
first industrial firms to attract public interest. The trust form of organization used by
many of the firms in these industries were the forerunner of modern corporate mergers.
Trust formation began when the majority of oil companies deposited their securities
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with a group of trustees with the expressed goal of decreasing overproduction. A few
of the individual corporations remained independent. The managers o f the individual
member firms o f the trust coordinated their commercial strategy to meet joint
objectives.
Other industries forming trusts during the period included the cotton, whiskey,
and sugar refining industry.

Very little earnings and operational information was

available to investors. Although the shares of the Standard Oil trust were closely held,
shares of the other trusts were actively traded. Trusts commonly sold preferred stock
secured by fixed assets and backed by earning capacity and common shares embodying
the risk, uncertainty and anticipated growth of the enterprise. The average volume of
these shares dwarfed other issues—during the last half of 1889, an average o f 150,000
trust shares exchanged hands each week; only 2,000 shares o f Pullman Car Company
were traded on average per week (Navin and Sears, 1955).
In 1890, fewer than ten industrial stocks were traded and quoted on the NYSE.
This number had increased to more than 30 issues by the crash o f 1893 and to over 200
by 1897. Industrial securities o f the period were concentrated in the manufacturing,
distributive, extractive and processing industries. The Dow Jones Industrial Average
began to be reported in the middle of this decade followed by the publication of
Moody’s Industrial Security in 1900.
Financial information other than the company’s capitalization and dividend
record was frequently unavailable to investors in the early twentieth century. Utility,
financial and railroad corporations generally provided more detailed data than other
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companies o f the period.

Before W orld W ar I, demands for increased disclosure o f

information by the shareholders were generally ignored by managers (Hawkins, 1963).
The NYSE, Investment Bankers Association o f America, public accounting firms
and the U. S. government began to require increased disclosure from publicly held
corporations.

The NYSE lacked stringent regulations for securities during the

nineteenth century (Michie, 1986). As time passed, the exchange sought to increase
regulation. The 1869 requirement for annual report publication by listed corporations
was largely ignored when first instituted by most managers; quarterly reports w ere not
required until 1926 (Hawkins, 1963).
Returns from industrial corporation shares began to surpass railroad company
stock returns after the Civil W ar.

The extrem e volatility o f the m arket immediately

following the w ar decreased during the last fifteen years o f the century (Smith, 1928).
Between 1872 and 1899, the income from industrial and utility common stock was
greater than the income provided by railroad bonds (Snowden, 1990).

Overall,

industrial stocks fared better than railroad stocks in the depression o f the last decade
o f the nineteenth century.

The three largest industrials of the time paid dividends

throughout the depression; only General Electric failed to pay dividends and the
suspension o f dividends was the result o f cash retention by corporate management
rather than the consequence o f a lack o f earnings (Navin and Sears, 1955). The return
on investment in industrial, utility and railroad common stocks exceeded the return
from railroad bonds from 1900-1920 (Smith, 1959).
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Corporate dividends before 1920 did not reflect the cyclical economic influences
shown by stock prices (Snowden, 1987). Dividend payments and stock prices trended
in opposite directions during the first 20 years o f the twentieth century in contrast to
the positive relationship shown before 1900 (Van Strum, 1927). After 1900, consistent
strong earnings by corporate America led to a gradual increase in dividends but the
increased earnings precipitated by World War I were not reflected by increased
dividends (White, 1990).

However, the aggregate dividend payment by American

corporations during the first two decades o f the twentieth century increased more
rapidly than nominal stock prices (Snowden, 1990).
Dividends did not begin to be smoothed by corporate management until after
1920 (Van Strum, 1927). The increased variability of dividends during the period is
a potential explanation for the extreme volatility of stock prices during the period
(Baskin, 1988). Increase volatility during this period was also partially the result of
attempts by professional traders to manipulate share prices (Allen and Gale, 1992).
The mean return from common stock dividends between 1871 and 1925 was
5.17 percent. Average share dividends exceeded eight percent in 1918 while returns
fell to less than four percent in 1886, 1890, 1898, and 1906-1907. Table 2.3 shows
the average dividend income per share by year from 1871 through 1919.

2.5.3 The Maturation and Specialization of Preferred Stock
Although not actively traded, preferred stock was important in the emergence
of industrial corporations (Navin and Sears, 1955).

At the end o f the nineteenth

century, preferred stock began to be viewed as an investment distinct from common
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TABLE 2.3
DIVIDEND INCOME ON COMMON STOCKS BY YEAR1
1871-1919

Year

1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1887
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902

Dividend Income
(Percent)

5.57
5.17
5.07
7.37
6.35
6.47
5.32
5.39
6.24
5.24
4.98
5.12
5.54
5.97
5.34
3.78
4.14
4.17
4.28
3.85
4.72
4.43
4.12
4.40
4.53
4.17
4.38
3.81
4.10
4.35
4.45
4.02

40
TABLE 2.3 (continued)
DIVIDEND INCOME ON COMMON STOCKS BY YEAR
1871-1919

Year

1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

Dividend Income
(Percent)

4.10
4.54
4.19
3.95
3.98
6.02
5.34
4.16
5.09
5.22
5.25
5.03
5.61
6.39
7.48
8.58
6.37

1 From Wilson, Jack W. and Charles P. Jones, 1987, A Comparison of Annual
Common Stock Returns: 1871-1925 with 1926-85, The Journal o f
Business, 60, 239-258.

stock. The fixed dividend rate was likened by most investors to bond interest payments
(Stevens, 1936a).

The issue of preferred stock allowed repatriation o f sunk costs

without loss of control and was an inexpensive and safe method for raising funds
(Navin and Sears, 1955). Preferred shares were customarily viewed as an investment
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in the firm’s tangible assets; common stock represented the company’s growth potential
(Dewing, 1926).

Before 1904, preferred stock had a preference only to dividend

payment; in return for this preference, dividends were limited in amount. Later issues
were cumulative and also had prior claim to assets in the event of bankruptcy (Dewing,
1953).

Participation in profits by preferred shares began to appear in corporate

charters, especially in railroad and utility preferred issues (Stevens, 1936b).
The investing public was already familiar with preferred issues from the
railroads’ long use of the security.

Industrial and utility corporations began to use

preferred stock to raise capital on more liberal terms in the last decade o f the nineteenth
century and the first two decades of the twentieth century (Dewing, 1926). Between
1890 and 1893, at least 23 investment grade preferred issues began trading; these issues
were predominately offered in exchange for existing securities and were sold at par
without regard to dividend rate. The majority of the industrial preferred issues traded
on the NYSE had 7 to 8 percent cumulative dividend rates (Navin and Sears, 1955).
A second type of preferred stock was offered by railroad, utility, industrial and
financial corporations in reorganization. If the company was unable to extend current
liabilities, current debt was often refunded with non-cumulative preferred stock.
Although yields and other features were unattractive to debtholders, the alternative of
default on the debt by the corporation left the creditor with little choice (Dewing,
1953).
Preferred stock dividends averaged over 8 percent before 1897 and averaged 6.7
percent between 1897 and 1920. Industrial corporation preferred stock had the highest
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yield since these firms were more disinclined to use debt financing.

Utility

corporations issued cumulative preferred stock prim arily after the depression o f 1903;
yields averaged six to seven percent (Dewing, 1926). M ost shares carried voting rights
but investors viewed the right as superfluous as long as dividends were paid (Stevens,
1938).

The voting rights were only exercisable under special charter provisions on

many o f the issues (Bradley, 1948).
The issues distributed by companies in reorganization before 1905 were noncum ulative and were habitually issued with lower dividend rates (Berle, 1923). The
board o f directors uniquely determined if dividends were to be paid on the shares
(Stevens, 1936c). O f the 51 preferred stocks traded on the exchange, 32 o f the issues
were issued during corporation reorganizations.

Despite the precarious economic

conditions surrounding the origination o f the majority o f these issues, dividends were
paid on these shares 83 percent of the time (Spal, 1942).

2.5.4 The Origins of No-Par Stock Issues
Shares o f stock were originally issued with a minimum fixed value called par
that was defined as the valuation o f the participation in the rights o f ownership. The
purpose for requiring the payment o f a minimum fixed am ount was to protect the
creditors o f the coqioration (Berle and Means, 1932).
equivalent to par was required initially.

The paym ent o f a cash

Later, property, services and intangibles of

equal value became acceptable substitutes. The legal dilution of par value began when
management began to be allowed to value the non-cash equivalents used for payment
o f par (Dewing, 1926).
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Owners o f issued shares could not collect par value from the corporation even
though the am ount was paid in full; the shares’ current trading price on the exchange
was the maximum price per share available to the shareholder (Dewing, 1926).

Par

also allowed the investor to approximately value the corporation even with the crude
accounting methods o f the period (Baskin, 1988). Railroad and industrial shares were
commonly issued with a par value o f $100; early railroad shares had a par value o f $50
(M ontgomery, 1927).

Copper mining shares were often issued with a $25 par value;

other mining stocks were issued with pars as low as $1.
Shares designed to participate in earnings only but not representing ownership
in corporate assets began to be issued without a par value in the first decade o f the
twentieth century. Capital stock taxes were levied on the shares assuming a par value
of $100. Subsequent offerings were issued with low par values—$1 or $5—bearing little
relation to the historical contribution (Dewing, 1953).
The New York Bar Association began lobbying for legal issuance o f no par
stock before the beginning o f the twentieth century.

Par value was criticized for

causing confusion among investors and for unfairly pegging the value o f the shares to
their par value. The trading price of par value shares tended to gravitate toward par.
Others criticized par value due to the difficulty o f assessment o f a true value o f the
coiporation. The decline o f trading price below par value enables new shareholders to
purchase the shares at a discount compared to original investors paying par for the
stock. Proponents argued that the retention o f par value would maintain the distinction
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of capital and profits to be used for dividend payment and would provide a "true" value
for investors to use in their analysis o f an issue (Dewing, 1926).
The issuance of no par stock was first legalized in New York in 1912 (Berle and
Means, 1932). More than 20 states followed this precedent and allowed the issue of
no par stock by 1923; by 1927 almost all states allowed the issuance of no par shares
(Dewing, 1926). By 1919, 27 NYSE corporations had issued no par stock; the number
had increased to 189 companies by 1924 (Montgomery, 1927).

2.5.5 Summary
In the years following the Civil War in the United States, the general lack of
publicly available financial information required investors to value industrial securities
solely using their dividend history.

The rise o f industry trusts increased investor

interest in the securities markets and trading activity increased. Smoothing of corporate
dividend streams began to be practiced by managers and specialized uses of preferred
stock and no-par common stock increased.

2.6 THE ROARING TWENTIES AND THE GREAT CRASH: 1920-1929
2.6.1 The Boom and the Bust
Until 1920, common stock was not viewed as an investment grade security; only
railroad bonds and industrial preferred stock were purchased by conservative private
and institutional investors.

At this time, security analysts began advocating the

purchase of common stocks as an inflation hedge. The increased risk and short-term
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volatility o f stock were balanced by the benefits o f superior returns over the long-term
(Snowden, 1990).
The shareholder rolls of American corporations increased dramatically in the
first three decades of the twentieth century (Carosso, 1970). Corporate shareholders
increased from 500,000 in 1900 to two million in 1920 to over ten million by 1930
(Baskin, 1988). The most rapid period of increase was from 1917-1923. Less affluent
investors—those not in the top income bracket—became shareholders in record numbers
during this time. The percentage of share ownership by those individuals with the top
25,000 incomes in the United States declined from 57 percent in 1916 to 37 percent in
1921. These increases were the result of customer ownership campaigns, employee
stock ownership plans, decreased share attractiveness to the wealthy due to high
dividend tax burdens, a decrease in the World War I surtax following the end o f the
conflict (Means, 1930), funds available for investment from Liberty Bond maturation
and a decrease in the commission rate on smaller share purchases (Carosso, 1970).
Dividends paid by corporations increased from $2.10 in 1871 to $6.62 in 1929
(White, 1990). In 1920, share prices were low and dividend yields were relatively
high. The market began a long rise in mid 1921 with only minor corrections in 1924
and 1926 (Galbraith, 1954). Total yearly share volume increased 500 percent from
1921-1928 (Klingaman, 1989).

The bull market beginning after World War I was

largely the result of the public’s expectations of continued dividend increases greater
than the actual increases (Galbraith, 1954). Corporate earnings averaged 9 percent per
year from 1922-1927 while dividends averaged 6.8 percent (White, 1990). Dividends
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o f industrial firms averaged seven percent during the period (Fisher, 1930). In 1927,
$1.5 billion was paid in dividends (W ilbur, 1932).
As American businesses prospered in the 1920’s, stock values increased. Within
a five-year period, stock prices rose threefold (Erickson, 1972).

Share volum e also

increased 250 percent from 1927-1929 while bond offerings decreased 38 percent
during the same period (Carosso, 1970). Railroad stocks fell in relation to utility and
industrial shares, especially utility shares (W hite, 1990).

In 1927, the bull market

began in earnest; by 1928, buy orders overwhelmed the capacities o f the brokerage
houses (Galbraith, 1954).

Trading hours on the NYSE w ere shortened in hope of

decreasing the trading volume (Carosso, 1970). As share prices continued to increase,
corporate managers began to slow dividend increases in an attempt to retard investor
speculation and enthusiasm. Other managers warned the public o f the overvaluation o f
company shares and the unrealistic nature o f their expectations (W hite, 1990). Analysts
warned o f the impending crash; professional financiers and traders began to quietly
withdraw their funds from the market (Erickson, 1972). Other investors heeded few
o f these cautions and share prices continued to increase rapidly outpacing dividend
increases (White, 1990).
March 1928 marked the beginning o f a "speculative mania" (Galbraith, 1954).
N ovice and seasoned investors alike purchased stocks with their savings believing that
stock prices would increase indefinitely (Erickson, 1972).

On March 5, General

M otors (GM) stock increased in price $5 and had risen $10 by the end o f the week.
Record Corporation of America (RCA) increased $13 the same week.

Despite the
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common favoritism shown to these issues by speculators, the stocks were dissimilar.
GM had recently promised to increase dividends and investors expected the recent
increases in earnings to continue. RCA on the other hand had not yet paid a dividend
nor would the firm pay dividends for many years to come (White, 1990).

Speculative

stocks of infant industries—radio, airplane and movie corporations—paying little or no
dividends enjoyed the greatest increase in price (Carosso, 1970). The stable dividend
paying railroad stocks languished during the boom. The average dividend per share
increased to $5.97 in 1928 (White, 1990).
Total dividends increased to $2.6 billion in 1929 (Wilbur, 1932).

Dividend

increases averaged slightly less than eight percent per year for the decade with the
average dividend paid to common shareholders doubling in less than ten years (Brittain,
1966). Quarterly dividends continued to rise in late 1929, increasing 12.8 percent in
the third quarter and 11.6 percent in the fourth quarter. Although slowed, dividend
increases and stock prices gave no indication o f the imminent recession (White, 1990).
The stock market decline beginning in 1929 cannot be logically explained by dividend
decreases (Shiller, 1981). The 240 leading issues of the NYSE lost 2.8 billion dollars
in market value during September 1929 (Klingaman, 1989).
Bear raids were not the cause o f the drastic fall in prices but other forms of
stock price manipulation were common. Trading pools—investor groups that purchased
blocks o f stocks, circulated rumors that led to price increases, and sold their blocks at
a profit— were not uncommon (Allen and Gale, 1992).
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Dividend payments exceeded net income from 1922-1933; the shortfall in
income was paid from accumulated surplus (Sage, 1937). The average dividend yield
on all NYSE stocks from 1921 to 1930 ranged from a low of 3.5 percent to a high of
nine percent. Blue chip issue yields from 1897-1930 ranged from a low of 2 percent
immediately preceding the crash to a high o f 7.5 percent (Sloan, 1931). Table 2.4
shows the average dividend yield on a share o f common stock by year from 1920-1929.

TABLE 2.4
DIVIDEND INCOME ON COMMON STOCKS BY YEAR1
1920-1929

Year

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

Dividend Income
(Percent)

5.52
6.50
6.67
5.77
6.25
5.73
5.62
5.20
4.32
3.82

1 Dividend income 1920-1925 from Wilson, Jack W. and Charles P. Jones,
1987, A Comparison of Annual Common Stock Returns: 1871-1925 with
1926-85, The Journal o f Business, 60, 239-258. 1926-1929 from Stocks,
Bonds, Bills and Inflation 1992 Yearbook™ (annually updates work by
Roger G. Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield), Chicago, Illinois: Ibbotson
Associates, Inc.
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The percentage of earnings paid out as dividends increased for most industry
sectors from 1920 to 1929 (Brittain, 1966). The increase in dividends between 1920
and 1929 was significantly higher than the increase in earnings by most industry
sectors. The ratio o f net dividends to net profits increased to 70 percent during this
decade. Table 2.5 shows the payout ratio for 1920 and 1929 by industry sector.

TABLE 2.5
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO BY INDUSTRY1
1920 AND 1929

Industry

Mining
Construction
Food
Textiles
Lumber
Paper
Printing
Petroleum
Rubber
Leather
Stone, Glass
Metals and Products
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance
Public Utilities
Services
All Corporations
All Manufacturers

1920

1929

55
35
169
128
37
37
36
112
#2
if
29
42
68
90
284
77
74
64
55

91
60
72
117
93
60
63
52
322
97
66
57
74
92
95
71
75
71
63

1 From Brittain, John A ., 1966, Corporate Dividend Policy, Washington: The
Brookings Institution.
2 #: Negative profits for the year.
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In 1929, the number o f new stock issues exceeded the number o f bond issues
for the first time. The number o f new equity issues doubled from 1927 to 1928 and
approximately doubled again the following year (Carosso, 1970). Table 2.6 shows the
number of new equity issues by year from 1919 through 1929.

TABLE 2.6
NEW EQUITY ISSUES BY YEAR1
1919-1929

Year

1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

New Equity
Issues

1,546
1,038
275
621
736
865
1,247
1,220
1,738
3,491
6,757

1 From Carosso, Vincent P ., 1970, Investment Banking in America, A History,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

In 1925, 13 percent of preferred issues had a dividend rate of 6 percent, 68
percent paid 7 percent, and 13 percent paid 8 percent (Dewing, 1926). The yield on
preferred stocks had fallen to 4.7 percent by 1929 (Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, 1962).
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2.6.2 Summary
A major change in the distribution o f wealth and share ownership occurred in
the United States during the early twentieth century. Stocks continued to be valued
primarily by dividend payment history; other financial information was still generally
unavailable. The increases in corporate dividend payments during the decade were
reflected in rising stock prices.

The first express use of dividends as a signaling

mechanism in the months preceding the 1929 crash failed—investors acknowledged the
dividend increase signal by bidding up the share price but ignored the negative
connotations associated with the slowing of dividend increases. The growth in dividend
payments during this decade outpaced the growth in earnings and many firms were
forced to use retained earnings to fund the higher payments.

2.7 MODERN DIVIDEND HISTORY: 1930 TO THE PRESENT
2.7.1 Post-Crash Corporate Activities
In 1931, the management of General Motors announced that all earnings should
be paid as dividends in poor economic times and if a corporation is sound, the use o f
accumulated surplus to maintain the dividend is justified (Wilbur, 1932). Shareholders
began to lobby Congress to decrease corporate retained earnings and increase dividend
payments. The Revenue Act of 1934 threatened to heavily tax undistributed corporate
earnings; the Revenue Act of 1936 began the taxation of retained earnings.

In

response, many corporations increased dividends or declared special dividends (Sage,
1937) despite having profit levels 22 percent below their 1926-1929 average (Jaeger,
1972). Managers were thankful to have an excuse for increasing dividends; the large
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number of business failures early in the decade had seriously shaken shareholder faith
in corporate management and many o f the managers believed that increasing dividends
was a low cost method o f restoring investor faith (Graham and Dodd, 1934).
Large corporations in the United States distributed more than 80 percent o f their
earnings as dividends in 1937.

This increase in dividends totaled greater than 1.1

billion dollars in 1936 and 1937, one-third greater than expected (Lent, 1948). Despite
the increases, the net dividend/net profit after tax ratio fell to 35 percent during 19291947. Although corporate profits were 90 percent greater in 1946 and 1947 than in
1929, aggregate dividend payout was only three percent greater (Brittain, 1966).
During World War II, corporate cash dividends were paid using Liberty Bonds
(Preinreich, 1978). Dividend increases averaged six percent per year in the fifteen
years following the end o f the second World War; corporate net profits after tax
increases averaged two percent per year during the same period (Brittain, 1966).
The ratio o f net dividends to net profit after tax, the dividend payout ratio,
increased to its highest level during the twenty years following World War II (Brittain,
1966). Table 2.7 shows the dividend payout ratio for 1947, 1960 and the 1920-1960
period by industry sector.
The ratio of dividends paid to net earnings in the electric utility industry showed
exceptional stability from 1947 to 1959. Individual firm ratios were much more volatile
during the period (Dhrymes and Kurz, 1964).
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TABLE 2.7
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO BY INDUSTRY1
1947, 1960 and 1920-1960

Industry

Mining
Construction
Food
Textiles
Lumber
Paper
Printing
Petroleum
Rubber
Leather
Stone, Glass
Metals and Products
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance
Public Utilities
Services
All Corporations
All Manufacturers

1947

1960

38
15
42
24
22
24
33
38
29
33
36
36
20
25
58
66
36
36
34

95
ff2

53
41
74
62
40
55
58
73
58
64
33
68
59
92
102
62
58

1920-1960

78.0
37.4
59.4
52.1
52.5
47.6
46.7
53.5
43.4
67.5
47.6
52.0
35.1
49.6
67.2
83.0
65.5
58.2
52.3

1 From Brittain, John A ., 1966, Corporate Dividend Policy, Washington: The
Brookings Institution.
2 it\ Negative profits for the year.

2.7.2 Contemporary Dividend Policy
In the years following the second World War, corporate dividend policy in the
United States and Great Britain has remained relatively unchanged and dividend payout
levels relatively constant. In the 15 years following World War II, dividends increased
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an average o f 6 percent each year and the aggregate dividend payout ratio increased to
levels comparable to the payout levels following the first World War (Brittain, 1966).
A state of "inertia" has developed in the payment of corporate dividends (Dhrymes and
Kurz, 1967). Dividends as a percent of net income have increased in Great Britain
during this period (Thomas, 1978). The dividend rate was relatively unaffected by the
high levels o f inflation that characterized the American economy during and
immediately following the War in Viet Nam showing only a slight increase during these
years. The consistent level of dividend payment is evidence of the continued smoothing
of dividends by corporate management (Ibbotson and Sinquefield, 1982). Table 2.8
displays the average dividend per share for common stock from 1930 to 1991.

2.7,3 Summary
Over the past fifty years, a state of inertia has developed in corporate dividend
policy.

Dividend rates were relatively unaffected by the high levels o f inflation

characteristic o f the American economy during and immediately following the War in
Vietnam.

The consistent level of dividend payments is evidence o f the continued

smoothing of dividends by corporate managers.

2.8 SUMMARY
Dividend payments to shareholders began as a simple convention of
convenience.

Joint stock shareholders found the payment o f dividends solely from

company profits while maintaining the enterprise as a going concern to be more
efficient than divisions o f all profits and company capital. Later corporate managers
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TABLE 2.8
DIVIDEND INCOME ON COMMON STOCKS BY YEAR1
1930-1991

Year

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961

Dividend Income
(Percent)

4.57
5.35
6.16
6.39
4.46
4.95
5.36
4.66
4.83
4.69
5.36
6.71
6.79
6.24
5.48
4.97
4.09
5.49
6.08
7.50
8.77
6.91
5.93
5.46
6.21
4.56
3.83
3.84
4.38
3.31
3.26
3.48
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TABLE 2.8 (continued)
DIVIDEND INCOME ON COMMON STOCKS BY YEAR1
1930-1991
Year

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Dividend Income
(Percent)

2.98
3.61
3.33
3.21
3.11
3.63
3.18
3.04
3.41
3.33
3.09
2.86
3.69
5.37
4.38
4.31
5.33
5.71
5.73
4.89
5.50
5.00
4.56
5.10
3.74
3.64
4.17
3.85
3.36
3.83

1 From Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 1992 Yearbook™ (annually updates
work by Roger G. Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield), Chicago, Illinois:
Ibbotson Associates, Inc.
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began to retain earnings to fund investment opportunities and dividends became
symbolic liquidations of the enterprise paid from profits and retained earnings rather
than distributions of all current profits.
The importance o f significant dividend payments to maintain shareholder
satisfaction was recognized early by corporate managers. Less than ethical activities
were often used to continue dividend payments and the payments were often paid solely
from retained earnings during unprofitable periods o f company operations. The lack
o f financial information available to investors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries magnified the importance o f a history o f consistent dividend payments;
shareholders used this information as their primary input when valuing firms.

CHAPTER 3
THE EVOLUTION OF DIVIDEND POLICY THEORIES

3.1 INTRODUCTION AND INITIAL RESEARCH
Corporate dividend policy has captured the interest of economists for the last
century and has been the subject of intensive theoretical modeling and empirical
examination by financial economists over the last four decades.

A number of

conflicting theoretical models, all lacking strong empirical support, define the current
state of financial economists’ attempts to explain the dividend phenomenon.

The

purpose o f this chapter is to examine systematically the academic attempts to explain
corporate dividend policy.
Initial forays into explaining corporate dividend policy are divided as to their
prediction of the dividend payment’s effect on share price. Three schools of thought
emerge: one faction sees dividends as attractive and a positive influence on stock price,
a second bloc believes stock prices are negatively correlated with dividend payout levels
and a third group of empiricists maintain that firm dividend policy is irrelevant in stock
price valuation.
Common stock theory proponents maintain that the safety and total return from
dividends and capital gains o f common stock will exceed bond return over the long
term. Common stocks are able to sustain purchasing power more effectively than bonds
because as commodity prices increase, purchasing power decreases and the bond
income and par value returned upon maturity become less valuable (Fisher, 1912). The
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theory requires only fundamental assumptions; limited investor liability, complete
markets and the ability of investors to diversify their portfolios.

A number of

elementary empirical analyses support the theory (see Norton, 1912, Smith, 1923, Van
Strum, 1925, and Harold, 1934).
Preinreich (1932) sees dividend policy as merely a residual decision. Dividends
are paid to shareholders if and only if revenues remain after all positive investment
opportunities have been funded.

Another method determines dividend payout by

examining and estimating corporate contingencies and financial needs rather than more
rudimentary approaches based simply on current funds availability or historical payout
patterns (Sage, 1937).
Following the proclamation by Graham and Dodd (1934) that the corporation’s
main objective is to pay the owners of the firms (the shareholders) dividends, a
preference for issues that pay regular cash dividends became the prevailing investment
strategy in the financial community. A dollar paid as a cash dividend was shown to
increase a share’s price four times as much as a dollar retained. Dividend multiples
became the preferred method for share valuation by both amateurs and professional
money managers.
Harkavy (1953) shows empirical support for Graham and Dodd’s proclamation
by showing a positive correlation between stock price and dividend payout.

The

relation is modeled theoretically by Walter (1956). Over the long term, share price is
the present value of expected dividends. Investors are willing to pay increased price
premiums for issues with consistent dividend growth. Because current cash dividends
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are less risky than future capital gains or higher expected dividend payments, dividend
policy is relevant in firm valuation (Gordon, 1959, 1962). Lintner (1962) and Gordon
(1963) show a decrease in the investor’s required rate of return as dividends increase
because the cash received from dividends is more certain than future capital gains.
Stock prices are led by dividends in the long run and contemporaneous causality is
found between dividends and security price (Sung and Urrutia, 1992). Conversely,
Friend and Puckett (1964) posit that biased results from omitted variables, different
methods of analysis and measurement errors likely undermine the early study results
showing a strong preference by investors for dividends.
The seminal paper o f Miller and Modigliani (1961) is the beginning of
contemporary theoretical attempts to explain the role o f dividend policy. Their model
assumes perfect capital markets, rational investors, full and costless information,
competitive markets, no transaction costs and no taxes.

Firm investment policy is

exogenous in the model. Using the arbitrage proof o f Modigliani and Miller (1958),
Miller and Modigliani (M&M) conclude that the dividend decision does not affect
shareholder wealth nor the cost of capital-dividend policy is irrelevant. If investors
can buy and sell securities to manufacture their desired dividend payout rate, the
expected return required for investors to hold shares is not affected by the combination
of new issues and gross dividend payments. Since dividend policy doesn’t affect the
discounting rate o f expected future cash flows, the firm’s market value is independent
of changes in dividend policy. Accordingly, corporations have no incentive to follow
a systematic policy.

Financing decision indifference results in a shareholder
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indifference to corporate dividend policy. Dividend policy is material only if a change
in dividend policy relays information that investors do not have. Fama (1978) extends
the model to a general equilibrium.
Empirical evidence is inconclusive as to the irrelevancy of dividend policy. The
empirical results of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), Brigham and Gordon (1968),
McDonald, Jacquillat and Nussenbaum (1975), Bar-Yosef and Kolodny (1976), McCabe
(1979), Anderson (1983), Peterson and Benesh (1983) and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn
(1992) all fail to support the M&M irrelevancy proposition. These studies show the
investment and dividend decisions to be interrelated. According to Peterson and Benesh
(1983), market imperfections are the cause of the interdependencies.
Conversely, Higgins (1972), Fama (1974), Smirlock and Marshall (1983) and
Frankfurter and Gong (1993) find empirical support for the proposition. The empirical
results from this group of papers are too inadequate to reject the M&M irrelevance
proposition. Fama (1974) posits that existing market imperfections are not significant
enough to invalidate the independence of the two policies. Table 3.1 presents these
works by their principal attributes.
The M&M model is generally accepted as valid if its assumptions are not
violated.

Modification of these assumptions and the introduction of capital market

imperfections can cause dividend policy to become relevant. Dividend policy relevancy
is solely due to market imperfections, inefficiencies, or irrationalities (Brealy and
Myers, 1991).

TABLE 3.1
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE MILLER AND MODIGLIANI (1961)
DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE PROPOSITION

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Dhrymes and Kurz (1967)

1951-1960
Annual

XSRA
OLS, 2SLS, SSLS

Reject M&M "behaviorally oriented conclusions".
dividend decisions are interrelated.

Investment and

Brigham and Gordon (1968)

1958-1962
Annual

MRA

Stock value is dependent on dividend policy. Required rates of returns
increase with increases in leverage and retention rates.

Higgins (1972)

1961-1965
Annual

XSRA

Questions Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). Dividend payout is the result of
profit and investment but is not causally related. Supports M&M
independence proposition.

Fama (1974)

1946-1968
Annual

TSRA
OLS, 2SLS

Results supports M&M—the evidence is inadequate to reject investment
and dividend decision independence. Existing market imperfections do
not invalidate independence.

McDonald, Jacquillat and
Nussenbaum (1975)

1962-1968
Annual

XSRA
OLS, 2SLS

Results are not consistent with the M&M the dividend irrelevance
proposition and do not and support Dhrymes and Kurz (1967).

Bar-Yosef and Kolodny (1976)

1963-1971
Annual

XSRA

Security price and firm payout policy are positively related. Dividend
policy is significant in explaining a security’s return. Findings conflict
with the M&M dividend irrelevance proposition.

TABLE 3.1 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE MILLER AND MODIGLIANI (1961)
DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE PROPOSITION

Data

Method of
Analysis

McCabe (1979)

1966-1973
Annual

XSRA
OLS, 2SLS

Earlier research results in error due to model misspecifications and
variable omissions. Investment and dividend decisions are interrelated.
Findings fail to support M&M.

Anderson (1983)

1963-1977
Quarterly

TSRA

Corporate investment policies and opportunities likely influence the cash
flows available for payment o f dividends.

Peterson and Benesh (1983)

1975-1979
Annual

XSRA
2SLS, 3SLS, SUR

Financing decisions significantly impact investment decisions. Market
imperfections lead to interactive policy determination.

Smirlock and Marshall (1983)

1958-1977
Annual

GC Test

Results support M&M. The dividend decision does not motivate the
investment decision.

Jensen, Solberg and Zorn
(1992)

1982, 1987
Annual

XSRA
3SLS

Insider ownership, debt policy, and dividend policy are interdependent.
Dividend levels are paid after internal financing o f investment
opportunities. Insider holdings and dividends are inversely related.

Frankfurter and Gong (1993)

1979-1990
Quarterly

TSRA, XSRA,
VAR

Dividend and investment policy are independent. Current dividends are
only affected by past dividends. No industry effects are present. Previous
empirical examination accuracy suffered from model misspecification.

Author(s)

1 See Appendix A for method o f analysis abbreviations.

Major Result(s)
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Theoretical and empirical research attempting to explain corporate dividend
policy can be broadly segregated into models formulated in states with full information,
models in states with informational asymmetries and models using behavioral rationales
as the basis for their development.

Section 3.2 reviews theoretical models and

empirical research in full information equilibriums adding the market imperfection of
taxes.

Section 3.3 examines investigation and modeling in states with asymmetric

information; specifically the signaling, agency costs and free cash flow hypotheses.
Behavioral models are discussed in Section 3.4.

The chapter closes with a brief

conclusion.

3.2 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS UNDER FULL INFORMATION
A large body of theoretical models and empirical research analyzes the effect
o f the market imperfection of taxes on corporate dividend policy. An early examination
of the effect shows that depreciation allowances and individual tax rates substantially
influenced dividend payout rates in the U.S. between 1920 and 1960 (Brittain, 1964).
The significance of the effect of the tax code on the determination and implementation
o f corporate dividend policy is not questioned by the majority of writers. The models
developed thus far are therefore not separated into paradigms supporting the contention
that taxes do not affect corporate dividend decisions and those modeling the effect of
taxes on corporate policy; rather, the paradigms can be better classified as tax-adjusted
or tax-avoidance dividend models.
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3.2.1 Theoretical Models
Tax-adjusted models surmise that investors require and secure higher expected
returns on shares of dividend paying stocks.

The imposition of a tax liability on

dividends causes the dividend payment to be grossed up to increase the shareholder’s
pre-tax return. Under capital asset pricing theory, investors offer a lower price for the
shares due to the future tax liability of the dividend payment.
One consequence of the tax-adjusted model is the division of investors into
dividend tax clienteles. The clientele argument was first proposed in the seminal work
o f M&M (1961). In later research, Modigliani (1982) finds that the clientele effect is
responsible for only nominal alterations in portfolio composition rather than the major
differences predicted by Miller (1977).

Masulis and Trueman (1988) model cash

dividend payments as products o f deferred dividend costs. Their model predicts that
investors with differing tax liabilities will not be uniform in their ideal firm
investment/dividend policy. As the tax liability on dividends increases (decreases), the
dividend payment decreases (increases) while earnings reinvestment increases
(decreases). Differences can be minimized by segregation of investors into clienteles.
The model developed by Farrar and Selwyn (1967) assumes investors maximize
after-tax income. In a partial equilibrium framework, investors are presented with two
choices. Individuals choose the amount of personal and corporate leverage and also
choose whether to receive corporate distributions as dividends or capital gains. If the
tax liability of capital gains distributions is less than the liability incurred by dividend
distribution, rational investors will prefer capital gains; the preferred payment is the one
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with the least tax liability.

The model contends that no dividends should be paid;

rather, share repurchase should be used to distribute corporate earnings.
The Farrar and Selwyn (1967) model is extended into a general equilibrium
framework by Brennan (1970). In this setting, investors maximize their expected utility
of wealth. Although the model is more robust, the predictions are similar to those of
the Farrar and Selwyn model; an equilibrium with dividend paying firms is not
consistent with a zero required return per unit of dividend yield.
Auerbach (1979a) develops a discrete time, infinite horizon model in that
shareholders maximize their wealth. If a capital gains/dividends tax differential exists,
wealth maximization no longer implies firm market value maximization. Subsequently,
Auerbach (1979b) posits that dividends are distributed due to the consistent, long-term
undervaluation of corporate capital.

The undervaluation is the result o f a dynamic

process encompassing multiple periods of total reinvestment of all firm profits followed
by firm returns less than the returns expected by investors. If firms are unable to make
distributions to investors except in the form of dividends, shareholders must include the
expected tax liabilities of future dividend payments to accurately determine market
prices. These liabilities decrease the share price investors are willing to pay so as to
increase the expected return from their investment. Stocks with dividend yields higher
than the risk-free rate likely provide positive abnormal returns from the increased risk
of these cash flows (see Bradford (1981) and Fung (1981) for further extensions).
Tax-adjusted models are criticized as incompatible with rational behavior by
investors. Miller (1986) advances the strategy of tax sheltering of income by high tax
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bracket individuals as a behavior more consistent with rational shareholder behavior.
Individuals can, of course, not purchase dividend paying shares to avoid the tax liability
of these payments. Alternatively, using a strategy first advanced by Miller and Scholes
(1978), shareholders can purchase dividend paying stocks and receive the distributions,
then simultaneously borrow funds to invest in tax-free securities. The interest charges
on the loan are used to offset the tax liability o f the dividend income while the income
from the bonds is free of tax liability and consequently does not increase the investor’s
taxable income. The firm’s value is independent o f its dividend policy due to investor
indifference between capital gains and dividends.
The use of dividend specific personal tax shelters (for example, the existing
dividend income exemption) to avoid tax liabilities is advanced by DeAngelo and
Masulis (1980). They contend that the Miller and Scholes (1978) tax shelter strategy
is not sufficient to induce positive dividend payment at equilibrium.

Fung and

Theobald (1984) model tax shelters that are not based on interest charges and apply the
theoretical results to the French, German, British, and U.S. tax systems. Dividend tax
credits are incapable of inducing a positive dividend equilibrium; non-interest related
tax shelters are required. The dividend payout level depends on the efficiency o f the
market for tax shelters and country specific tax law influences.

3.2.2 Empirical Investigation of the Tax Effect on Dividends
An examination of the pricing of the tax on dividends has been actively pursued
since the results of these studies should conclusively support either the tax-adjusted
model or the tax-avoidance model. The inevitable tax liabilities cause dividends to be
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grossed up by discounting share prices in the tax-adjusted model.

Several studies

analyze this issue by adding an additional variable representing the price o f the dividend
component to the capital asset pricing model. If the coefficient on the dividend factor
is positive, the results support the tax-adjusted model—returns on dividend-paying shares
are increased and the tax rate on dividends is greater than zero; if zero, dividend paying
shares are valued using the same pricing mechanism as non-dividend paying shares and
the results support the tax-avoidance model.
The results of these studies are diverse. Black and Scholes (1974), Miller and
Scholes (1982) and Hess (1982, 1983b) report insignificant or negative dividend
coefficients.

Christie (1990) finds a negative coefficient on a dummy variable

representing the zero dividend firm. These zero dividend firms earn abnormal negative
returns. The diverse results raise the question o f the appropriate method o f analysis
(Hess, 1983a).

Potential method of analysis inadequacies contributing to the non

homogeneity of the results include the linear model’s suitability (Blume, 1980 and
Elton, Gruber and Rentzler, 1983), the choice of the market portfolio proxy (Roll,
1977) and the influence of the information effect (Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1982
and Miller and Scholes, 1984). Table 3.2 summarizes the studies pricing the dividend
component using the capital asset pricing model.
Other authors investigate share price changes during the period surrounding the
ex-dividend date to determine if the tax on dividends is priced. Campbell and Beranek
(1955) first document the tendency for the share price to decline less on the ex-date
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TABLE 3.2
EMPIRICAL STUDIES PRICING THE TAX ON DIVIDENDS BY ADDING
A VARIABLE TO THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Black and Scholes (1974)

1936-1966
Monthly

MRA

Pre-tax stock returns are independent of dividend policy. The share price
is not influenced by choice o f dividend policy.

Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1979)

1936-1977
Monthly

MRA

Risk adjusted returns increase with increased dividend yields
implying a non-desirability of dividends. A high return is necessary to
induce purchase o f high dividend stocks.

Rosenberg and Marathe (1979)

1931-1966
Monthly

MRA
2SLS

The dividend yield term is statistically significant—the tax rate on dividends
is positive and returns on dividend paying stocks are increased. The
lack o f power o f the Black and Scholes (1974) study is due to inefficient
estimation procedures.

Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1980)

1936-1977
Monthly

XSRA

Results support Elton and Gruber (1970) and Litzenberger and
Ramaswamy (1979).

Gordon and Bradford (1980)

1926-1978
Monthly

MRA

Valuation o f dividend and capital gains does not differ systematically.
Results are consistent with price maximization but not increased tax
liability. The findings suggest an irrational preference for dividends.

Green (1980)

1962-1977
Daily

XSRA
TSRA

Dividend yield effects disseminate over time and are not just present on
ex-dividend date. The study identifies potential sources o f bias in use
of the price drop to infer tax rates.

TABLE 3.2 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES PRICING THE TAX ON DIVIDENDS BY ADDING
A VARIABLE TO THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Blume (1980)

1936-1976
Quarterly

XSRA

Dividends are preferred to capital gains despite the increased tax
liability. Average returns are approximately equal. This is explained
by the possible failure by the market to anticipate the increase o f dividends
by high yield stocks.

Morgan (1982)

1931-1977
Monthly

MRA, OLS
BJM

The abnormal return/dividend yield relation is consistent with
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) findings but not with Miller and
Scholes (1982). Different methods prevent comparisons but evidence
suggests non-linear relations.

Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1982)

1936-1980
Monthly

XSRA

Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) model reformulated. Results support
1979 findings. Stock returns and expected dividend yields are positively
correlated; the relation is non-linear.

Miller and Scholes (1982)

1940-1978
Monthly

XSRA

Short term dividend yields cannot be used to determine the tax liability
differences o f dividend and capital gains stocks. Tax effect and
announcement effect confounded in earlier studies.

Hess

1962-1979
Daily
1951-1980
Monthly

MRA

The studies finds a negative coefficient for the dividend pricing variable.
Empirical results fail to support the existence o f clienteles. Dividend
yields likely proxy for expected return changes over time.

(1982)
(1983b)

o

TABLE 3.2 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES PRICING THE TAX ON DIVIDENDS BY ADDING
A VARIABLE TO THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Auerbach (1983)

1963-1977
Daily

MRA

Tax-based clienteles exist and are relatively constant over time. Clienteles
are strongly motivated by dividend/price ratios; largely unaffected by
firm specific risk and other firm traits.

Elton, Gruber and Rentzler
(1983)

1936-1976
Annual

MRA

Dividend yields and excess returns are positively related.
The
phenomenon is likely related to tax effects but other factors can influence
the relation.

Ang and Peterson (1985)

1973-1983
Annual

XSRA

The role o f dividends as a proxy for risk is examined using ex-ante data
that increases tax and information effect confounding. A positive
expected return/yield relation is demonstrated but the relation displays
a large variance. Returns and beta are positively related; returns and
size are negatively related.

Christie (1990)

1946-1985
Monthly

MRA

Zero dividend firms earn negative abnormal returns. The results conflict
with Blume (1980). The findings cannot exclusively be attributed to the
tax effect but could possibly be influenced by a dividend expectations
effect.

1 See Appendix A for method o f analysis abbreviations.
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than the amount of the dividend payment. The dividend/price decline differential is not
pronounced.

Later work (Durand and May, 1960) supports this finding but the

discrepancies between the dividend payment amount and the price decline in this study
of American Telephone and Telegraph common stock are also negligible. Marginal
shareholders must be indifferent between holding the ex-dividend shares and the after
tax dividend or owning the share before the dividend is paid (Elton and Gruber, 1970).
This equality allows for indirect estimation o f the shareholders’ tax rates.
Table 3.3 summarizes empirical work relating the price change to dividend ratio
around ex-dividend days. A positive tax rate is implied if the price change/dividend
ratio is bounded by 0 and 1. Campbell and Beranek (1955), Elton and Gruber (1970)
and Kaplanis (1986) find evidence that supports the tax clientele hypothesis.

Other

authors (Brooks and Edwards, 1980 and Kalay, 1982) question the method’s ability to
infer tax brackets due to the influence of short term trading activity and other
confounding factors. Gagnon and Suret (1991) show that the return variance in most
empirical study samples precludes tax rate inference and the consequent clientele
estimation. Although the full impact of short term traders on ex-dividend day returns
is not known, the impact o f these investors has decreased as abnormal returns and
transaction costs have decreased following the initiation of a negotiated commission
structure (Finnerty, 1981, Eades, Hess and Kim, 1984 and Lakonishok and Vermaelen,
1986). Karpoff and Walkling (1988) are unable to demonstrate any correlation between
transaction costs and ex-dividend day returns. The importance o f transaction costs to
the short term trader is discussed by Kalay (1982, 1984) and Elton, Gruber and
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Rentzler (1984).

Kalay (1982, 1984) asserts that transaction costs are not a major

determinant of trading strategy and do not significantly affect short term trading activity
because floor trader and specialist commission rates are not significant. Traders will
exploit the arbitrage opportunities of the share price changes on ex-dividend day if the
abnormal returns are large.

On the other hand, Elton, Gruber and Rentzler (1984)

refute Kalay’s findings because of the underestimation o f transaction costs.

These

authors believe that the transaction costs significantly affect trading profits to the extent
that abnormal profit capture is not possible and short term trading activity effects are
negated.
A third approach explores the effect a change in the capital gains/dividend tax
differential has on the share price of dividend and non-dividend paying firms.
According to the tax-adjusted model, a change in the tax rate should cause a change in
the demand curve for dividends and a change in the pricing. Alternatively, no change
in the pricing of dividends should occur under the tax-avoidance model.
Table 3.4 summarizes empirical analyses of this topic.

In a study o f stock

returns before the introduction of federal income taxes in the United States, Barclay
(1987) finds support for the tax-adjusted model since no tax clientele effect is present.
Investor dividend preference is little affected by changes in the tax code (Crockett and
Friend, 1988). Grammatikos (1989) reports that abnormal returns in high yield stocks
have increased following the 1984 Tax Reform Act. Robin (1991) and Wu and Hsu
(1992) find support for the tax clientele hypothesis in the period preceding and
following the 1986 Tax Reform Act (1986 TRA). Conversely, Michaely (1991) and

TABLE 3.3
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN PRICE DURING THE PERIOD
SURROUNDING EX-DIVIDEND DAYS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Studies Using Price Change to Dividend Ratio
Elton and Gruber (1970)

1966-1967
Daily

EG

SupportM&M (1961) clientele effect; results suggest changes in dividend
policy cause changes in shareholder wealth. Dividend yield and exdividend price drop are positively correlated. This study demonstrates
a preference o f highly (low) taxed investors for capital gains (dividends).

Long (1978)

1956-1976
Daily

PriceA/PriceB ratio

The study analyzes two classes of utility corporation stock differing only
in dividend policy. Investors prefer cash dividends to stock dividends
despite lower after tax returns.

EG

Shareholders of electric utility companies prefer dividends to capital gains.
Two types o f investors are present in the market—taxable investors able
to claim 85 permit interest deductions and investors seeking a high current
income.

Modified EG

Refines Elton and Gruber (1970) due to potential biases in original study.
Results support the hypothesis that a higher dividend tax allows short
term traders to make arbitrage profits.

Finnerty (1981)

Kalay (1982)

1978
Daily

1966-1967
Daily

TABLE 3.3 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN PRICE DURING THE PERIOD
SURROUNDING EX-DIVIDEND DAYS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Studies Using Price Change to Dividend Ratio (continued)
Kaplanis (1986)

1979-1984
Daily

Option price changes

Supports clientele hypothesis; results inconsistent with short term trading
hypothesis. Expected and actual differences are not significant.

Poterba (1986)

1965-1984
Daily

PriceA/PriceB ratio

Re-examines Long (1978) data. Stock dividend shares have higher retums-a finding consistent with capital gain preference. The price decrease
following cash dividend payment is less than the amount of the dividend.

Skinner and Gilster (1990)

1980-1985
Daily

EG

Other factors likely confound the findings of earlier studies (i.e. Elton
and Gruber, 1970). The dividend clientele effect is likely an industry
effect rather than a tax effect.

Sterk and Vandenberg (1990)

1984-1986
Daily

PriceA/PriceB ratio

In a study using Citizens Utilities stock (also used by Long (1978) and
Poterba (1986), the authors find a dividend/capital gains tax differential
premium exists but its effects are eclipsed by the shareholder’s preference
for cash dividends. Tax laws affect share value.

-j

TABLE 3.3 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN PRICE DURING THE PERIOD
SURROUNDING EX-DIVIDEND DAYS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Studies Using Abnormal Positive Returns
Eades, Hess and Kim (1984)

1962-1980
Daily

Modified EG

Capital gains/dividend tax differential incompletely explains ex-dividend
day excess returns. Ex-dividend day returns decrease after negotiated
commissions are allowed. Return distribution results support the taxadjusted hypothesis.

Lakonishok and Vermaelen
(1986)

1970-1981
Daily

ES

Test tax arbitrage using trading volume around the ex-dividend date.
A significant increase volume is positively (negatively) related to dividend
yield (transaction costs).

Bailey (1988)

1976-1983
Daily

ClassA/ClassB ratio

Cash dividend paying shares sell at a premium to stock dividend paying
shares. Premiums are explained by changes in the relative value and
trading costs. No evidence is shown for a cash dividend preference.

Karpoff and Walkling (1988)

1964-1985
Daily

XSRA
OLS

Ex-dividend day returns are significantly affected by short term traders.
This effect is primarily in high-yield stocks and has grown following
negotiated commission introduction. Trading activities vary positively
(negatively) with yield (costs).
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TABLE 3.3 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN PRICE DURING THE PERIOD
SURROUNDING EX-DIVIDEND DAYS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Studies Using Abnormal Positive Returns (continued)
Bajaj and Vijh (1990)

1962-1987
Daily

ES

The price reaction to a change in dividend policy is more pronounced
in high yield stocks. The findings support the dividend clientele
hypothesis. The small firm reaction is partially attributable to higher
relative costs. Information and yield effects are confounded.

Karpoff and Walkling (1990)

1973-1985
Daily

ES

Ex-dividend day returns are positively related to bid-ask spreads. The
relation is stronger in high yield stocks. Short term trading activity
significantly affects abnormal returns.

Venkatesh (1991)

1988
Intraday

Modified EG

The ex-dividend day price decrease and trading volume increase is related
to transaction costs. Trading activity decreases abnormal returns.

Stickel (1991)

1972-1980
Daily

ES

The study examines non-convertible preferred stocks. Increased
liquidity is associated with decreased abnormal returns and increased
increased volume. Transaction costs preclude short term trading profits.

Dubofsky (1992)

1962-1987
Daily

Modified EG

Market microstructure (specifically NYSE and AMEX trading rules)
precipitate ex-dividend day abnormal returns.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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Hearth and Rimbey (1992) find few changes in market activity following the 1986 TRA
and little support for the tax clientele theory.
Following a sequence o f tax reform acts in Canada, Khoury and Smith (1977),
Morgan (1980), Amoako-Adu (1983) and Booth and Johnson (1984) find support for
the tax-adjusted model using Canadian stock market data from the period preceding and
following the changes in the tax law. Notwithstanding these findings, Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1983) report results more supportive of the short term trading hypothesis.
The tax-adjusted model is also supported in studies using British data (Feldstein, 1970,
Poterba and Summers, 1984 and Ang, Blackwell and Megginson, 1991).
Another approach uses direct examination of investor portfolios to test the tax
clientele hypothesis. The tax-adjusted model predicts that certain subgroups of taxable
investors will hold dividend paying stocks while the tax-avoidance model posits that
only tax exempt investors and shareholders who are able to shelter the dividend income
will hold dividend paying shares.
Blume, Crockett and Friend (1974) find an inverse relation between portfolio
dividend yield and the investor’s tax bracket. Although high income investors hold
lower dividend paying stocks in their portfolios, the yield differences between the high
income investor portfolios and the low income investor portfolios were less than the tax
bracket differential. In a later investigation of individual brokerage accounts, Pettit
(1977) finds that the large dividend/capital gains tax differential induces high tax
bracket individuals to hold low yield issues. Portfolio dividend yields also increase as
age and liquidity needs increase. A subsequent re-examination o f the Pettit (1977) investor

TABLE 3.4
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN THE TAX LIABILITY OF DIVIDENDS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

U.S. Tax Law Changes
Barclay (1987)

1900-1910
Daily

EG

Examines stock price movements on ex-dividend day before federal income
taxes. Results supportthetax-adjustedhypothesis. Notaxclienteleeffect
is found. Dividend/capital gain taxation differentials affect individual
portfolio choices. The value of the firm is affected by its dividend policy.

Crockett and Friend (1988)

1940-1985
Annual

TSRA
OLS

Dividend payments cause significant tax liabilities. Investors are not
indifferent between dividends and capital gains. Results are consistent
with an after-tax preference for dividends. Tax law changes have little
effect shareholder dividend preference.

Grammatikos (1989)

1975-1985
Daily

Modified EG
ES

An increase in abnormal return on ex-dividend day follows the 1984 Tax
Reform Act. The increase is found only in high yield stocks. Shortterm
trading is inhibited by tax law changes.

Robin (1991)

1984-1988
Daily

ES

Supports the tax clientele hypothesis. A statistically significant decrease
in ex-dividend day returns follows the 1986 TRA. Short term trading
activity has also diminished.

TABLE 3.4 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN THE TAX LIABILITY OF DIVIDENDS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

U.S. Tax Law Changes (continued)
Michaely (1991)

1986-1989
Daily

Modified EG

Analyzes the ex-dividend day premiums before and after the 1986 TRA.
The 1986 TRA has little effect on ex-day returns. Short term traders
are mainly responsible for ex-day effects.

Givoly, Hayn, Ofer and Sang
(1992)

1983-1987
Annual

XSRA

Personal tax rates affect corporate capital structure decisions. The study
finds indirect support for dividend clientele existence.

Hearth and Rimbey (1992)

1984-1988
Daily

EG, NP Tests

Results do not support the tax clientele hypothesis. Few significant
changes in ex-day returns following the 1986 TRA.

Wu and Hsu (1992)

1984-1990
Daily

ES

Ex-dividend day premiums increase significantly after the 1986 TRA.
Short term trading volume decreases due to the increase in corporate
tax liability. Lower yield stock price changes are consistent with the
tax clientele hypothesis. Ex-dividend day premiums on high yield issues
are related to arbitrage trading.
Canadian Tax Law Changes

Khoury and Smith (1970)

1962-1973
Annual

TSRA
Means Test

Changes in taxation of capital gains induce changes in dividend policy.
Canadian corporate dividendpolicy is dissimilar to U . S. corporate policy.
Aggregate dividends depend on the capital gain/dividend tax differential.
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TABLE 3.4 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN THE TAX LIABILITY OF DIVIDENDS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Canadian Tax Law Changes (continued)
Morgan (1980)

1968-1977
Monthly

MRA,
OLS, GLS

Dividend and capitals gains are almost perfect substitutes following the
tax law changes in 1972 and were imperfect substitutes preceding the
passage of the act. The change in substitutability is the result of the
introduction of a tax on capital gains, an increase in the dividend tax
credit or a combination of these factors.

Lakonishok and Vermaelen
(1983)

1971-1972
Daily

Modified EG

Results are not compatible with Elton and Gruber (1970). Marginal
shareholder dividend/capital gain valuation is not reflected in ex-dividend
day price behavior. The short term trading hypothesis is supported.
Ex-day price declines are smaller in Canada.

Amoako-Adu (1983)

1968-1978
Monthly

ES

Significant differences between the effects of tax reform on high yield
and low yield stocks is demonstrated. Shareholders use personal tax
liabilities to price stocks.

Booth and Johnston (1984)

1970-1980
Daily

EG

Shareholders prefer capital gains to dividends. The short term trading
hypothesis is not supported by empirical findings. Weakly supports the
dividend tax clientele hypothesis.

TABLE 3.4 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN THE TAX LIABILITY OF DIVIDENDS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

British Tax Law Changes
Feldstein (1970)

1953-1964
Quarterly

XSRA, OLS, GLS, IV,
ALS

Changes in the tax rate affect dividend policy. 40-60 percent of the effect
of the change ensues in the first year.

Poterba and Summers (1984)

1955-1981
Daily
Monthly

XSRA, GLS

Results support the tax-adjusted model. Taxes are partially responsible
for the positive dividend yield/stock return relation. The results support
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979,1982) and conflict with Miller and
Scholes (1982) and Gordon and Bradford (1980).

Ang, Blackwell and Megginson
(1991)

1969-1982
Annual

Means Test

Taxes rates affect dividend payout levels and share valuation by investors.
Stock dividend shares sell at a premium when compared to cash dividend
shares if the tax liability of capital gains is lower. Cash dividends are
preferred if tax liabilities are equal.

1 See Appendix A for method o f analysis abbreviations.
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portfolios by Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum (1978) finds little evidence of
the tax clientele effect—rather, dividend paying shares are found in the portfolios of
investors with differing tax liabilities.
A further group o f studies attempts to determine if shareholders pay taxes on
dividends. The tax-adjusted model predicts that tax payments will be made because
pre-tax returns are grossed up due to potential investor awareness of the tax liability;
the tax-avoidance model predicts that no taxes will be paid because non tax exempt
investors will shelter the income.

Feenberg (1981) finds that only 2 'A percent of

dividends are paid to individuals eligible to take the interest deduction proposed by
Miller and Scholes (1978).

Also,

Peterson, Peterson and Ang (1985) report that

shareholders pay considerable taxes on dividends and that they do not shelter their
income.

Other research shows that an increase (decrease) in the tax liability of

dividends versus capital gains leads to a decrease (increase) in aggregate dividends in
the United States (Lent, 1948 and Brittain, 1966), Canada (Khoury and Smith, 1977)
and Great Britain (Feldstein, 1970).

3.2.3 Summary
Transaction costs, tax differentials, and heterogeneous shareholder expectations
should induce a capital gain preference if firms are following an optimal investment
strategy (Lintner, 1962). Stiglitz (1981) and Modigliani (1982) assert that corporations
acting in the shareholder’s best interest should pay zero dividends if capital gains tax
liability is less than dividend tax liability.

However, corporations continue to pay

dividends despite their apparent liabilities. This is not completely unexpected. General
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equilibria of standard finance models demand that prices adjust upward to induce firms
to make taxable distributions (DeAngelo, 1991).
The underlying tax structure significantly affects corporate dividend policy.
Empirical analysis of these effects better support the tax-adjusted model than the
alternative tax-avoidance model. Under the tax-adjusted model, high dividend yield
stocks with high tax liabilities are priced to increase the pre-tax expected returns. The
theory that rational shareholders require a higher return from dividend paying shares
is logically consistent.
Positive support for the dividend clientele hypothesis is shown by the differences
in ex-dividend day return performance of high yield and low yield stocks (Haugen and
Senbet, 1986). However, the proportion o f non-dividend paying stocks is much smaller
than expected if the majority of investors are subject to the tax liabilities associated with
dividends.

3.3

THEORETICAL
ASYMMETRIES

EXPLANATION

BASED

ON

INFORMATIONAL

The market imperfection of asymmetric information is the basis for three distinct
efforts to explain corporate dividend policy.

The mitigation of the informational

asymmetries between managers and owners via unexpected changes in dividend policy
is the cornerstone of dividend signaling models.

Agency cost theory uses dividend

policy to better align the interests of shareholders and corporate managers. The free
cash flow hypothesis combines attributes of both the signaling and agency costs
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paradigms; the payment of dividends can decrease the level of funds available for
perquisite consumption by corporate managers.

3.3.1 Signaling and the Information Content of Dividend Hypothesis
In their seminal work, M&M argue that the share price is independent of
dividend policy—the value o f a share reflects both the future cash flow stream and
future growth opportunities. M&M acknowledge that dividend changes influence stock
prices and attribute this phenomenon to the "information content of dividends".

A

stock price change resulting from a change in dividend payout due to the informational
content o f dividends represents differences in the private information known by
corporate managers and the information available to the public.

Only unexpected

changes in dividend levels and the release of new information should affect stock prices
under perfect market assumptions.
Corporate managers hold private information concerning the firm’s future value.
Managers are motivated to release this information to investors but must do so
indirectly to prevent competing firms from profiting from the release. The signal of
this information must be credible—i.e. costly to prevent false signaling by other firms
in the marketplace. If managers have information that is not known by the public and
an incentive to release this information indirectly, they can relay this information to
shareholders through unexpected changes in dividend policy (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
This price reaction to announcement of changes in dividend policy is rational
(Myers, 1987).

The dividend information message o f unobservable true earnings

foreshadows expected future earnings. The market price of the shares should increase
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(decrease) from the raised (lowered) expectations.

Communication of managerial

expectations using dividends is less ambiguous than earnings announcements since
dividend policy is solely at the discretion of management. A reluctance on the part of
managers to reduce dividends is a necessary condition for dividend use as a credible
signal (Kalay, 1980).
The results of early empirical attempts to support the information content of
dividends hypothesis are ambiguous. Separate studies by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and
Roll (1969), Petitt (1972,1976), Griffin (1976) and Laub (1976) show positive
(negative) excess returns accruing following unexpected dividend increases (decreases).
Works by Ang (1975) and Gonedes (1978) fail to support the premise while Watts
(1973) finds that transaction costs preclude excess return capture by market participants.
Charest (1978) reports that earnings announcement and dividend announcement effects
are confounded.

Inconsistencies in the results can be traced to differences in data,

sample period, methods of analysis and model misspecification.

Table 3.5 is a

summary of these works.

3.3.1.a Theoretical Signaling Models
Akerlof’s (1970) model of the used car industry as a pooling equilibrium in the
absence o f signaling activities illuminates the costs o f informational asymmetries. The
generalization of Akerlof s model by Spence (1974) became the prototype for all
financial models o f signaling.

The model defines a unique and specific signaling

equilibrium in that market participants seeking employment in a world o f uncertainty
and asymmetric information rely on signals of their quality rather than reputation

TABLE 3.5
EARLY EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDENDS HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll
(1969)

1927-1959
Monthly

ES
TSRA

Changes in dividends are assumed to signal changes in long run managerial
expectations. Increased prices are associated with concurrent stock splits
and dividend increases; decreases if dividends decrease. Markets adjust
rapidly to the information.

Pettit (1972)

1964-1969
Daily

ES
XSRA

Dividends relay significant new information of managerial estimates of
earning power. Moderate dividend increases are associated with favorable
market movements; large and small increases don’t affect returns; all
decreases in dividends reduce returns. Prices react rapidly. Dividend
announcements relay more information than earnings announcements.

Watts (1973)

1946-1965
Monthly

XSRA
OLS

The positive effects have no economic value since transaction costs erase
abnormal returns. Only inconsequential differences in the six month
performance of firms are seen following dividend increases or dividend
decreases. The results can be confused by noise and confounding effects.

Ezell (1974)

1966-1970
Annual

MRA

Formation of expectations of dividend and earnings levels impacts the
informational content of dividends.

Ang (1975)

1966-1971
Quarterly

Cross spectral analysis

Results fail to support the informational content of dividends. Short run
earnings and dividends are highly correlated implying that dividendpolicy
is not entirely a residual decision.
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TABLE 3.5 (continued)
EARLY EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDENDS HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Griffen (1976)

1968-1973
Monthly

XSRA
ES

Earnings, dividends, and earnings forecasts jointly significantly affect
security returns. Analysts’ forecasts and dividend changes (especially
decreases) carry unique information.

Laub (1976)

1946-1965
Annual

MRA

Refutes Watts (1973) due to incorrect analysis of the empirical results.
The results support the release of future earning prospects information
via dividends. Watts (1976a) rebuts these findings.

Petitt (1976)

1946-1965
Monthly

MRA

Review of Watts (1973) method of analysis. Dividend changes relay
relevant information. Watts (1976b) argues that Petitt’s model is
misspecified and results are confounded by external effects.

Charest (1978)

1962-1969
Daily

ES

Stock prices increase (decline) following dividend increase (reduction)
announcements. Significant abnormal returns accrue in the months
following the announcement of a change in dividend policy. The study
does not segregate dividend and earnings announcement effects; dividend
announcements do not necessarily transmit information.

Gonedes (1978)

1946-1972
Annual

XSRA

The results do not support the dividend information hypothesis.
Unexpected dividend changes provide little additional information to the
market—shareholders already have all pertinent information.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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acquisition to find positions. Although formulated in the job market, Spence believes
that findings can be extended to a limited number o f other settings (admissions
procedures, promotions, and credit application). A necessary condition for signaling
to be successful is an inverse relation between a signal’s costs and true productivityrelative costs are higher for inferior workers to signal. The signaling mechanisms must
be controlled, must be able to be modified by the signaler, and must be costly. Since
managers cannot determine a worker’s quality through observation, a high quality
worker signals his value through additional education resulting in higher pay. A similar
model is formulated for the insurance market (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).

The

general sufficient conditions for a signaling equilibrium to exist are formalized by Riley
(1979).
Numerous theoretical financial models of signaling have been formulated to
explain how managerial activities attempt to reduce the information asymmetries
between corporate shareholders and managers.

These include share repurchases

(Stewart, 1976, Vermaelen, 1981 and Barclay and Smith, 1988), ownership equity
proportion (Leland and Pyle, 1977), capital structure (Ross, 1977), convertible bond
conversion (Harris and Raviv, 1985), insider trading (Damodaran and Liu, 1993) and
models with dual signals o f the insider trading activity occurring around other corporate
signaling activities (John and Mishra, 1990 and John and Lang, 1991).

Signaling

models of corporate dividend policy are formalized by Bhattacharya (1979,1980),
Talmor (1981), Hakansson (1982), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985),
Bar-Yosef and Huffman (1986), Makhija and Thompson (1986), Ambarish, John and
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Williams (1987), Ofer and Thakor (1987), Kumar (1988), Kale and Noe (1990) and
Rodriguez (1992).
The majority of financial theorists believe that signaling via corporate dividend
policy has a lower cost than alternatives that would accomplish the same result. If less
costly alternatives are available, prudent corporate managers would choose these
alternatives rather than dividend policy to signal their inside information (Ambarish,
John and Williams (1987) and Ofer and Thakor (1987)).

The use o f dividends as

signals implies that alternative methods o f signaling are not perfect substitutes (Asquith
and Mullins (1986)).
The dividend signaling model developed by Bhattacharya (1979) is descended
from Ross (1977). In this model of an all equity firm, a higher dividend payment per
share implies a higher firm value.

Unexpected increases in dividends are favorable

signals relaying unique information of managements’ expectations of future cash flows.
The costs associated with dividend payments—the opportunity costs of the use of
internal funds or the transaction costs associated with external financing—make the
signal costly for firms lacking positive information to imitate. Unlike Spence (1974),
the costs of signaling occur in the future while the firm benefits from the strategy
during the current period. The increase in share value associated with the signal offsets
the shareholders’ tax liability from dividend income. In this environment, closely held
firms are likely to pay higher dividends to communicate their value to outside
shareholders because information availability is constrained in closely held firms. If
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the least profitable firms pay zero dividends, the dividend and earnings relation will be
linear. The model’s predictions are supported by Brittain (1966).
Bhattacharya (1980) extends the model to a two-period intertemporal setting
while Talmor (1981) augments the model using a multivariate signaling paradigm with
multiple valuation parameters and signaling mechanisms. In Talmor’s model, managers
make several financing decisions simultaneously. The firm’s management considers all
financial decisions as a single operation even if the individual activities are not
explicitly recognized by the shareholders as signaling vehicles. Makhija and Thompson
(1986) define the least profitable firm differently than Bhattacharya (1979) in their
extension of the model.

If all firms have non-zero earnings, the dividend/earnings

relation will be nonlinear. To ensure equilibrium existence, the dividend policy of the
most profitable firms must be constrained and additional limiting conditions likely have
to be imposed.
A signaling equilibrium will exist only if firm quality dispersion is limited in the
extension of the Bhattacharya (1979) model developed by Rodriguez (1992). If a cash
flow range is specified for each firm, an upper bound on firm quality distribution
exists; an equilibrium is not feasible beyond the bound. If the lowest quality firms have
zero cash flows, dividends will increase linearly with firm quality in equilibrium. If
some firms pay excess dividends due to the wide distribution in firm quality, an
equilibrium is not likely. Dividend signaling levels in equilibrium are an increasing
function o f the firms’ differences in quality (consistent with Ofer and Thakor, 1987).

92
An equilibrium with homogeneous shareholder beliefs and efficient markets
precludes the use of dividend policy to signal (Hakansson, 1982). Increased market
efficiency via private information dissemination through corporate dividend policy will
occur provided one o f three sufficient conditions are met—shareholders have
heterogeneous probability assessments, markets are incomplete, or investors have
different consumption allocations over time. The three are not mutually exclusive. In
this model, the information content of a change in dividend policy is a significant but
the signaling function alone cannot explain dividend persistence. Unexpected changes
in dividends convey private information of expected future payoff patterns. The release
of information through dividend policy changes proxies for additional financial markets.
The model only discusses gains in shareholder welfare from dividend payments; it does
not explain how investors induce managers to pay dividends or the preference for cash
dividends.
John and Williams (1985) develop a signaling model with multiple equilibria
using the assumption that firms with unique private information will receive varied
marginal benefits following changes in dividend policy. The model is developed in an
adverse environment where only dividends are taxed. Managers’ expectations o f future
returns are signaled. An increase in dividends increases share price-consistent with the
goal o f shareholder value maximization (this goal differs from Bhattacharya, 1979).
Information dissemination cause a premium to be offered by investors for dividend
paying shares that offsets the costs of the signaling-increased shareholder tax liabilities
and constrained firm liquidity. In equilibrium, firms with more favorable information
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pay higher dividends and are consequently more highly valued by investors. Firms
with lower cash flow levels pay dividends no greater than firms with higher expected
cash flows. Dividend clienteles exist in this model. Although modeled in a world with
unfavorable market conditions, an equilibrium exists with dissipative dividends. The
firm’s efficient equilibrium is determined by internalizing the investment decision.
Miller and Rock (1985) model a net dividend concept—the unexpected net
dividend is determined by subtracting external financing from the total dividend paid—to
signal expected current earnings information that implies future earnings levels. The
model combines dividends and external financing that are stylized as different sides of
the same coin. The signal of current earnings differs from the models of Bhattacharya
(1979) and John and Williams (1985). The cost o f the signal in the model is a nonoptimal investment policy—the payment of dividends uses cash that could otherwise be
used for investment opportunities. Earning, dividend and financing announcements are
closely related and dividends and earnings announcements are perfect substitutes if the
model’s assumptions are met. Unexpected increases in dividends provide increases in
shareholder wealth.
The assumption of a managerial incentive reward/penalty policy underlies the
signaling model developed by Bar-Yosef and Huffman (1986).

In this equilibrium,

dividends increase as managerial expectations of cash flow increase but the marginal
effect of cash flows on dividends decreases as cash flows increase.

Consistent with

Leland and Pyle (1977), higher levels of uncertainty are present in firms with lower
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dividend payout ratios. Unlike Bhattacharya (1979) interest rate effects on dividend
payment levels are indeterminant.
Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) generalize the models o f Myers and Majluf
(1984), John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985).

In this model,

dividends are less efficient than other methods (investment policy, share repurchase and
equity issues) o f releasing private information to the market. The private information
known to managers is communicated through combinations of changes in dividend and
investment policies or changes in dividend policy and new equity issue or share
repurchase announcements.

If all private information can be conveyed via an

alternative signaling venue, relaying information through changes in dividend policy is
redundant.

Dividends exists in this equilibrium only if the cost o f using multiple

signaling mechanisms is less than using individual vehicles.

The tax liability of

dividend payment is the cost of signaling. The use o f two corporate policy decisions
minimizes the costs associated with signaling.
In Ofer and Thakor (1987), both dividends and stock repurchases are used as
signals. The difference in costs of the two approaches precludes their substitutability.
In addition to the financing costs associated with dividend payments, share repurchases
have the additional cost o f increasing managerial risk due to the proportional increase
in managerial ownership following a repurchase.

It follows that share repurchases

disseminate more information due to their higher cost. Dividends are used to signal
small market underpricings o f the firm while repurchase is reserved for periods when
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the stock is significantly underpriced due to the cost differential between the two
methods.
The ability to use a multivariate signal does not preclude the use o f a single
signal. In the model developed by Hausch and Seward (1993), cash distributions are
assumed to signal changes in managerial expectations of firm potential. Two types of
distribution policies exist, a deterministic policy with known, declared amounts of cash
payments (dividends) and a stochastic policy characterized by a firm’s precommitment
to pay an unspecified amount of cash (share repurchases). Each alternative has distinct
signaling properties and the distribution’s size and the announcement effect’s magnitude
are uncorrelated. If firms have identical production possibilities but dissimilar cash
levels, firms with decreasing absolute risk aversion are more likely to hold higher levels
of cash and have a lower relative cost o f stochastic disbursement. High quality firms
can distinguish themselves from low quality firms by their choice of distribution policy.
A corporation’s prospects can only be partially revealed using dividend policy
because the payment stream is routinely smoothed by managers; changes in dividend
policy are only a rough signal of future expected earnings. Kumar (1988) models a
rational expectations signaling equilibrium in that dividends convey only broad
information of changes in a firm’s prospects. The model implies that although dividend
increases (decreases) signal important positive (negative) information about the firm’s
prospects, dividends are a poor predictor of corporate earnings due to the smoothing
process applied by managers.
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In a two-period model developed by Kale and Noe (1990), dividend increases
signal increased future cash flow stability and decreased riskiness o f the cash flows.
In the model, dividends are positively correlated with share price returns and are
inversely related to expected cash flow variance and underwriting costs.

3 .3 .l.b Empirical Tests of the Informational Content of Dividends Hypothesis
Empirical tests of the information content o f dividend hypothesis are largely
supportive of the theory. A large number of studies using diverse sample periods find
that unexpected changes in dividend policy relay information and the information
released by a change in dividend policy is not trivial.

The magnitude o f the price

change associated with unexpected decreases in dividend payouts is greater than the
change following unexpected increases and is positively related to the excess returns and
trading volume associated with the change. Earnings and dividend announcements are
not perfect substitutes; each convey unique information. Changes in regular dividends
provide more information than special dividends.

A size effect (more pronounced

reactions following dividend changes by smaller firms) due to the decreased level of
small firm information available to the market is shown. Results can be confounded
by ex-dividend/announcement effects, wealth transfers and decreases in profitable
investment opportunities.

A summary of the empirical studies supporting the

information content of dividend hypothesis is found in Table 3.6.
Several studies show results that contrast with the previous findings and that are
inconsistent with the information content of dividend hypothesis/signaling models. The
impact of an unexpected and substantial change in dividend policy is more diverse and

TABLE 3.6
EMPIRICAL TESTS SUPPORTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Aharony and Swary (1980)

1963-1976
Daily

ES

Separates earnings and dividend announcement effects. Each conveys
unique information and are associated with significant abnormal returns.
Negative announcement effects are stronger. Results strongly support
the information content hypothesis.

Kalay (1980)

1956-1975
Annual

Dividend change analysis

The Ross (1977) model is applied to corporate dividend policy and finds
an indefinite evidence of managerial reluctance to decrease dividends.
The few cases of forced dividend reduction imply that the information
content of dividends cannot be rejected analyzing dividend decreases.

Kwan (1981)

1973-1977
Quarterly

ES

Extends Watts (1973) with an modified Lintner (1956) and Fama and
Babiak (1968) model. The information is non-trivial.

Woolridge (1982)

1970-1977
Daily

ES

Positive (negative) debt and preferred stock returns result from
unanticipated increases (decreases) in dividends. Signaling is the main
influence on security prices but wealth transfer and confounding effects
cannot be ruled out.

Eades (1982)

1960-1979
Monthly
Daily

MRA
ES

Signaling is more effective in lower risk firms. The negative correlation
between yield and variance implies more information is released by a
change in dividend policy in a low risk firm. Results support the
information hypothesis.
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TABLE 3.6 (continued)
EMPIRICAL TESTS SUPPORTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Woolridge (1983)

1971-1977
Daily

ES
NP Tests

Dividend change announcements convey information; the unexpected
dividend change/abnormal return relation is significant. If anticipated,
no additional information is released.

Asquith and Mullins (1983)

1964-1980
Daily

ES

Initial dividend announcements result in significantpositiveexcess returns
and increased investor wealth.
Subsequent dividend increase
announcement effects are greater than initiation or resumption
announcement effects. Dividend announcements relay unique information.

Brickley (1983)

1969-1979
Daily

ES

Regular dividend announcement effects are greater and more permanent
than those associated with special dividends .Both announcements convey
positive information. Dividend increases or special dividends precede
earnings decreases.

Divecha and Morse (1983)

1977-1979
Daily

ES

The increase in share price is directly proportional to the magnitude of
of the dividend increase announcement. The results are consistent with
the informationhypothesisbut the results are likely confounded by effects
from a perceived decrease in profitable investment opportunities.

Penman (1983)

1968-1973
Annual

TSRA
Means Test

Managers increase earnings forecasts rather than increase dividends;
dividend decreases are not associated with decreases in earnings. Dividend
announcements carry information but less effectively than earnings
announcements if small.
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TABLE 3.6 (continued)
EMPIRICAL TESTS SUPPORTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Kane, Lee and Marcus
(1984)

1979-1981
Daily

ES
MRA

Earnings and dividend announcement individual effects and interactions
result in abnormal returns. Earnings and dividend announcements are
not perfect substitutes.

Handjinicolaou and Kalay
(1984)

1975-1976
Daily

ES

Bond price changes around dividend announcement support the dividend
informationhypothesis. The information conveyed is the expected future
profitability of the firm. Decreases in dividends negatively affect bond
prices; increases have no effect on bond prices.

Benesh, Keown and Pinkerton
(1984)

1971-1978
Daily

ES

Anticipated dividend omissions and large decreases depress stock prices.
Initiations of dividends are associated with significant positive returns.
Reaction to unfavorable announcements is more significant. Results
strongly support the informational hypothesis.

Dielman and Oppenheimer
(1984)

1969-1977
Daily

RCRA

Random coefficient results support the information content hypothesis.
Dividend change announcements alter shareholder expectations. The
price adjustment is protracted over the month following the announcement.

Kalay and Lowenstein
(1985)

1962-1980
Daily

ES

Positive net announcement effects. Excess returns accruing during the
announcement period partially compensate investors for the increase in
variance and systematic risk during the period.
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TABLE 3.6 (continued)
EMPIRICAL TESTS SUPPORTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Eades, Hess and Kim
(1985)

1962-1980
Daily

ES

The market’s response to dividend announcement is lagged due to
announcement effect and ex-dividend effect confounding. No lag occurs
if the ex-dividend effect is controlled for. The reaction to the dividend
information effect is overly optimistic.

Asquith and Mullins (1986)

1964-1980
Daily

ES

Dividend initiation produces positive excess returns. The magnitude of
the dividend is positively correlated with the size of abnormal return.
The returns are larger than the dividend/capital gains tax differential.
Subsequent increases are also associated with positive excess returns.

Kalay and Lowenstein
(1986)

1979-1981
Daily

ES

Managers select eamings/dividendannouncement dates to impact returns.
Return decreases following delayed dividend decrease announcement are
more pronounced.

Richardson, Sefcik and
Thompson (1986)

1969-1982
Daily

XSRA

Significant positive returns are associated with dividend initiation.
Increases in trading volume from future earnings represent more than
a change in shareholder clientele. The findings support the information
hypothesis. Trading volume and dividend changes are positively related.

Ofer and Siegel (1987)

1976-1984
Daily

MRA, IV

Tests dividend signaling hypothesis using earnings forecast error and
dividend change correlation. A change in dividend policy relays
information to the market—analysts revise earnings forecasts following
a change in dividend policy.
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TABLE 3.6 (continued)
EMPIRICAL TESTS SUPPORTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Healy and Palepu (1988)

1954-1963
1969-1982
Quarterly

XSRA

Increased (decreased) earnings are associated with dividend initiation
(omission). Positive (negative) earnings are documented one year prior
and post dividend initiation (omission). Changes provide additional
information on future earnings.

Eddy and Seifert (1988)

1983-1985
Daily

ES

Larger dividend increases more significantly affect small firms.
significant size/price reaction relation is shown.

Fehrs, Benesh and Peterson
(1988)

1980-1984
Daily

ES

Excess return is positively (negatively) correlated with security yield if
dividends are increased (decreased). Reaction is conditional on yield.

Damodaran (1989)

1981-1985
Daily

EPS/DPS analysis
NP Tests

Friday earnings and dividend announcements tend to be more negative.
Smaller firms are affected more. The weekend effect is not related to
earnings and dividend announcements.

Venkatesh (1989)

1972-1983
Daily

NP Tests

Dividend information proxies for earnings announcement information
following dividend initiation. The findings support the signaling
hypothesis. Volatility decreases follow dividend initiation implying less
uncertainty following initiation.

Manakyan and Carroll (1990)

1979-1983
Quarterly

NP Tests
GC Test

Dividends signal reliability and precede unexpected earnings changes
and changes in short term firm performance. The consistency of earnings
changes and dividend changes imply that earnings cause dividend changes.
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TABLE 3.6 (continued)
EMPIRICAL TESTS SUPPORTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Easton (1991)

Data

1978-1980
Semi-annual

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

MRA

Using Australian data, interaction between earnings and dividend effects
announcement effects is shown. The interaction is independent of the
timing of the announcements.

Wansley, Simians, Shilling
and Lee (1991)

1973-1986
Daily

ES
XSRA

Although significant abnormal returns are associated with both positive
and negative changes in dividends, the effects are more pronounced in
dividend decreases. The effect is magnified if current earnings are not
known. No earnings predictability or percent change in earnings/dividend
announcement effect relation is found. Late announcements of dividend
decreases are anticipated by the market and have little effect. Information
content is positively correlated with the size of the change.

Ghosh and Woolridge (1991)

1962-1984
Daily

ES

The firstdividendomissionis associated with significant negative returns;
subsequent omission effects are insignificant (consistent with Kalay and
Lowenstein (1985) and Eades, Hess, and Kim (1985)). Prices react to
unanticipated announcements only.

Shrader and Milkman (1991)

1987-1988
Daily

ES

Dividend increases signal increases in future cash flow expectations or
alternatively, decreases in growth opportunities. Low growth firms have
abnormal returns following increases in dividends; high growth firms
have no excess returns.
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TABLE 3.6 (continued)
EMPIRICAL TESTS SUPPORTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Data

Method of
Analysis

DeAngelo, DeAngelo
and Skinner (1992)

1980-1985
Annual

LOGIT
NP Tests

Earnings levels increase the predictability of dividend decreases in firms
with losses. The results support the information content of dividend
hypothesis. An annual loss is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for a dividend decrease to occur in firms with established records of
dividend payouts. The change in dividend policy following negative
earnings is more pronounced.

Eddy and Seifert (1992)

1983-1985
Daily

ES

The combined dividend/earnings announcement effect is greater than the
reaction to one announcement (approximately doubled).
Joint
announcements convey more information. No significant reaction is
documented when contradictory signals.

Kao, Wu, and Lin (1992)

1965-1990
Quarterly

TOBIT

Dividends are customarily smoothed by managers; non-systematic changes
in dividend policy signal unexpected earnings changes. Unexpected
changes in dividend policy and changes in future earnings forecasts are
positively related.

Kim and Viswanath (1992)

1971-1980
Daily

ES

The market’s reaction to dividend changes increase costs. Dividend policy
is matched to permanent earnings levels. Signaling is supported.

Schatzberg and Datta (1992)

1963-1988
Daily

ES
NP Tests

An information hypothesis/weekend effect relation is not seen.

Author(s)

Major Result(s)

TABLE 3.6 (continued)
EMPIRICAL TESTS SUPPORTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Wong and Swindle (1992)

1970-1986
Daily

NP Tests

Dividend initiation does not decrease information acquisition costs.
Earnings announcement effects are not decreased by dividend initiation
(contrasts with Venkatesh (1989)). The volatility decrease is due to the
decrease in volume, not in information asymmetry.

Gu and Clayton (1993)

1982-1986
Quarterly

ANOVA RBD

Most firms show a positive relation between increased cash flows and
signaling. Not all dividend changes are accurate signals. Small and
medium changes in dividend policy are accurate; large changes are more
likely to be false signals. The signal conveys the stability of future cash
flows.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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of greater complexity than signaling models predict.

Managerial subjectivity in the

estimation o f earnings likely cause inaccuracies in future earnings prognostications and
severely limit the usefulness o f the private information released through changes in
corporate dividend payout levels. The decrease in the earnings growth rate of firms
following the announcement o f the change in policy is also inconsistent with theory
predictions. Further, the wide variance in excess return distributions associated with
changes in policy is not compatible with the models’ predictions.
Frankfurter and Gong (1992) provide the only direct test o f a signaling model
by examining the model developed by John and Williams (1985). In their analysis, the
authors show that liquidity demands and dividend payments are negatively correlated;
these results are diametrically opposed to the model’s predictions. Shareholder liquidity
requirements partially determine firm dividend policy. Share prices increase (decrease)
and trading volumes decrease (increase) following dividend increases (decreases). The
categorization of the results o f these studies is presented in Table 3.7.

3 .3 .l .c Summary
The only direct test of a signaling model (Frankfurter and Gong, 1992) is unable
to find empirical support for the theory. Crockett and Friend (1988) conclude that the
John and Williams (1985) model prediction that zero dividend firms have little
investment capital and cash flows instead o f capital constraints is improbable.
Managerial imposition of costs on remaining shareholders to benefit sellers o f the shares
is irrational. In the model developed by Miller and Rock (1985), increased dividends
can release misinformation that benefits selling shareholders; a conclusion in

TABLE 3.7
EMPIRICAL TESTS NOT SUPPORTIVE OF THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF
DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS AND SIGNALING MODELS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Riding (1984)

1974-1979
Monthly

RRA
ES

No information effects from dividend or earnings announcements are
found in dividend decreases of greater than 20 percent.

Bom, Moser and Officer
(1988)

1962-1985
Daily

ES
MRA

Dividend policy is relevant—the market reacts to unexpected changes in
policy. Dividend increases are followed by increases in the earnings
growth rate. Abnormal returns and dividend increase magnitude are
positively related but only consistent increases raise share price. Dividend
policy effects are more complex than modeled by signaling models.

McCann and Webb (1992)

1975-1987
Daily

ES
MRA

The earnings growth rate decreases following dividend initiation
announcement, contrary to dividend signaling hypothesis prediction.
Initiations signify the coming of age of firms and lower capital costs due
to increased capital market accessibility.

Frankfurter and Gong
(1992)

1986-1990
Daily

ES

Tests John and Williams (1985) and fails to support the model; liquidity
demands and dividend payments are negatively correlated. Shareholder
liquidityrequirements partially determine firmdividendpolicy. Dividend
increases (decreases) cause increases (decreases) in share price and
decreases (increases) in share volume. The positive relation between
dividend change and price change is significant in small firms only.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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contradiction with behavior rationality.

In addition, consistent underinvestment by

management would make the firm a target for takeovers. Brennan and Thakor (1990)
assert that the choice of cash distribution method cannot depend solely on information
asymmetries because share price is not an absolute composite of private information due
to the costs involved with information collection.
On the other hand, the majority of empirical tests o f the information content of
dividend support the hypothesis-unexpected changes in dividend policy result in excess
returns. The results are not without possible inadequacies, however, because they are
partially driven by other events. Methods of analysis are likely less than appropriate.
The arbitrary assignment of a dividend change as unexpected (defining unexpected by
the magnitude of the change) and the length of the event window used in excess return
determination likely bias the results.
Miller (1987) reviews Riley’s (1979) sufficient conditions for a signaling
equilibrium concentrating on their application in a financial setting. He concludes that
its adaption to financial modeling is difficult if not impossible. The costs associated
with signaling in finance are for the most part opportunity costs—departures from
optimal investment strategies under full information conditions.

The existence of

benefits from signaling are obvious—what the benefits are specifically and who they
benefit are not. Financial researchers differ in their opinions of what is being signaled;
the permanence of past earnings (Lintner, 1956 and Fama and Babiak, 1964), a more
precise measure of current earnings (Watts, 1973, Gonedes, 1978 and Miller and Rock,
1985) or future earnings expectations (Marsh and Merton, 1986). Grundy (1991) shows
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that the models developed by John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) fail
to satisfy Riley’s (1979) conditions if negative investments, prices, or quantities are
possible.
The ability of changes in dividend policy to serve as signals o f private
managerial information will likely never be fully understood due to misapplication of
the model.

Spence (1973) writes that his signaling model is not likely to be

representative of many markets because of the different informational structures in those
markets.

The leap from the specific model developed by Spence to the theoretical

financial signaling models of the last decade is likely to have been inappropriate given
the original model’s assumptions.
The questions of what dividends signal, how they signal, and why less expensive
methods are less successful in communicating private information have not been
conclusively answered. Signals are "self-verifying "—the mechanism is believable only
if the message in reasonable and accurate.

Messages relayed through changes in

dividend policy are often ambiguous—insolvent firms are liquidated via dividends
following changes in dividend policy (Easterbrook, 1984).
Signaling cannot totally explain the continued existence o f dividends.

The

assumption that dividend payments in excess o f optimal levels are partially explained
by signaling is simple; proving this assumption is far more difficult since other factors
determine policy (Miller, 1987). The price reaction is evidence of the capacity for
signaling. If dividends are changed solely for the purpose of signaling firm specific
information, then fluctuations in aggregate dividends should be stochastic and
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insignificant in magnitude. If altered for any other reason, then the lack o f information
makes dividends useful in measuring the firm’s information content in dividend
announcements (Marsh and Merton, 1987).

Managers’ preference o f using cash

dividend policy to signal rather than less expensive alternatives lacks a reasonable
explanation (Feldstein and Green, 1983 and Thakor, 1989).

If managers are not

attempting to relay information through dividend policy, other dissipative methods of
cash disbursement are available and should be utilized to ensure shareholder wealth
maximization (Myers, 1987). Future research efforts will likely be more successful in
explaining why dividends cannot be used as signals rather than why they can (Miller,
1987).

3.3.2 Agency Cost Theory
The recognition o f potential agency costs associated with the separation of
management and ownership is not new; differences in managerial and shareholder
priorities have been recognized for over three centuries. Adam Smith (1937) adjudged
the management of early joint stock companies to be negligent in many o f their
activities. These problems were especially prevalent in the British East Indies Company
and attempts to monitor managers were largely unsuccessful due to inefficiencies and
costs associated with shareholder monitoring (Kindleberger, 1984). Scott (1912) and
Carlos (1992) question these assertions-while control and organization were less than
ideal, the continued success and long life of the corporation implies general sound
managerial practices.

Although some fraud no doubt existed, the majority of

managerial activities coincided with shareholder desires.
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Modem agency theory seeks to explain corporate capital structure as the result
of attempts to minimize the costs associated with the separation of corporate ownership
and control. Agency costs are lower in firms with high managerial ownership stakes
due to the better alignment of shareholder and manager goals (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) and in firms with large block shareholders that are better able to monitor
managerial activities (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986).

Agency problems result from

informational asymmetries, potential wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders
through the acceptance o f high risk and high return projects by managers, and failure
to accept positive net present value projects and perquisite consumption in excess of the
level consumed by prudent corporate managers (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1981).
Dividend policy influences these relations in two ways.

Fama and Jensen

(1983a, 1983b) espouse that potential shareholder and bondholder conflicts can be
mitigated by covenants governing claim priority. These orderings can be circumvented
by large dividend payments to stockholders.

The payment o f large dividends to

shareholders can also result in the rejection of positive net present value projects and
misuse of low-cost capital (Myers, 1977).

Debt covenants to minimize dividend

payments are necessary to prevent bondholder wealth transfers to shareholders (John
and Kalay, 1982).

Although potentially substantial in their precipitation o f agency

costs, dividend policy is not a major source of bondholder wealth expropriation. In
firms where dividend payouts are limited by bondholder covenants, dividend payout
levels are still below the maximum level allowed by the constraints (Kalay, 1982).

I ll
The second way dividend policy affects agency costs is the reduction o f these
costs through increased monitoring by capital markets.

Large dividend payments

reduce funds available for perquisite consumption and investment opportunities and
require managers to seek financing in capital markets.

The efficient monitoring of

capital markets reduces less than optimal investment activity and excess perquisite
consumption and hence reduce the costs associated with ownership and control
separation (Easterbrook, 1984).
In an empirical examination, Rozeff (1982) finds three common trends in
corporate dividend policy: (1) lower dividend payment levels are found in high growth
firms—investment requirements reduce the funds available for dividend payment, (2)
corporations with higher firm specific risks or leverage ratios pay smaller dividends and
(3) higher payouts are found in firms with little insider ownership and large number of
outside shareholders. These results imply that dividend policy mitigates agency costs
due to the partial monitoring activity provided by dividend payments. Other research
generally supports the agency costs hypothesis. Table 3.8 outlines these studies.

3.3.3 The Free Cash Flow Theory
Prudent corporate managers working in the shareholders’ best interests should
invest in all profitable opportunities.

However, management and owner separation

affords corporate managers the temptation to consume or otherwise waste surplus funds.
The inefficient use of funds in excess o f profitable investment opportunities by
management was first recognized over 60 years ago (Berle and Means, 1932). Jensen’s
(1986) free cash flow hypothesis updated this assertion combining market information

TABLE 3.8
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF AGENCY COST THEORY

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Rozeff (1982)

1974-1980
Annual

MRA

Cross-sectional dividend payout regularities are the result of the capital
cost and agency cost tradeoff when dividends are paid. Firm growth
and expected growth are negatively related to the dividend level and the
percentage of insider ownership. Growth is positively related to the
number of shareholders. Firm risk is negatively correlated with dividend
level.

Dyl and Hoffmeister (1986)

1979
Weekly

MRA

Dividends are an important determinant of a firm’s risk. Dividend
payments are made in order to select a preferred risk environment. Higher
dividends are found in lower risk firms.

Crutchley and Hansen
(1989)

1981-1985
Annual

MRA

Earnings volatility and degree of leverage are inversely related (consistent)
with agency theory predictions). New issue transaction costs and dividend
payout levels are also negatively correlated. Ownership stake, leverage
and dividends arejointly orchestrated by managers to decrease total costs.

DeAngelo and DeAngelo
(1990)

1980-1985
Annual

LOGIT

The results support agency theory. All financially distressed firms reduce
dividends, even those without covenants requiring them to do so. Debt
covenants restrict dividend policy but are not the only factors impacting
dividend policy. In the absence of covenants, dividends are reduced;
managers are more averse to omission than to reduction. Reductions
are the result of inferior performance and strategic maneuvers.

TABLE 3.8 (continued)
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF AGENCY COST THEORY

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Collins, Saxena and Wansley
(1992)

1989-1990
Annual

MRA, OLS

Regulated payout ratios are higher than unregulated ratios. The insider
ownership stake is not an important determinant in unregulated firms.
Increased (decreased) growth and increased (decreased) systematic risk
are associated with lower ratios. Regulations inhibit growth, temper
external monitor need, and increase wealth transfer through dividends
implying decreased insider importance. Restrictions proxy as monitors.

Dempsey and Laber (1992)

1981-1987
Annual

MRA

Extends Rozeff (1982). The original model maintains its substantial
explanatory power and design stability. The results are statistically
indistinguishable from the original study.

Sun (1992)

1979-1983
Annual

MRA

Efforts to decrease agency costs lead to dividend regularities across firms.
Ownership structure, informational asymmetries, and leverage risk
characteristics characterize agency problems. Decreased (increased)
insider ownership, decreased (increased) growth, and decreased (increased)
debt risk are associated with increased (decreased) dividend payments.
Results imply that dividend payments can lead to effective monitoring
but cannot be used as effective signals. The higher dividend payments
increase bondholder risk.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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asymmetries with agency theory. The funds remaining after financing all positive net
present value projects cause conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.
Dividend and debt interest payments decrease the free cash flow available to managers
for use in investment in marginal net present value projects and manager perquisite
consumption. This combination of agency and signaling theory should better explain
dividend policy than either theory alone but the free cash flow hypothesis better
explains the corporate takeover frenzy of the 1980’s (Myers, 1987 and 1990).
An alternate information hypothesis, that changes in dividend policy signal
changes in management’s expected investment policy, is fashioned by Lang and
Litzenberger (1989).

The model’s inferences support the free cash flow and

overinvestment hypotheses better than the signaling hypothesis.
Table 3.9 lists the empirical tests of the signaling and free cash flow hypotheses.
Although both of the hypotheses find some support, the research results better support
the free cash flow hypothesis. Barber and Castanias (1992) view the two paradigms as
complementary rather than competing.

3.3.4 Summary
Although M&M’s informational content of dividend hypothesis is supported by
the majority of empirical studies, the only direct test of a signaling model (Frankfurter
and Gong, 1992) fails to support the model. Empirical research generally supports the
agency costs hypothesis and the partial mitigation o f these costs through dividend
payments. Neither information relay or agency cost mitigation are sufficient to explain
the existence and persistence of corporate dividend policy. Jensen’s (1986) free cash

TABLE 3.9
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE SIGNALING VERSUS FREE CASH FLOW HYPOTHESES

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Lang and Litzenberger
(1989)

1979-1984
Intra-day

AARA

Results are consistent with both signaling and free cash flow
hypotheses but better support the free cash flow hypothesis.

Barber and Castanias
(1992)

1977-1989
Annual

LOGIT
NP Tests

The paper views the signaling hypothesis and free cash flow
hypothesis as complements. Both explain the initiation of dividends
by firms with high cash flows.

Denis, Denis and Sarin
(1992)

1962-1987
Daily

XSRA

Replicate Lang and Litzenberger (1989) using a larger sample. Low
Q firm’s dividend change announcements have larger stock price changes.
Q and dividend yield are negatively related. Dividend yield likely drive
the study’s results. Results support signaling and clientele hypotheses.

Lee and Roberts-Glandoff
(1992)

1975-1987
Daily

ES

Dividend initiations support signaling theory but not the free cash flow
hypothesis; dividend omissions support both. Both announcements carry
information. Investor dividend preference influences the magnitude of
price change associated with omissions.

Maquiera and Megginson
(1992)

1980-1990
Daily

ES, MRA
NP Tests

The free cash flow hypothesis is supported in this analysis of young firms
initiating dividends. The Miller and Rock (1985) cash flow signaling
and Rozeff (1982) ownership structure hypotheses cannot be rejected.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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flow hypothesis, a combination of agency and signaling theory, more adequately explain
corporate dividend policy than either of these theories individually.

3.4 BEHAVIORAL MODELS
No theoretical paradigm developed thus far completely explains the persistence
of corporate dividend policy; empirical attempts to validate these theories are
inconclusive or contradictory (Baker and Farrelly, 1988).

Investor behavior is

substantially influenced by societal norms and attitudes (Shiller, 1984). Unfortunately,
this motivation has been ignored by financial theorists for the most part due to the
difficulty o f introducing investor behavior into traditional financial pricing models
(Arbel, Carvell and Postnieks, 1988). Including these influences into modeling efforts
can enrich the development o f a theory to explain the endurance of corporate dividend
policy (Shiller, 1989).
Ordinary investors are faced not with risk but with uncertainty—a lack of concise
judgement and sense o f objective evidence (Knight, 1964). Social pressures can lead
to errors in judgement and trading activities by shareholders that cannot be logically
explained.

These errors in judgement are only mistakes, not lapses of rational

investment activity. Mass investor psychology profoundly influences aggregate market
activity (Shiller, 1984).
Dividend policy is inconsistent with wealth maximization of the shareholder and
is better explained by the addition of a socioeconomic behavior paradigm into economic
models.

Dividend payouts can be viewed as the socioeconomic repercussion of

corporate evolution—the informational asymmetries between managers and shareholders
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causes dividends to be paid to increase the attractiveness of equity issues (Frankfurter
and Lane, 1991). The systematic relation between industry type and dividend policy
reported by Michel (1979) implies that managers are influenced by the actions of
competitive firm executives when determining dividend payout levels. Managers realize
that shareholders desire dividends and pay or increase dividends as a method of
mollifying investors (Frankfurter and Lane, 1991). Dividend payments to shareholders
should help increase the corporation’s stability by serving as a ritualistic reminder of
the managerial and owner relationship (Ho and Robinson, 1992).

Dividends are

partially a tradition and partially a method to allay investor anxiety (Frankfurter and
Lane, 1991).
A review of the survey articles seeking to define financial manager determinants
and beliefs about corporate dividend policy follows.

Models explaining dividend

preference and policy as primarily functions of behavioral and social activities are then
examined. The section closes with a brief conclusion.

3.4.1 Managerial Surveys
Lintner (1956) surveyed corporate chief executive offices and chief financial
officers and finds dividend policy is an active decision variable because managers
believe that stable dividends lessen negative investor reactions.

The active

determination of dividend policy implies that the level o f retained earnings and savings
are dividend decision byproducts. Corporate management believes shareholders should
receive a equitable portion o f earnings. The majority o f managers develop long term
payout ratio targets and use periodic partial adjustments to reach target levels; the

118
magnitude of the percentage change is more important than the absolute dollar amount.
Unexpected changes in earnings are one o f the most important dividend determinants.
Managers are reluctant to renege on changes—dividend decreases are met with
considerable managerial resistance and dividend increases occur only if managers are
sure of the coverage of the higher levels by future cash flows.

Dividend are smoothed

in the short run so as to not reflect the variability o f earnings. These results fail to
explain why companies pay dividends.
A change in dividend policy implies a change in managerial expectations of
future cash flows and depends substantially on current and past earnings.

Darling

(1957), Tumovsky (1967) and Fama and Babiak (1968) find empirical support for
Lintner’s findings; dividends are a function of current and past profit levels, expected
future earnings and are negatively correlated with changes in the level o f sales. Current
income remains the critical determinant of corporate dividend policy 25 years following
Lintner’s original survey (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1992).
Other factors not considered by Lintner (regulatory constraints, investment
magnitude, debt and firm size) also affect dividend policy.

Variations in dividend

policy is primarily due to a combination of endogenous and exogenous elements
(Dhrymes and Kurz, 1964).
Harkins and Walsh (1971) find that shareholder dividend desires and
management need of retained earnings for investment opportunities conflict.
compromise policy partially satisfying both parties is chosen.

A

Managers consider

current and expected earnings, dividend payment history, dividend level stability, cash
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flows and investment opportunities and shareholder desires in their determination o f the
payout level.

One-half of the firms surveyed have target dividend payout levels;

dividends are gradually adjusted over a period of years to reach the target level.
Although costly, dividend payments are important.
A survey of 318 NYSE firm chief financial officers (CFO’s) by Baker, Farrelly
and Edelman (1985) find attitudes similar to those found by Lintner (1956). The CFO’s
cite the importance o f dividend continuity, the belief that share prices are affected by
dividend policy and the difference in classification of regular and unusual cash flows
as important determinants o f dividend policy. Dividends are changed only if managers
are sure o f the changed cash flows’ permanence.

The effects on share price from

dividend payment and earnings retention are viewed differently by financial managers.
Regulated firm CFO’s have different attitudes toward dividend policy.
In a survey of corporate managers of dividend achievers (defined as firms with
ten consecutive years of dividend increases), the amount o f dividend payment is less
important than the consistency of payment. Managerial views o f dividend policy are
essentially unchanged thirty years after Lintner’s study; dividends are paid because
shareholders expect continued dividend growth and managers believe investors want to
receive dividends. Managers believe that dividend payments are necessary to maintain
or increase share price and to attract new investors.

Dividend payout policy is

determined using criteria including sustainability, current firm profitability, future cash
flow expectations, and industry norms. The majority of firms develop target payout
ratios and use dividends as an active decision variable. Although changes in dividend

120

policy are viewed by financial managers as carrying information, the message is often
ambiguous and can actually misinform investors. Baker and Farrelly (1988) find that
less than one-half of financial officers questioned in their study attempted to signal
through dividend policy.

3.4.2 Theoretical Behavioral Models
Feldstein and Green (1983) model the corporate dividend decision as the last
step in a process that evaluates inputs from five sources. First, dividend policy is a
consequence of investor consumption needs. The tax liabilities from dividend payment
are less than the transaction costs of selling shares to provide income if earnings are
retained. Second, the market value of retained earnings is less than the market value
of dividends. Third, dividend payment is consistent with steady state growth and an
optimal debt/equity ratio. Fourth, dividend payments are a byproduct o f the separation
of corporation owners and managers; dividend payments help to diminish the agency
costs arising from separation of corporate owners and managers and are used for
signaling activities.

Finally, although asymmetric information and agency costs are

present in the model, the paradigm is not dependent on these market imperfections.
Shareholders with diverse tax liabilities and diversification goals in an equilibrium with
uncertainty result in dividend payments.
Shefrin and Statman (1984) explain dividend preference by using the theory of
self control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) and the descriptive theory o f choice under
uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Information models are used to justify the
presence of corporate dividends while the tax liability of dividends is used as a
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counterargument. This model is also consistent with dividend clienteles. Dividends
and capital gains are not always perfect substitutes (even in a world without taxes and
transaction costs) due to a lack o f self control to delay gratification (Thaler and Shefrin,
1981). In financial theory, dividends and capital gains have the same value; this is not
the case in a world modeled using the theory of self control.

Dividend checks are

appreciated more than capital gains and provide an automatic control device on
spending levels (Thaler, 1980). Risky alternatives, costs, and payoffs are evaluated
separately.

This theory is also supported by the greater effects shown following

dividend decreases; losses are more significant than gains.

Kahneman and Tversky

(1982) posit that the sale of shares of stock cause more investor regret and anxiety than
spending the cash received from dividend payments. A subsequent price rise of shares
sold for income needs increases the shareholders’ contrition. Clearly in this model,
capital gains and dividends are not perfect substitutes. Regret aversion can induce a
preference for dividends through the use of a consumption rule based on the use of
dividends, not invested capital. Dividend yields are positively correlated with planned
dissaving rate.

If dissaving is positively related to age and negatively related to

income, portfolio dividend yields will be positively correlated with age and negatively
correlated with income.
Marsh and Merton (1986) develop a rational expectations model o f dividend
policy as management’s response to permanent earnings.

In equilibrium, dividend

levels are determined using future earnings expectations. Using dividends as signals
is incompatible with this model.
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Marsh and Merton (1987) study an aggregate stock market dividend process
using 55 years of aggregate data and economic earnings.

Market prices adequately

reflect permanent earnings; managers systematically change the dividend payout
following unexpected changes in permanent earnings by partially adjusting dividend
levels; this partial adjustment causes dividends to be less volatile than share prices. The
change in dividends is unrelated to later changes in share price.

Lagged dividends

explain little aggregate dividend variance when previous period stock price changes are
included in the model.

Dividends exhibit a systematic time series behavior—the

aggregate dividend change is driven by the one period lagged stock price change.

3.4.3 Summary
Managerial and shareholder behavioral and socioeconomic influences profoundly
affect corporate dividend policy. In surveys of corporate managers, the authors find
that the attitudes toward dividend payments have remained largely unchanged over the
past forty years.

Managers believe that shareholders expect and are entitled to

significant and regular dividend payments. The managers also believe that share price
is substantially affected by dividend policy and that shareholders use dividend payments
as a major input in firm valuation. However, these surveys are incapable o f explaining
why corporations began to pay and continue to pay dividends.
Behavioral influences affect shareholder attitudes toward dividend payments.
Dividends and capital gains are not perfect substitutes in the eyes of the shareholders
due to psychological and behavioral influences affecting the evaluation of the two
alternatives.

Incorporating investor behavioral and psychological influences into
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theoretical models could greatly enrich the development of a theory to explain corporate
dividend policy persistence.

3.5

ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL TESTS OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND
THEORY

3.5.1 Introduction
The conflicting results o f empirical analyses are commonly blamed on modeling,
method of analysis, data or sample period differences. The choice o f variables included
in or those omitted from a model (Watts, 1976b, McCabe, 1979, Frankfurter and Gong,
1993) and the definition used in the estimation o f important factors (Miller and Scholes,
1982) can significantly influence a study’s results. Roll (1977) asserts that the lack of
an adequate proxy can make a theoretical model untestable.

The use o f different

methods across studies can limit the comparability o f the results (Morgan, 1982).
Attempts to empirically validate theoretical dividend models are thus far
inconclusive or in some cases even contradictory (Baker and Farrelly, 1988).
Numerous rationales have been offered as explanations for these divergent results; the
model and empirical method of analysis employed in the studies (Watts, 1973 and
Morgan, 1982), the frequency of sample observation (Watts, 1976a and Laub, 1976)
and the period of the sample (Watts, 1973) are specified as possible causes of the
inconsistencies.

The purpose of this analysis is to examine the empirical studies of

corporate dividend policy and determine if the choice of method of analysis, frequency
of sampling observation or sample period influence the results of these tests o f dividend
policy. The journal of publication is also included as an explanatory variable.
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This research is important for several reasons. Results that cannot be duplicated
over diverse sample periods are likely artifacts of a particular sample period.

In

contrast, findings that persist through time can lead to the development of more
descriptive models. Finally, results that change over time can be indicative of changes
in the returns generating mechanism (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987).

3.5.2 Method of Analysis
The categorical data analysis method (CDAM) is used to determine if the
method o f analysis, observation frequency, sample period or journal o f publication can
be used to predict and explain the results of a study. The data analyzed in the analysis
is drawn from Tables 3.1-3.8. Five attributes from each study are present in the test.
The first variable, the results of each study, are classified as either supporting or failing
to support the hypothesis tested by the authors. The second variable o f the model is
the method of analysis employed in each o f the dividend studies. These are classified
either as methods analyzing changes in price or average return (event study or price
change methods of analyses) or studies using regression analyses (least square analysis,
logit analysis, etc.) or other methods (see Appendix A for the assignment o f methods
of analysis to classes). The third variable is defined by the studies’ choice o f data type.
Studies are classified into one group if daily data is used and into another for less
frequent observations. The mid-point of each study’s sample period serves as the fourth
variable. If a study’s mid-point of the sample period occurs before 1976, the study is
assigned to one class; if the mid-point is after 1976, it belongs to the other class. The
choice of 1976 as the dividing point is based on the publication of Jensen and
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Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory and the beginning of intense examination of the
costs of asymmetric information. Also, the approximate mid-point o f the "modem"
financial era (beginning with Modigliani and Miller’s seminal paper o f 1958) is 1976.
In addition, this choice divides the studies used in the analysis into two approximately
equal groups. The findings o f the study are robust; classifying the sample period using
other criteria did not alter the study’s results. The final independent variable entered
is the journal o f publication. Classification is fixed by the study’s publication in a "toptier" journal ( The Journal o f Finance, Journal o f Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Journal o f Financial Economics and The Review o f Financial Studies) or not. Each
study’s result is used as the response (dependent) variable in the analysis while the
method of analysis, the data type, the sample period and the journal are employed as
explanatory (independent) variables.
CDAM is a specialized multivariate analysis technique for evaluation o f response
and explanatory variables via weighted least squares (WLS) procedures. The procedure
is useful in the examination o f dichotomous (i.e. studies supporting or failing to support
a hypothesis), non-ordered polytomous (i.e. differences in method o f analysis) and
ordered polytomous (i.e. early, middle and late sample periods) discrete variables.
Although the technique resembles the Analysis o f Variance (ANOVA), CDAM differs
from ANOVA by describing the structural relations between the explanatory variables.
ANOVA models, in contrast, determine the effects of independent variables on a
dependent variable and partition the overall variability of the model.
explanation of CDAM is found in Appendix B.

A detailed

The method of analysis assumes
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mutually independent explanatory variables—the knowledge of one variable does not
increase the probability of a correct prediction of another explanatory variable’s level.
The implementation of CDAM is facilitated by the assignment of the sample’s
observations into classes based on some explanatory variable characteristic. The table
developed from this classification process provides a concise summary o f the data. The
technique then uses a series of dummy variables representing the explanatory variable
classes and tests the model using WLS estimation techniques. Table 3.10 displays the
framework used in the assignment of the individual studies to CDAM populations.

3.5.3 Empirical Results
A population profile succinctly summarizes the assignment of individual
empirical studies to groups based on explanatory variable combinations. The sample
size of each population is the frequency that each combination of categorical variables
appears in the overall sample. Table 3.11 summarizes the classification o f empirical
studies analyzing the theoretical explanations of corporate dividend policy into CDAM
populations.
As shown in Table 3.12, the WLS estimates of study method of analysis, data
type, sample period and journal coefficients do not differ significantly from zero and
therefore do not influence the outcome of the analyses.

The estimates of each

explanatory variable are extremely small and the reported p-values range from 0.167
to 0.962. The intercept term representing the mean of the dependent variable is highly
significant with a p-value of <0.001.
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TABLE 3.10
THE CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS METHOD OF ANALYSIS
CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK

Result

Method o f
Analysis

Support

Price Change1

Data Type

Daily

Sample
Period

Pre 1976
Post 1976

Other3

Pre 1976
Post 1976

Other4

Daily

Pre 1976
Post 1976

Other

Pre 1976
Post 1976

Fail to Support

Price Change

Daily

Pre 1976
Post 1976

Other

Pre 1976
Post 1976

Other

Daily

Pre 1976
Post 1976

Other

Pre 1976
Post 1976

Journal

Top-tier2
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other

1 Price change methods of analysis include event study and price change methods of analysis.
A listing of method of analysis classifications is found in Appendix A.
2 Top-tier journals include The Journal o f Finance, Journal o f Financial and Q uantitative
A nalysis, Journal o f Financial Economics and The Review o f Financial Studies.

3 Other data includes weekly, quarterly and annual observations.
4 Other methods of analysis include regression analyses and other methods (see Appendix A).
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TABLE 3.11
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS POPULATION PROFILES OF
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY

Sample

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Method of
Analysis

Data

Sample
Period

Journal

Sample
Size

Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other

Other
Other
Other
Other
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily
Other
Other
Other
Other
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily

Pre
Pre
Post
Post
Pre
Pre
Post
Post
Pre
Pre
Post
Post
Pre
Pre
Post
Post

Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other

5
2
2
2
11
7
17
20
19
25
9
15
3
3
8
7

1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976

TABLE 3.12
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OBTAINED FROM
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF
CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1

Variable

Estimate

Intercept
Method of Analysis
Data Type
Sample Period
Journal Type

0.2088
0.0118
-0.0020
0.0452
-0.0089

Standard
Error

0.0324
0.0413
0.0411
0.0327
0.0324

Chi
Square2

Probability
(P-Value)

41.43
0.08
0.00
1.91
0.08

0.001
0.775
0.962
0.167
0.784

1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N = 155 in this analysis.

CDAM is then applied to empirical studies testing a specific hypothesis. The
information content of dividend hypothesis empirical tests is the only subset of
empirical analyses with enough observations to test the effect that method of analysis,
data type, sample period and journal selection have on the outcome o f the research.
The data used in this analysis are drawn from Tables 3.5 and 3.6.

Table 3.13 shows

the population profiles o f studies testing the information content o f dividend hypothesis.
TABLE 3.13
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS POPULATION PROFILES
OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF THE INFORMATION
CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS

Sample

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Method of
Analysis

Data

Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Price Change
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other

Other
Other
Other
Other
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily
Other
Other
Other
Other
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily

Period

Pre
Pre
Post
Post
Pre
Pre
Post
Post
Pre
Pre
Post
Post
Pre
Pre
Post
Post

1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976

Journal

Size

Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other
Top-tier
Other

2
2
2
2
5
5
8
11
7
7
1
5
2
2
5
3

The total number of studies testing the information content of dividend
hypothesis by CDAM is 69. Consistent with the results found in the overall analysis
of empirical tests of theoretical dividend models, the method of analysis, data type,
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sample period and journal coefficients are again not significant. The p-values of the
coefficients o f the explanatory variables range from 0.219 for the journal variable to
0.9535 for the method of analysis choice variable. The intercept term is again highly
significant with a p-value o f <0.001.

Table 3.14 shows the results of the CDAM

analysis of studies testing the information content o f dividend hypothesis.

TABLE 3.14
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OBTAINED FROM
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS1

Variable

Intercept
Method of Analysis
Data Type
Sample Period
Journal Type

Estimate

Standard
Error

0.2465
-0.0031
-0.0433
0.0252
0.0565

0.0475
0.0523
0.0579
0.0504
0.0460

Chi
Square2

Probability
(P-Value)

26.89
0.00
0.56
0.25
1.51

0.001
0.953
0.456
0.617
0.219

1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
2 N = 69 in this analysis.

3.5.4 Discussion and Summary
A common rationale used to explain different results from empirical analyses is
to attribute the inconsistencies to method of analysis, data, or sample differences. In
contrast to commonly held beliefs, the choice o f method o f analysis, data type and
sample period do not significantly affect the results of a study.

Using CDAM, an

examination of empirical studies testing a wide range of hypotheses of dividend policy
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and of empirical tests of a specific hypothesis (the information content o f dividend
hypothesis) finds that none of these explanatory variables is significant (p-values range
from 0.167 to 0.962).
The intercept term is highly significant in both the overall analysis and the
information content of dividend hypothesis analysis. Because the term represents all
variables not included in the model, factors absent from the model can be responsible
for the diverse results of the empirical tests.
Additional CDAM is performed using finer divisions of the explanatory
variables. The method of analysis variable is divided into four groups—event study,
price change, regression and other methods o f analysis. The variable representing data
type is divided into studies using annual, quarterly, monthly and daily samples and is
analyzed. The results of these efforts are consistent with previous findings—none of the
independent variables show any significant explanatory power.

Statistical results of

these tests are shown in Appendix B.
The length of the sample period or the total number of observations used in the
analysis can influence the results of a study. Studies using data drawn from a smaller
time horizon can be subject to anomalies that are washed out over longer sample
periods or with more observations. Model specification, variable definition and proxy
choice can also impact the findings.

3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
"The nearly universal policy of paying substantial dividends is the primary
puzzle in the economics of corporate finance" (Feldstein and Green, 1983). A number
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o f conflicting theoretical models all lacking strong empirical support define the current
state of financial economists’ attempts to explain the dividend phenomenon. Nor can
corporate dividend policy be ascribed to existing regulatory constraints. The incomplete
nature of current theories and the sensitivity of data to changes in specifications
precludes any dogmatism (Brealy and Myers, 1991).
We know that dividend policy is "sticky"—managers decrease dividends only
when absolutely necessary—in the event of poor earnings with reserves insufficient to
fund the dividend (Myers, 1984 and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1992).
Furthermore, individual market imperfections do little to explain the underlying reasons
for dividend payments (Black, 1976). The systematic time series behavior o f corporate
dividend policy implies that firm specific theoretical explanations o f dividend policy—
signaling and agency theories—cannot explain the practice (Marsh and Merton, 1987).
The majority of shareholders must pay taxes on dividend income. The majority
o f empirical works support the hypothesis that the returns on dividend paying stocks are
increased to offset the tax liability of dividend payment. However, the absence o f a
pronounced difference in the portfolios of high tax bracket and low tax bracket
individuals casts doubts as to the significance of taxes in the determination o f corporate
dividend policy.
Dividends can relay information but the use o f dividends for this purpose fails
to explain why firms pay dividends. Signaling’s impact on the investor’s preference
for dividends is even less certain due to the ambiguity associated with signals. Further,
if dividends are changed only to signal firm specific information, aggregate dividend
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changes should be small and random in nature rather than having a systematic time
series pattern and a demonstrated positive trend (Marsh and Merton, 1987).
No single economic rationale is capable o f explaining the dividend phenomenon.
A combination of risk averse shareholders invested in capital constrained firms, the
costs associated with systematic liquidation of holdings, agency costs and information
transmission can partially explain the preference of shareholders for dividends (Crockett
and Friend, 1988). The incompleteness o f the theoretical model is largely due to a
misconception of the nature of dividend payments. The continuance o f dividends is
based largely on long-standing corporate traditions (Brealy and Myers, 1991).
The corporate tradition of paying dividends is the sum total o f over three
hundred years of dividend payments.

Despite individual differences in policy,

consistent, identifiable patterns of dividend payment recur through corporations.
Managers are reluctant to reduce dividend payments, even in periods of financial
distress.

Moreover, dividends are increased only if a corporation’s management is

confident that the higher levels can be maintained. Executives believe shareholders
expect significant dividends to be paid and shareholders believe that they deserve these
dividends.
liability.

Finally, shareholders prefer dividend payments despite their economic
Myers (1990) surmises that dividend payments are in reality an unwritten

contract between shareholders and corporate management.
Current models of corporate dividend policy by and large ignore behavioral and
socioeconomic influences on managerial and shareholder activities.

Dividend

preference is difficult to explain other than as an irrational desire by investors for
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dividends unless behavior models and social pressures are incorporated into the model
(Shiller, 1984). The exclusion of these motivations from financial models severely limit
their application to corporate activities and policy determination. Dividend policy is
influenced by the same fads and fashions that affect stock prices because the managers
who determine dividend policy are motivated by behavioral and socioeconomic
influences (Shiller, 1990). A model incorporating a combination of modem financial
theories and behavioral and psychological influences best explain corporate dividend
policy (Shiller, 1986).

CHAPTER 4
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, DIVIDEND POLICY
AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE

4.1 INTRODUCTION
The seminal papers o f Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and M&M showed
that a firm’s capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the determination of
the value of the company. These theses motivated an abundance of theoretical and
empirical work to determine the existence and definition o f the optimal capital structure
and dividend policy for a firm. An implicit assumption of the majority of these efforts
is that corporate managers always act in the best interest of the shareholders.
In contrast, financial hypotheses based on agency theory maintain that conflicts
of interest arising from the separation of a corporation’s management from firm
ownership can result in managers deviating from the shareholder wealth standard. The
personal goals of management—security, advancement, prestige, power and personal
income—often take precedent over corporate goals (Kaysen, 1960 and Gordon, 1961)
and are the likely result of this separation (Berle and Means, 1932).
Agency theory suggests that informational asymmetries and managerial
imprudence can be minimized through the joint optimization of corporate executive
compensation contracting, dividend policy and capital structure (Jensen, Solberg and
Zorn, 1992, Mehran, 1992 and Smith and Watts, 1992). The proper structuring of
compensation contracts can better order managerial activities and efforts to the benefit
of shareholder interests.

The payment of significant dividends and the obligations
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resulting from debt issuance can decrease the available free cash flow for excess
perquisite consumption by corporate managers and increase monitoring activities by
capital markets (Easterbrook, 1984 and Jensen, 1986).
Executive compensation, dividend policy and capital structure are major
corporate policy decisions. Theory predicts that these policy decisions can be optimized
through a concurrent decision making process.

A set o f firm-specific financial

measures influence the decision making process for each o f these corporate strategies.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the interaction between executive
compensation, dividend and capital structure policy decisions.
Section 4.2 reviews the existing executive compensation literature. Section 4.3
examines the predicted effects o f explanatory variables on compensation, dividend and
financing policy variables.

Section 4.4 discusses method o f analysis, variable

definitions and model development. Section 4.5 presents the results of the empirical
examination. Section 4.6 is a brief summary of the chapter.

4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The separation of managers and owners can result in a number of potential
problems.

The intent of corporate management often diverges from endeavors that

would most benefit the owners of the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).

The

deviations include the rejection of positive net present value projects and other strategies
that result in the underinvestment of owner capital (Myers, 1977). Jensen (1986) posits
that these squanderings o f investment opportunities are especially pronounced in
companies with substantial cash flows.

Jensen and Smith (1985) summarize the
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applications of agency theory to management, shareholder and debtholder conflicts of
interest.
A number of potential solutions are offered to mitigate these conflicts of interest.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) contend that the competitive nature of the
managerial labor market will discipline imprudent managerial activity.

Competitive

forces and the threat of takeover will also impede improper activities (Manne, 1965 and
Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Firms with significant dividend payment policies are forced
to undergo the scrutiny of capital markets when funds for investment activities are
needed (Rozeff, 1982 and Easterbrook, 1984) while investors holding large blocks of
shares also monitor executive activity (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986).
Haugen and Senbet (1981), Beck and Zorn (1982), Jensen and Zimmerman
(1985) and Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin (1987) show that the proper structuring of
executive compensation plans can further decrease the agency costs arising from the
separation of owners and managers.

Managerial behavior is better aligned with

shareholder interests by relating compensation and termination decisions to share price
performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). The initial adoption of or a change in
corporate compensation plans is associated with positive abnormal share price returns
and increases in shareholder wealth (Larcker, 1983, Brickley, Bhagat and Lease, 1985,
Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985, Warner, 1985 and DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn, 1990).
Raviv (1985) believes this change in corporation performance is the direct result of the
implementation of performance based executive compensation plans.
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The theoretical executive compensation models of Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell
(1979) extend and formalize the theoretical agency models o f Ross (1973), Stiglitz
(1975) and Mirrlees (1976).

In these models, executive production is increased by

relating compensation to firm performance when executive output is unobservable.
Although not flawless, the benefits received from the use of an imperfect monitoring
device (executive incentive plans) outweigh the costs. Rosen (1982) extends the model
to a macroeconomic setting while Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) include security
prices in their incentive modeling.
Consistent with long-term contracting, executive experience and compensation
are related even when the executive’s productivity level effect is ignored (Harris and
Holmstrom, 1982). Paying salaries to executives in excess of their marginal product
is economically rational if the wages motivate lower rank workers to increase their
production in hope of attaining a higher position (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Sappington
(1991) provides a broad overview o f the theoretical incentive contracting literature.
Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) model compensation contract valuation
from the manager’s perspective. They show that the value of the compensation plan
to the manager can be quite different than the cost perceived by the firm’s owners.
They further show that incentive contracts cannot always be valued correctly using
market based valuation techniques and that the addition of new incentives added to
existing plans can only be accurately valued by analyzing the total executive
compensation plan.
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Executive compensation has been intensely analyzed by financial economists.
The efforts can be divided into studies that find firm size to be the primary determinant
of executive compensation, those that contend that salary level is better related to firm
share price and profitability, those that show that multiple inputs determine
compensation levels and those that analyze the effects of the adoption of executive
incentive plans on various financial measures and operational strategies.
A positive correlation between executive compensation and firm size is shown
by several empirical studies summarized in Table 4.1. McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing
(1962) and Ciscel (1974) report that managerial wages in large industrial coiporations
are a reward for current and past sales. Current sales are found to be the primary input
in the compensation determination process. The emphasis on maximizing sales volume
is likely to lead to managerial goals that unduly accentuate strategies formulated to
increase sales while disregarding long-term profits (Patton, 1966 and Baumol, 1967).
A study of utility corporations shows that firm size has a significant influence on and
is the major determinant o f executive compensation in regulated industries (AbdelKhalik, 1988).
A second body of literature, outlined in Table 4.2, argues that executive
compensation levels are more closely correlated with stock price and corporate profits.
The positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance
provides incentives for managers to work toward goals that benefit corporate owners
(Masson, 1971, Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Agrawal, Makhija and Mandelker, 1991,
Crystal, 1991 and Lewellen, Loderer, Martin and Blum, 1992). In the two decades

TABLE 4.1
EMPIRICAL STUDIES RELATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO FIRM SIZE

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

McGuire, Chiu and Elbing
(1962)

1953-1959
Annual

Means Test

Executive compensation in large industrial corporations is a reward for
past and current sales. Current sales are the most important determinant.

Patton (1966)

1953-1965
Annual

XSRA

Executive compensation is more closely related to sales than profits.
This emphasis on total sales could lead to goals with an undue accentuation
on increasing sales levels at the sacrifice of corporate profits.

XSRA

Executive compensation is better correlated with sales thanwith corporate
profits.

Baumol (1967)
Annual
Ciscel (1974)

1969-1971
Annual

Corr Coeff

Firm growth and size rather than profitability are the major determinants
of executive compensation. Theresults can be confounded by collinearity
between the explanatory variables.

Abdel-Khalik (1988)

1981-1983
Annual

2SLS

Firm size is the major determinant of executive compensation inregulated
industries. No correlation between either compensation and operating
efficiency or compensation and managerial effort is found.

Chopin (1993)

1973-1991
Annual

SUR

The effect of sales level on executive compensation is widely divergent
across industries; positively related in some, negatively in others and
not related in others. Industry and firm characteristics should be included
in compensation analyses.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.

-1^
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following World War II, companies with executive wage incentives based on
performance have higher returns than those with bonuses tied to the level of sales or
corporate profits (Masson, 1971).

Lewellen (1968, 1969) maintains that executive

compensation is directly related to the firm’s profitability through executive stock
ownership programs and incentive-based deferred compensation plans.

The

performance relative to competing firms in the firm’s industry rather than the actual
price performance is used to determine salaries (Antle and Smith, 1986).

Early study

results (McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing, 1962, Patton, 1966 and Baumol, 1967) are in error
because of their reliance on cross-sectional data and one year profit levels.
A third group o f studies reviewed in Table 4.3 contend that the determining
process o f executive salaries is more complex than previously hypothesized and the
association cannot be explained by a single variable. Stober (1988) questions the logic
of using firm size to totally explain the differences in corporation executive
compensation levels.

The disparate levels of executive compensation and the

inconsistent correlation o f sales level to executive compensation across industries
implies that the determinant process of salaries is more complex than the early research
suggests. According to Stober, multiple input factors influence and determine the level
of managerial compensation.
Murphy (1985) finds that compensation is positively correlated with both firm
size and profitability.

Smith and Watts (1992) (hereafter S&W), Gaver and Gaver

(1993) and Kole (1993a) discuss the interaction between investment, financing and

TABLE 4.2
EMPIRICAL STUDIES RELATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO FIRM SHARE
PRICE AND CORPORATE PROFITS

Authors)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Lewellen and Huntsman
(1970)

1942-1963
Annual

XSRA

Results conflict with McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing (1962). Using
multivariate regression, the authors find that profits strongly influence
executive compensation levels while sales lack a significant impact. The
firm’s market value also has a major influence on the compensation level.
Executive salary and bonus serve as a good proxy for total compensation.

Masson (1971)

1947-1966
Annual

XSRA

Early studies (McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing, 1962, Patton, 1966 and
Baumol, 1967) are in error due to their reliance on cross-sectional data
and one year profit levels. Executive compensation incentives are
predominately related to stock price performance. The relation to
corporate sales levels is neutral.

Coughlan and Schmidt (1985)

1978-1980
Annual

XSRA

Managerial behavior is better managed by relating compensation and
termination decisions to share price performance. Sales growth has a
minor influence in aligning shareholder and manager interests. Share
price and managerial turnover are negatively correlated.

Benston (1985)

1970-1975
Annual

DA

Conglomerate firm share prices and managerial compensation show little
correlation. The change in the market price of shares owned by executives
impacts managerial wealth three to five times more than managerial
salaries and bonuses.

to

TABLE 4.2 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES RELATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO SHARE PRICE

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Antle and Smith (1986)

1947-1977
Annual

TSRA
XSRA

Overall results weakly support the hypothesis thatexecutive compensation
is based on relative firm performance evaluation. Wage levels are
positively correlated with accounting profitability. Average industry profit
levels are used in evaluating executive performance.

Agrawal, Makhija and
Mandelker (1991)

1975-1984
Annual

XSRA

Manager and shareholder interests are aligned through managerial
compensation packages in the utility industry. Results contrast with Ciscel
and Carroll (1982)—the differences are possibly due to differences in
variable definition. Compensation and stock price changes are positively
related implying incentive optimize shareholder wealth.

Lanen and Larcker (1992)

1970-1986
Annual

TSRA
XSRA

Changes in executive compensation plans are in response to changes in
the corporation’s competitive environment and/or strategic plan.
Regulatory constraints influence compensation contracts. Diversification
into non-regulated fields and production efficiency are unrelated to
compensation levels. Findings contrast with Abdel-Khalik (1988).

Lewellen, Loderer, Martin
and Blum (1992)

1964-1973
Annual

OLS

Higher levels of executive compensation lead to better firm performance
whether firm performance is defined by higher levels of profitability or
stock return. This correlation implies that agency costs can be reduced
by properly designing executive compensation packages.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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compensation decisions and argue that these decisions are partially driven by the firm’s
investment opportunity set.
A fourth body o f literature summarized in Table 4.4 examines the effects that
changes in executive compensation packages have on financial measures and operational
strategies of the corporation. Changes or introduction of performance based incentives
result in changes in stock prices (Raviv, 1985).

Both short term and long term

compensation plan adoption is associated with positive abnormal returns (Brickley,
Bhagat and Lease, 1985 and Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985). Kumar and Sopariwala
(1992) document increases in corporate profitability, accounting returns and earnings
per share following plan introduction. The improved performance is attributed to a
better alignment of shareholder and manager interests and a decrease in self-serving
behavior by managers but the results can be confounded by tax benefits or signaling
effects.
Conversely, DeFusco, Zorn and Johnson (1991) find a decrease in cumulative
abnormal returns and firm profitability in the five years following incentive plan
adoption.

In addition, shareholder risk also increases; earnings and share price

volatility rise from changes in manager risk taking behavior after the plan is initiated.
Managers attempt to ease the equity holder’s uncertainty and fear by decreasing the
corporation’s level of outstanding debt and increasing dividend payments. Despite the
increase, dividend levels are lower than levels forecasted.

The smaller increase in

dividends is the result o f decisions that benefit corporate managers; most o f the stock

TABLE 4.3
EMPIRICAL STUDIES RELATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO MULTIPLE FACTORS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Ciscel and Carroll (1980)

1970-1976
Annual

XSRA

Executive compensation increases with increased profits (achieved either
through increased sales or decreased costs). Firm size also significantly
impacts compensation levels but the market for corporate executives is
the primary determinant of salaries. Firm specific characteristics
substantially influence executive compensation.

Carroll and Ciscel (1982)

1970-1976
Annual

XSRA

Executives in regulated industries have substantially lower earnings than
their contemporaries in non-regulated industries. Although sales is a
significant determinant in the compensation levels of all industries
analyzed, profit levels are used as an input factor only in non-regulated
industries.

Eaton and Rosen (1983)

1970-1973
Annual

XSRA

The executive compensation scheme is affected by the executive’s age,
firm monitoring capabilities, and noise confounding future firm
performance. Older executives have increased levels of deferred
compensation and more stable compensation plans while younger executive
compensation is more closely aligned with future firm performance
(through stock options). Executives of firms with high research and
development commitments have compensation programs less closely tied
to firm performance.

TABLE 4.3 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES RELATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO MULTIPLE FACTORS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Murphy (1985)

1964-1981
Annual

XSRA

The percentage change in managerial salary and bonus is positively
correlated with firm sales and firm size. Long term incentive options
are negatively related-managers are more likely to be offered incentives
when the stock price is depressed. The variance is largely unexplained.

Lewellen, Loderer and Martin
(1987)

1964-1973
Annual

OLS

The variation in executive compensation plans across firms imply that
individual firm plans are structured to decrease agency costs. Executive
compensation and the managerial decision making process are interrelated.

Jensen and Murphy (1990)

1974-1986
Annual

OLS
LOGIT

Results are inconsistent with agency theory—incentive payment schemes
and threat of dismissal have little effect on managerial activity. CEO’s
are a minor production process input and their activities are easily analyzed
and monitored by the board of directors. Implicit regulations are the
most likely reason for contract limitations The executive compensation
and shareholder wealth correlation is small and has decreased over the
past fifty years. Bonuses (50 percent of CEO compensation) are not based
on sales, share price, or accounting earnings.

Lambert, Larcker and
Verrecchia (1991)

1970-1984
Annual

MRA

Individual characteristics of corporate managers (for example, the
percentage of managerial wealth in company stock) can significantly alter
the cost/value correlation of corporate contracts. These personal attributes
can also alter the managers’ level of risk aversion.
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TABLE 4.3 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES RELATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO MULTIPLE FACTORS

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

Gibbons and Murphy (1992)

1971-1989
Annual

OLS

Executive career concerns have significant impact on managerial activity
even in the presence of incentive contracts and should be considered in
the development of a total incentive plan.

Riahi-Belkaoui (1992)

1986
Annual

OLS.WLS

Compensation is positively correlated with both sales and profits and
is positively related to security analysts’ opinions.

Smith and Watts (1992)

1965-1985
Annual

XSRA

Firms with higher growth rates have lower debt ratios and dividend yields
and higher executive compensation levels. Stock option plans are also
more common in these firms. As firms increase in size, dividend yields
and compensation levels increase (consistent with Murphy, 1985).

Gaver and Gaver (1993)

1985
Annual

OLS
TOBIT
LOGIT

The results support Smith and Watts (1992). Executive compensation
is higher in growth firms. Stock option plans are also more common
in these firms but the difference in the frequency is not significant.

Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993)

1981-1987
Annual

OLS
NP Tests

Executive compensation plans are affected by a firm’s financial distress.
Incentives are altered and compensation programs are restructured so
as to expedite mediation with creditors.

Kole (1993a)

1980
Annual

LOGIT
NP Tests

Supports Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993). Complex
associations exist between executive compensation contract determinants.

1 See Appendix A for method o f analysis abbreviations.
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option plans are not dividend protected and the payment of dividends reduce the value
of the option (Lambert, Lanen and Larcker, 1989).

4.3 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. DIVIDENDS AND DEBT
4.3.1 Introduction
Existing models of the relation between policy and exogenous variables provide
the basis for previous empirical analyses of executive compensation, dividend and debt
policy variables.

Theoretical predictions about the relation between compensation,

dividend policy and capital structure policy variables and the exogenous variables are
discussed in the sections following.

4.3.2 Executive Compensation
Two alternative hypotheses explain the executive compensation and dividend
policy relation.

Contracting theory (S&W) predicts a negative correlation between

dividend and compensation levels; firms with more growth opportunities should have
higher levels of compensation and lower levels o f dividends. In contrast, if dividends
are used to lessen shareholder anxieties about managerial activities that deviate from
shareholder wealth maximization (Lintner, 1956, Easterbrook, 1984 and Frankfurter
and Lane, 1991) and if considerable compensation payments are a source of investor
apprehension, the correlation should be positive. If compensation and dividend levels
are positively related, the results support contracting theory; a negative finding would
better support the alternate hypothesis.

TABLE 4.4
EMPIRICAL STUDIES DEMONSTRATING THE EFFECTS OF EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE PLAN
ADOPTION ON FINANCIAL MEASURES AND OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis1

Major Result(s)

Larcker (1983)

1971-1978
Annual
Daily

NP Tests
ES

Capital investment significantly increases following executive incentive
plan adoption. Initiationis also associated with positive abnormal returns.
Changes in contracts cause changes in the managerial decision making
process.

Brickley, Bhagat and Lease
(1985)

1979-1982
Daily

ES
ANOVA

Long-term compensationplans increase manager and shareholder interest
alignment. Plan introductionsare associated with increases inshareholder
wealth but the increases can be the result of tax benefits or signaling.

Tehranian and Waegelein
(1985)

1970-1980
Monthly

ES

Short term compensation plan announcements result in positive abnormal
returns. Results are possibly confounded by other factors. Although
plan adoption provides an incentive to increase earnings, the price
adjustment is not immediate.

TSRA
XSRA

Actual dividend payments are less than expected payments following initial
adoption of stock option plans. This shortfall is the result of manager
self-serving behavior because increases in dividends reduce the value
of executive stock options since most are not dividend protected. The
reduction in dividend payout is greatest in firms where the decrease will
produce the largest increase in option value.

Lambert, Lanen and Larcker
(1989)

1946-1978
Annual

I

TABLE 4.4 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES DEMONSTRATING THE EFFECTS OF EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE PLAN
ADOPTION ON FINANCIAL MEASURES AND OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES

Author(s)

Data

Method of
Analysis

Major Result(s)

DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn
(1990)

1978-1982
Daily

ES

The variance of stock prices, option prices and accounting returns increase
following executive stock option plan adoption. Stockholder wealth also
increases but bondholder wealth decreases. Effects are the result of a
perceived change in managerial risk-avoidance behavior.

DeFusco, Zorn and Johnson
(1991)

1978-1982
Annual

NP Tests

Changes in executive incentive plans cause changes in managerial risk
taking behavior. Although dividend payments increase and the debt ratio
declines, firm earnings volatility increases, profits decrease and research
and development expenditures decrease. Cumulative abnormal returns
decrease in the five years following plan adoption.

Kumar and Sopariwala (1992)

1978-1982
Daily

ES
NP Tests

Adoption of performance based executive compensation contracts are
associated with positive abnormal returns. The positive returns are
consistent with a reduction in agency costs. Plan initiation is followed
by an increase in the firm’s profitability and is positively correlated with
the EPS growth rate.

1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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According to contracting theory, executive salaries and debt levels should be
negatively correlated; wage levels are positively related to growth opportunities and
firms with high growth potential have lower levels o f debt.

Growth options are

financed with equity rather than debt to avoid potential agency conflicts (Myers, 1977).
Contracting theory predicts a positive relation between compensation and firm
size because managerial decisions affect a larger stock o f resources in large firms and
hence the decision should be better compensated. Similarly, managerial salaries and
incentive plans are positively correlated since both are positively related to growth
opportunities.

McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) and Ciscel (1974) find that

compensation levels and firm size are positively correlated. Other research (Lewellen
and Huntsman, 1970 and Masson, 1971) shows a positive correlation between executive
wages and firm profitability.

4.3.3 Dividends
The cash flow identity links dividends and investments.
investment opportunities pay lower dividends.

Firms with more

Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984),

Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986) theorize that faster growing firms have
more investment opportunities resulting in smaller free cash flows and lower dividend
payments.

Because growth firms pay higher compensation to their executives,

compensation and dividends should be negatively related.
Contracting theory predicts a positive association between debt and dividends.
In contrast,

Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) (hereafter JS&Z) predict that higher

dividend levels should exist in firms with lower leverage ratios because o f a tradeoff
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between fixed (debt) and variable (dividend) payout obligations. They also maintain
that corporations with higher levels o f collateralized assets pay higher dividends.
A negative association between firm growth and dividends is predicted by
contracting theory. In contrast, signaling models hypothesize that growth firms will
pay more dividends than non-growth firms. Growth firms should have higher levels
of asymmetric information and will attempt to decrease these asymmetries by paying
higher dividends. Numerous theoretical and empirical analyses find dividend payout
and firm profitability to be positively related (for example, see Lintner, 1956,
Bhattacharya, 1979 and Miller and Rock, 1985). Myers and Majluf (1984) predict that
firms with more investment opportunities will pay lower dividends due to the
competition for funds.

4.3.4 Debt
Increases in firm profitability should result in a lower demand for debt from the
increased availability o f internal funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984).

As growth

opportunities increase, debt levels decrease because growth projects are financed with
equity to avoid the costs associated with underinvestment (Myers, 1977 and Long and
Malitz, 1985). Alternatively, the signaling model o f Ross (1977) predicts that growth
firms with high levels of asymmetric information will increase leverage ratios to
mitigate the informational asymmetries.
Contracting theory predicts that growth firms will have lower collateralized
assets ratios.

The increased volatility of cash flows in growth firms increases the

volatility of tax liabilities and provides the impetus to decrease debt levels (Smith and
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Stulz, 1985 and Smith and Watts, 1992). The secured debt hypothesis (Scott, 1977)
and the tax shield hypothesis (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) predict that capital
intensive industries with high collateralized asset values and debt are positively related.

4.4 DATA. POLICY VARIABLES AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS
In general, previous studies have found that compensation policy is a function
of executive incentive packages, firm size, firm profitability and the firm’s growth
opportunities. Dividend policy is influenced by firm profitability, the firm’s growth
potential and a firm’s investment opportunities.

A firm’s capital structure policy is

determined by a firm’s profitability, growth opportunities and collateralized asset ratio.

4.4.1 Data Sources
Executive compensation data analyzed in the study is drawn from Business
Week’s annual surveys of executive compensation for the years 1984-1991. Although
other surveys of compensation are available (Forbes, The Compensation Board), the
data from Business Week provide the largest and most consistent sample.

All other

variables are from the Compustat Annual Industrial and Over-the Counter Files. These
variables include total inventories, total assets, gross property, plant and equipment,
property, plant and equipment expenditures, total long-term debt, net sales, common
stock dividends, research and development expense, the number o f corporation
employees, operating income before depreciation and common shares reserved for
conversion—stock options. Both compensation data and Compustat variables must be
available for the observation to be included in the sample. The final sample resulting
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from the pooling of cross sectional and time series data consists o f 2149 company year
observations from 423 companies in 51 industries.
The following sections describe the measures o f policy and explanatory variables
used in the study. Empirical methods utilized in the analysis are then presented. A
discussion o f hypotheses and empirical results is found in subsequent sections.

4.4.2 Policy Variables
Executive salary and bonus serve as a proxy for managerial compensation
(COMP).

Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970 show that this measure is an adequate

approximation of total compensation.

However, since this measures excludes

compensation received from incentive plans, a potential error is introduced.

If

incentive payments are a major component o f total salary over the sample period, the
use o f this proxy will decrease the probability o f finding a significant relation between
compensation and other policy variables due to a smaller variation in measured
compensation levels.
Dividend yield (DIVS) is defined as dividends per share divided by the closing
price of the stock for that year. Although alternate measures of dividend policy appear
in some studies (dividends divided by operating income or net income), dividend yield
is commonly used to avoid differences across firms in accounting for earnings.
A firm’s capital structure is proxied by the firm’s leverage ratio (LEV). The
leverage ratio is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets.
capital structure is also used by JS&Z and Mehran (1992).

This proxy for
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4.4.3 Explanatory Variables
Because the explanatory variables incorporated in the analysis are measures of
firm financial variables, the factors are not completely exogenous. The examination
requires two assumptions; that explanatory variables that are not completely exogenous
are predetermined and that each firm strategically selects operational levels to minimize
agency costs and tax liabilities or to achieve other objectives.
The proxy for executive incentive contracts (OPTIONS) is common shares
reserved for conversion (stock options). Incentive contracts are an integral part of the
compensation package determination process (Elton and Rosen, 1983, Lewellen,
Loderer and Martin, 1987 and Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia, 1991). Contracting
theory predicts a significant correlation between executive salaries and incentive plans
(S&W).
The surrogate measure o f firm size is total assets (ASSETS). Production and
organization economies of scale determine firm size.

As firm size increases,

managerial responsibilities increase and hence compensation levels should increase.
Earlier studies show that compensation levels are a function o f firm size (McGuire,
Chiu and Elbing, 1962 and Ciscel, 1974).
The proxy for firm profitability (ROA) is operating income before depreciation
divided by total assets (DeFusco, Zorn and Johnson, 1991 and JS&Z).

Firm

profitability affects compensation levels (Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970, Murphy, 1985
and others), dividend policy (Lintner, 1956, Rozeff, 1982 and Miller and Rock, 1985)
and capital structure (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
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The firm’s growth rate (GROWTH) is defined as the rate o f increase in
corporation employment. An alternate measure, research and development expense as
a percentage of sales, was also used to proxy for growth; results were consistent using
either measure. Executive compensation levels in growth firms and non-growth firms
differ substantially (S&W and Gaver and Gaver, 1993). Dividend policy and capital
structure are also affected by growth potential (Rozeff, 1982 and Myers, 1977).
The proxy for the collateralized value o f assets (COLLAT) is inventories and
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets (Mehran, 1992). Compensation
levels and capital structure are a function o f the collateralized value o f assets (S&W,
Scott, 1977 and Myers and Majluf, 1984).
The level of investment (INVEST) is proxied by the sum o f expenditures for
plant, property and equipment and research and development expense divided by total
assets. Investment opportunities are more numerous in growth firms (S&W). JS&Z
use the same measure as their proxy for investment opportunities.

Investment

opportunities affect dividend policy because the two alternative uses for funds compete
for available cash flows (Myers and Majluf, 1984).

4.4.4 Empirical Methods
All firms are a function o f internal operating choices and external factors
affecting profitability. If operation were constant across firms, this analysis would be
reduced to an examination of compensation, dividend and debt levels in each firm and
identification of the systematic tradeoffs between the policies.

Differences in size,

profitability and other firm specific variables dictate a more detailed analysis.
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S&W show that compensation, dividend policy and financial policy are related
to and are partially driven by a firm’s investment opportunities. Contracting costs best
explain the policies but information costs and taxes also influence the policy choices.
This study builds upon and extends the S&W work in two ways. First, firm level data
rather than industry level data is used here. Second, previous theoretical modeling and
empirical results imply that compensation, dividend and debt policy choices are not only
the product of firm specific characteristics but are interrelated. S&W look at the net
effects of these factors on policy choices but do not analyze the interaction between
policy choices. These interactions motivate the determination o f whether these choice
decisions are made simultaneously.

Theory predicts that the costs ensuing from

informational asymmetries and agency costs resulting from the separation of corporate
management and corporation owners are minimized by the joint optimization of
compensation, dividend and debt policies.
The first step in the examination o f the interrelations between compensation,
dividend and debt policies is a cross-sectional analysis o f the policy variables and the
explanatory variables found by previous work to influence policy choice. Correlation
coefficients are determined for the variables.

No directions of causality can be

determined from the correlation coefficient analysis.
The proper structuring of executive compensation contracts, dividend policy and
capital structure are all theorized to decrease asymmetric information and agency costs
arising from manager and owner separation. These policies are not without costs; the
structuring of compensation packages to ensure proper managerial activities is difficult.
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Dividends will only reduce informational asymmetries if the signal is costly and cannot
be imitated. Increased levels o f leverage reduce the levels o f free cash flows but at the
same time increase bondholder and shareholder conflicts.
The three policy choices can occur independently and still be a function of the
same firm characteristics.

Single equation estimation is incapable of showing any

potential simultaneity but the concurrent choice of policies can be examined using a
system of equations.

The next step in this analysis examines the interaction of

executive compensation, dividend policy and capital structure variables while controlling
for both internal operating choices and external economic factors.
An equation system with one equation for each of the policy decisions is
analyzed using 3SLS estimation. All o f the structural equations are estimated as a set
rather than each equation being estimated individually.

The equations are first

estimated using the two stage least squares technique and these estimates are used to
estimate the structural equations’ errors and contemporaneous variance-covariance
matrix. Generalized least squares estimation is then applied to estimate the large
equation system. 3SLS is a consistent estimator and has the advantage o f being more
efficient than other least squares methods.
The structural equations system to be estimated is:

COMP=CO(DIVS, LEV, OPTIONS, ASSETS, ROA, GROWTH, COLLAT)
DIVS=DI(COMP,LEV,ROA,GROWTH,INVEST)
LEV=LE(COMP,DIVS,ROA,GROWTH,COLLAT)
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Incentive contracts, return on assets, firm growth, assets, the ratio o f collateralized
assets and investment opportunities are the exogenous variables included in the system.
The simultaneous determination of the policy choice variables fails to explain
why changes are made in the policies. A residual analysis is conducted to determine
if direction of causality between executive compensation and dividend policy changes
can be determined.

The two equations are estimated independently using OLS

regression and the residuals are calculated using the estimated coefficients.

The

equations used in the estimation are:

COMP=CO(LEV,OPTIONS,ASSETS,ROA,GROWTH,COLLAT)
DIVS =DI(LEV,ROA,GROWTH,INVEST)

The residuals calculated represent "orthogonalized compensation" and "orthogonalized
dividend yields". Any correlation between the variables is indicative of linkages not
related to the explanatory variables. If executives increase dividends as "hush money"
to conceal their own increases in compensation, the residuals should be positively
correlated.

A negative relation would result from unusually high dividends being

associated with low compensation (altruistic executives) or unusually low dividends
being associated with unusually high compensation (self-interested managers).

This

correlation is consistent with the shareholder and manager conflicts of interest that
agency and contracting theory are based upon.
The equations are estimated two additional times, first with dividend yield
lagged one period and a second time with compensation lagged one period. Analysis
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of these residuals allows examination o f possible sequencing behavior as an indicator
of any direction o f causality.

4.4.4 Diagnostic Tests
To determine if the error variance is affected by any o f the regressors,
the White (1980) specification test is used to check for heteroskedasticity in the errors.
The results show that heteroskedasticity is not a significant problem. Variance inflation
factors are calculated to determine if serious multicollinearity exists between the
independent variables. These statistics show no significant multicollinearity.

4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.5.1 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics of each of the policy variables and explanatory variables are
shown in Table 4.5.

The hypothesis that the mean o f the profitability and growth

variables are each equal to zero is rejected at a 1 percent level o f significance.
Executive compensation averaged almost 1.1 million dollars over the sample period
while the mean dividend yield was 4.98 percent. The leverage ratio (defined as long
term debt divided by assets) of 18 percent is similar to the ratio found by Mehran
(1992).
For the sample period, the mean number o f common shares reserved for option
conversion was in excess of 11,000 shares. Firms averaged an over 14.6 percent return
on assets and the average annual growth rate exceeded 3.6 percent for the sample
period. The mean investment expenditure was 9.2 percent of total assets.
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4.5.2 Variable Correlation Coefficients
Pearson’s correlation coefficients provide an additional descriptive measure of
the primary degree o f linear association.

As shown in Table 4.6, the negative

correlation between executive compensation and dividends and debt is consistent with
the prediction of contracting theory and fails to support the hypothesis that dividends
are used contemporaneously to lessen shareholder anxieties. The positive compensation
and stock option correlation also supports the contracting hypothesis. Compensation
levels are positively correlated with both firm size and profitability.

The growth

variable is positively correlated with compensation and negatively correlated with
dividends and leverage as predicted by contracting theory. The collateralized value of
assets ratio and investment opportunities are also inversely related to compensation.
Dividend and debt levels are positively correlated—consistent with contracting
theory but inconsistent with the alternate financing argument of JS&Z. Firm size and
profitability are also positively correlated with dividend payment levels.

Dividend

levels and the growth and investment opportunity variable are negative as predicted by
contracting theory.
As expected, the sign on the debt and profitability correlation coefficient is
negative as predicted due to an decreased need for external financing by more profitable
firms; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. In addition, growth
opportunities are financed with equity rather than debt resulting in a negative correlation
between debt and growth. Asset levels and debt levels are also positively correlated
supporting the contracting and tax shield hypotheses. Finally, consistent with the
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TABLE 4.5
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF COMPENSATION, FINANCIAL
AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES1

Mean
Std. Dev.
T:Mean=0
Maximum
75% (Q3)
Median
25% (Ql)
Minimum

Mean
Std. Dev.
T:Mean=0
Maximum
75% (Q3)
Median
25% (Ql)
Minimum

COMP

DIVS

LEV2

OPTIONS

ASSETS

1093.053
962.446
52.819**
15424.000
1256.000
934.000
678.000
216.000

4.984
5.545
41.735**
144.928
6.237
3.940
2.295
0.000

18.178
13.528
62.294**
110.666
27.329
16.620
6.498
0.000

11.180
48.563
10.707**
1273.359
6.760
3.313
0.251
0.000

15128.290
25590.820
27.405**
230643.000
14841.000
5861.133
2557.818
210.660

ROA3

GROWTH4

COLLAT5

INVEST6

14.624
8.878
75.794**
71.123
19.773
14.828
10.016
-8.204

3.658
17.718
9.275**
18.369
6.292
1.025
-2.667
-7.381

74.290
41.590
82.806**
191.185
108.140
78.646
50.452
0.000

9.242
6.827
62.749**
53.851
13.200
8.686
4.294
0.000

1
2
3
4
5
6

2149 Observations
LEV = Long-Term Debt/Assets x 100
ROA = Operating Income/Assets x 100
GROWTH = Growth Rate
o f Corporation Employment
COLLAT = (Inventory +
Property,Plant
and Equipment)/Assets x 100
INVEST = (Property, Plant and Equipment Expenditures + Research and
Development)/Assets x 100
* Significant at the 5 % level
** Significant at the 1 % level

secured debt hypothesis, debt levels are positively correlated with the collateral value
of assets.
The variables used in this analysis are patently non-normal.

An alternate

measure of correlation, Kendall’s rank-order correlation coefficients, is a nonparametric test that does not assume that the data is distributed normally.

These
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correlation coefficients are calculated to ensure that the results are not being driven by
the lack o f normality.

The Kendall correlations are consistent with the Pearson

coefficients.

4.5.3 Three Stage Least Squares Estimation
Table 4.7 displays the results o f the 3SLS estimation o f the system o f equations.
The results are largely supportive of contracting theory. In the compensation structural
equation, the estimates of the dividend and capital structure coefficients are negative
and differ significantly from zero. These results are consistent with contracting theory
and signaling theory predictions but do not support the hypothesis that dividends are
used to reduce investor anxieties.

The stock option, firm size and profitability

coefficient estimates are ail positive and significant. The growth coefficient estimate
is positive as predicted and differs significantly from zero.

The collateralized asset

value estimate is negative and significant.
In the second structural equation, the estimate of the compensation coefficient
is negative and significant and the leverage ratio estimate is positive and significant as
predicted by contracting theory. The estimate of the growth coefficient is also negative
and significant, also supporting contracting theory. The investment variable coefficient
is negative and significant.

The profitability variable coefficient does not differ

significantly from zero.
The compensation variable coefficient is negative and significant and the
dividend variable coefficient is positive and significant in the third structural equation.
The estimates o f the coefficients representing firm profitability and growth are both

TABLE 4.6
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG COMPENSATION, FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES
(1984-1991)
VARIABLES

1

1 COMP
2 DIVS
3 LEV
4 OPTIONS
5 ASSETS
6 ROA
7 GROWTH
8 COLLAT
9 INVEST

1.00
-0.069**
-0.100**
0.082**
0.174**
0.065**
0.113**
-0.144**
-0.088**

2

1.00
0.108**
-0.040
0.096**
0.053*
-0.128**
0.115**
-0.069**

* Significant at the 5 % level
** Significant at the 1 % level

3

1.00
-0.028
0.099**
-0.012
-0.051*
0.422**
0.061**

4

1.00
0.089**
0.033
0.028
-0.080**
-0.007

5

1.00
-0.485**
-0.032
-0.394**
-0.346**

6

1.00
0.165**
0.156**
0.206**

7

1.00
0.033
0.556**

8

1.00
0.523**

9

1.00
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negative and significant. These results support the theory that more profitable firms
and firms with more growth opportunities have less debt. The collateralized asset ratio
variable coefficient is positive and significant as expected.
The 3SLS estimates for the compensation, dividends and debt coefficients all
differ significantly from zero. These findings imply that the three policy variables are
jointly and simultaneously determined.

4.5.4 Residual Correlation Analysis
In the previous section, executive compensation, dividend and capital structure
policies are shown to be simultaneously determined.

The finding of a concurrent

determination process fails to explain why changes are made in the policies. The data
are reexamined to determine if directions o f causality can be determined.
Although no serious multicollinearity exists, the correlation coefficients between
the variables are significant. The altered structural equations I and II from the 3SLS
analysis are estimated using compensation and dividend variables orthogonalized to the
explanatory variables o f the equations. This type of analysis biases the examination—no
significant results are expected. This type of analysis also facilitates the determination
o f potential lag relations between the variables.
The orthogonalized executive compensation and dividend yield correlation
coefficient is -0.0575 (p-value = 0.0104).

Compensation and dividend yield are

negatively correlated after controlling for leverage, firm size, growth and other
explanatory variables. This negative relationship is consistent with the results from
3SLS estimation and supports contracting theory. The correlation coefficient
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TABLE 4.7
THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES1 OF FINANCIAL AND
CAPITAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
DIVIDENDS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE2
(1984-1991)

COEFFICIENT

ESTIMATE

STANDARD
ERROR

t-VALUE
(H0:ESTIMATE=0)

P>|t|

Structural Equation I
Dependent Variable = COMP
INTERCEPT
DIVS
LEV
OPTIONS
ASSETS
ROA
GROWTH
COLLAT

891.857
-16.727
-4.659
0.947
0.009
24.068
3.875
-3.027

76.190
3.908
1.854
0.429
0.001
3.123
1.225
0.703

11.706
-4.280
-2.513
2.204
8.139
7.708
3.163
-4.305

0.0001
0.0001
0.0085
0.0276
0.0001
0.0001
0.0016
0.0001

Structural Equation II
Dependent Variable = DIVS
INTERCEPT
COMP
LEV
ROA
GROWTH
INVEST

4.409
-0.001
0.072
0.018
-0.028
-0.091

0.362
0.000
0.009
0.016
0.007
0.021

13.562
-3.982
7.737
1.113
-4.016
-4.256

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.2658
0.0001
0.0001

Structural Equation III
Dependent Variable = LEV
INTERCEPT
COMP
DIVS
ROA
GROWTH
COLLAT

10.737
-0.001
0.283
-0.463
-0.043
0.176

0.758
0.000
0.047
0.033
0.015
0.007

1 System Weight R-Square = 0.177
2 2149 Observations

14.149
-2.900
6.042
-13.782
-2.870
23.885

0.0001
0.0036
0.0001
0.0001
0.0041
0.0001
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o f compensation and lagged dividend yield is -0.0433 (p-value =

0.0835).

Compensation levels are also negatively correlated with the previous period’s dividend
yield. The lagged compensation and dividend correlation is negative but does not differ
significantly from zero.
The negative lagged dividend yield and compensation correlation could be due
to changes in the dividend payout amount or changes in the stock price.

The

correlation coefficients are again estimated after redefining the dividend variable as total
dividends paid by the firm and scaling both compensation and dividends by firm assets.
The executive compensation and dividend correlation is -0.0731 (p-value = 0.0015) and
the compensation and lagged dividend correlation is -0.0552 (p-value = 0.0205). The
lagged compensation and dividend correlation is not significant.

4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results o f this analysis are largely supportive o f the contracting theory and
support the findings of Smith and Watts (1992). The 3SLS estimates o f the policy
choice variables executive compensation, dividend policy and capital structure all differ
significantly from zero and the signs are consistent with theory predictions. Executive
compensation levels are negatively correlated with dividend and debt levels.

These

results are not consistent with the prediction that dividends are used to pacify investors
and decrease anxieties arising from the separation o f management and ownership.
Alternatively, dividends can be used to decrease investor anxieties but executive
compensation levels are not a source of anxiety. Dividend and debt levels are positive
and significant, consistent with contracting and signaling theory predictions but

inconsistent with the tradeoff theory o f JS&Z. The significance o f the policy variables
in all three structural equations infers that compensation, dividend and debt policies are
jointly determined.

CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

"Corporate dividend policy remains a topic on which the field has failed to
arrive at even a local sense of closure" (Marsh and Merton, 1987). Despite ardent
theoretical and empirical analysis, financial economists are unable to explain the
tenacity of the phenomenon. The purpose o f this dissertation has been to examine the
historical evolution of corporate dividend policy, to review the theoretical modeling of
dividend policy by financial economists and the empirical tests o f those theories and to
examine the interaction between executive compensation, dividend policy and capital
structure.
Dividend payments began as total distributions of all funds after each sailing
venture of the joint stock trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
All profits and invested capital were distributed to shareholders on a pro rata basis and
the enterprise was dissolved.

These disbursements were soon limited to profit

distributions when shareholders and managers found it more expedient to maintain the
corporation as a going concern. Stockholders received their share of the net profits of
the voyage based on their original investment, the ships were refitted and resupplied
and dispatched on another expedition. The distributions later evolved into symbolic
liquidations made up of both profits and retained earnings when managers realized that
internal funds provided the least expensive source of capital for expansion of the
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company.

Dividend levels are the result o f a process that considers profit levels,

investment opportunities, past payment history and other financial information.
Several recurring themes appear consistently throughout the historical evolution
o f dividend policy.

The importance o f maintaining a stable or increasing dividend

payment once payments are begun is paramount in the financial policy decisions o f the
corporation.

Managers have used substantial dividends to lessen the shareholder

anxieties arising from the separation o f corporate management and owners. Less than
ethical managers often resorted to fraudulent activities to maintain payment levels. In
addition, the determination o f dividend payments is a major policy choice rather than
a residual decision. Finally, shareholders equate consistent and substantial dividend
payments with firm value. Dividend payments have been the primary input for firm
valuation by investors over the past three centuries.
The Miller and Modigliani (1961) (M&M) irrelevance declaration is the genesis
of the modern era of theoretical modeling efforts. In perfect markets, dividend policy
is irrelevant-corporations lack the incentive to follow a systematic policy. Empirical
attempts are unable to conclusively support or reject the irrelevance theory. The next
body of research models dividend policy adds the market imperfection of taxes to the
equilibrium.

The significance of the effect o f taxes on dividend policy is not

questioned—models are either based on the tax adjustment hypothesis (dividends are
grossed up to offset the tax liabilities of payments) o f tax avoidance hypothesis
(dividend income is sheltered from tax liabilities). The majority o f empirical work
better supports the tax adjustment hypothesis but the literature fails to explain the large
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number of dividend paying corporations or the relative rarity o f non-dividend paying
stocks.
Market imperfections arising from the separation o f the corporation’s managers
and owners and the resulting informational asymmetries are the cornerstone for three
distinct attempts to explain dividend policy.

The need to relay information to

shareholders that is known exclusively by managers is the basis of dividend signaling
models.

The information content o f dividends hypothesis (M&M) posits that

unexpected changes in dividend policy can relay information to shareholders.

A

number o f theoretical models using dividends as signals have been developed. The
informational content o f dividend hypothesis is supported by the majority of empirical
analyses; the only test o f a theoretical signaling model fails to support the model. The
second theoretical model resulting from informational asymmetries is based on the
agency costs arising from the separation of owners and managers (Berle and Means,
1932 and Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The priorities and goals of managers often
diverge from activities that are in the best interests o f shareholders (Kaysen, 1960 and
Gordon, 1961).

Dividends lower these costs by reducing the cash available for

managerial improprieties and increasing the monitoring o f managerial efforts by capital
markets (Easterbrook, 1984). The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), the third
theoretical model, combines the signaling and agency cost models.

Empirical tests

generally support these theories.
The influence o f societal norms (Shiller, 1984) and corporate traditions (Lintner,
1956 and Frankfurter and Lane, 1991) on dividend policy and the use of dividends to
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decrease investor anxieties resulting from the separation o f corporate ownership and
management (Frankfurter and Lane, 1991) are the underpinnings for behavioral
modeling efforts.

Dividend policy is an active decision variable and dividends are

changed only when managers are confident of the permanence o f the higher levels of
earnings. Dividend payment tradition is an important input in the dividend decision
(Lintner, 1956, Baker, Farrelly and Edelman, 1985 and Baker and Farrelly, 1988).
Differences in method of analysis, data type and sample period are commonly
cited reasons for the conflicting results obtained in empirical analyses of theoretical
dividend models. An empirical analysis o f the tests o f dividend theory shows that none
of these factors have any significant explanatory power in the results o f the analysis.
Rather than the conflicting results being attributable to a factor commonly cited as the
element responsible for the discrepancy, the analysis implies that the paradigm is
incomplete in its modeling o f corporate dividend policy.
Research investigating the determinants o f executive compensation, dividend
policy and capital structure policy decisions have primarily relied on single equation
models to determine the significance of individual firm characteristics on these policy
choices. This analysis uses a system of equations and finds that compensation, dividend
and debt policy decision are made concurrently. The associations between the policy
variables and the variables representing firm specific characteristics are for the most
part consistent with contracting theory and signaling theory predictions.
The payment of dividends to shareholders has been a corporate tradition for over
three centuries; dividend payment policy remains a significant financial policy decision.
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Despite the importance of this tradition, financial economists have largely neglected this
influence in the development o f the theoretical dividend policy paradigm. Although
difficult to model, the incorporation of this corporate tradition into theoretical modeling
efforts could open new avenues for the unraveling of the dividend puzzle.
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APPENDIX A
METHOD OF ANALYSIS ABBREVIATIONS

A. Abnormal Return Methods o f Analysis
AARA
ES

Average Adjusted Returns Analysis
Event Study Method of Analysis (Fama and Babiak,
1968, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, 1969,
Fama, 1976, Aharony and Swary, 1980,
Brown and Warner, 1980, Masulis, 1980
and Brown and Warner, 1985)

B. Price Change Methods o f Analysis
ClassA/ClassB Ratio
EG
Modified EG
Option Price Changes
PriceA/PriceB Ratio

Price ratio between two classes o f common stock
Elton and Gruber (1970) Method
Modified Elton and Gruber (1970) Method
Changes in Option Prices
Price ratio between two issues

C. Regression Analysis Methods of Analysis
ALS
IV
LOGIT
MRA
OLS
RCRA
RRA
SUR
TSRA
2SLS
3SLS
TOBIT
XSRA

Augmented Least Squares
Instrumental Variables
Logit Analysis
Multiple Regression Analysis
Ordinary Least Squares Analysis
Random Coefficient Regression Analysis (Swamy,
1970, 1971 and 1974)
Recursive Regression Analysis
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (Zellner, 1962)
Time Series Regression Analysis
Two Stage Least Square Analysis
Three Stage Least Squares Analysis
Tobit Analysis
Cross Sectional Regression Analysis
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APPENDIX A (continued)
METHOD OF ANALYSIS ABBREVIATIONS

D. Other Methods o f analysis
ANOVA RBD
BJM
Corr Coeff
CSA
DA
GC Test
Means Test
NP Tests
VAR

Analysis o f Variance Randomized Block Design
Box Jenkins Method
Correlation Coefficient Method
Cross Spectral Analysis
Aggregate Data Analysis
Granger Causality Test (Granger, 1969)
Means Test
Non-Parametric Tests (Wilcoxin Signed Rank Test,
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients)
Vector Auto-Regression (Sims, 1980)

APPENDIX B
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS METHOD OF ANALYSIS

CDAM is a multivariate method of analysis that was originally developed around
the turn of the century (Fienberg, 1978). The technique utilizes a multidimensional
contingency table to cross classify data into categories. Each category count represents
the frequency of a unique combination of categorical variables in the sample.

The

population variable-level combination probability is estimated using iterative WLS using
the observed frequency (Fingleton, 1984). Iterative WLS improves WLS estimates by
first estimating the weights, fitting the regression function and calculating the residuals
using WLS. The residuals from the first estimation are then used to re-estimate the
weights and the regression is refitted.

The process continues until no significant

changes occur in the weights.
The explanatory variables used in the analysis are assumed to represent true
categorical variables and not a blend of variables and not combinations of explanatory
variables.

Each o f the variables used in the analysis are independent categorical

variables.

In addition, explanatory variables are assumed to be fixed and play a

defining role in the study and can be continuous or discrete. The method also assumes
that explanatory variables are mutually independent—the knowledge o f one o f the
independent categorical variables does not ensure correct prediction of another
explanatory variable.

CDAM further assumes that the table frequencies follow a
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product multinomial distribution (Fingleton, 1984).

The product multinomial

distribution requires that each observation in the sample be classified based on its
unique combination of explanatory variables.
CDAM and ANOVA are similar methods o f analysis.
ANOVA estimate the interaction between variables.

Both CDAM and

The methods differ in that

ANOVA models estimate the effects o f the independent variables on the dependent
variable and partition the overall variability of the model. In contrast, CDAM estimates
the structural relation between the variables by estimating the parameters and testing
hypotheses about linear combinations o f these parameters.
formulated so as to test the fit o f the model.

The null hypothesis is

The test statistics calculated are

generalized Wald (1943) statistics that approximate an asymptotic x2 distribution.
The multidimensional contingency table displays cross classified counts based
on each of several sets of categories and facilitates CDAM (Fienberg, 1980). The table
rows represent samples determined by unique combinations o f independent variables
while the table columns are determined by dependent variable response. The count in
the (ij)th cell is the quantity of individuals in the ith population that have the y'th
response.

The sample proportion, p(y = n^/ny estimates the probability of the jth

response (tt^). The proportion vector p is converted into a function vector F = F(p).
If the true probabilities for the entire table is represented by the vector tt, the functions
of the probabilities F(7r) follow the linear model

Ea(F> = F(tt) = XjS
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where EA indicates the asymptotic expectation, X is the fixed constant design matrix
and /3 is the parameter vector that is estimated.
The WLS estimation method is utilized to estimate the structural relation
between the variables. The weights are determined from the inverse covariance matrix
of the F(p) functions o f F and b (/3 estimate) and the weighted residual sum of squares
is minimized. If S is defined as the estimated covariance matrix of F, the fit of the
model is determined using the test statistic
F'S_1F - b 'C X 'S '^ b
which is asymptotically distributed x2- The goodness o f fit o f the model is tested with
the null hypothesis
H0 = C/3 = 0
where C is a matrix o f arbitrary constants. The test statistic for this hypothesis
b'C , [C(X'S"1X)'1C']"1Cb
follows an asymptotically x 2 distribution if H0 is true.

Although the maximum

likelihood estimation method o f CDAM has a smaller variance, WLS regression CDAM
is less complex and the difference in variance is not significant (Grizzle, Starmer and
Koch, 1969).

APPENDIX C

CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS METHOD OF ANALYSIS RESULTS

The following tables show the results o f CDAM analysis o f the empirical
analyses o f corporate dividend policy. In Table C l, methods o f analysis are partitioned
into four groups; abnormal return, price change, regression analysis and other methods.
Table C2 shows the results from dividing data type into studies using annual, quarterly,
monthly and daily data. The results from the analysis o f the study’s midpoint as the
only explanatory variable are shown in Table C3 while Table C4 shows the results from
analysis with the publication outlet as the only variable.

None o f the variables are

significant in the analyses.

TABLE Cl
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES
OBTAINED FROM CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE: METHOD OF ANALYSIS

VARIABLE

Intercept
Price Change
Regression Analysis
Other

ESTIMATE

STANDARD
ERROR

0.2036
-0.0640
0.0964
0.0536

0.0372
0.0527
0.0814
0.0524

CHI
SQUARE2

29.97
1.48
1.40
1.04

1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N = 155 in this analysis.
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PROBABILITY
(P = VALUE)

0.0001
0.2244
0.2365
0.3068
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TABLE C2
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES
OBTAINED FROM CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE: DATA TYPE

VARIABLE

ESTIMATE

0.2160
0.0567
-0.0285
0.0449

Intercept
Quarterly
Monthly
Daily

STANDARD
ERROR

0.0396
0.0676
0.0502
0.0759

CHI
SQUARE2

29.80
0.70
0.32
0.35

PROBABILITY
(P=VALUE)

0.0001
0.4013
0.5702
0.5542

1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N = 155 in this analysis.

TABLE C3
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES
OBTAINED FROM CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE: STUDY MIDPOINT

VARIABLE

Intercept
Late3

ESTIMATE

0.2169
0.0440

STANDARD
ERROR

0.0330
0.0330

CHI
SQUARE2

41.26
1.70

1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N = 155 in this analysis.
3 Late studies are those with sample period midpoints of 1975 and later.

PROBABILITY
(P=VALUE)

0.0001
0.1923
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TABLE C4
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES
OBTAINED FROM CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE: PUBLICATION OUTLET

VARIABLE

Intercept
Other3

ESTIMATE

0.2400
0.0032

STANDARD
ERROR

0.0340
0.0340

CHI
SQUARE2

47.37
0.01

PROBABILITY
(P=VALUE)

0.0001
0.9269

1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N = 155 in this analysis.
3 Other publications are all studies not appearing in The Journal o f Finance, Journal o f
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal o f Financial E conom ics an d The Review
o f Financial Studies.
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